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Abstract 
 
 
The ‘conditionalist’ approach to the economic statecraft literature in International 
Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis seeks to establish the conditions under which 
economic instruments of foreign policy are likely to be effective. This thesis applies 
these conditions to a specific set of economic instruments of foreign policy, namely 
energy resources, the use of which is here referred to as ‘energy statecraft’. The 
conditions for successful implementation of energy resources as an instrument of 
foreign policy set forth in this study serve as a theoretical framework to test a specific 
case study of energy statecraft: Brazilian biofuels. The choice of Brazil as the only case 
study in this thesis is justified by its uniqueness in energy statecraft on two different 
levels: empirical and theoretical. Empirically, among the relatively few energy-exporting 
countries that use their energy resources as instruments of their foreign policy, Brazil is 
the only one that uses biofuels for that purpose, whereas other countries that 
implement energy statecraft mostly do so with petroleum and/or natural gas. 
Theoretically, Brazil’s promotion of biofuels to third countries is also unique because it 
is pursued through soft power – attraction by encouraging emulation of its own 
successful experience with biofuels – rather than through hard power: bribes or 
coercion. The case study is also analysed in the context of a decade characterised by 
energy security concerns, including worries over increasingly scarce traditional energy 
resources, skyrocketing oil prices, unreliability of conventional energy supplies, and 
environmental threats. All of these factors have boosted the advancement of biofuels 
worldwide. Finally, the means through which Brazil pursues its goal of turning ethanol 
into a global commodity is tested against the conditional criteria set out in the 
theoretical framework. The thesis concludes that this particular foreign policy strategy 
has been fruitless, with little progress made towards achieving its goal of 
‘commoditizing’ ethanol in the short term, though its long-term prospects seem 
promising. Theoretically, the strategy’s ineffectiveness is attributed to the international 
context in which it took place, rather than any inherent characteristic of energy 
resources as an instrument of foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Fairly early in his seminal work on the subject of Economic Statecraft, David Baldwin 
cites Harold Lasswell: ‘Concepts for the study of influence must be changed or 
invented when influence is sought by novel means or under changed conditions.’1 
Baldwin’s study was an attempt to theorise, in a comprehensive manner, the 
increasing use of economic instruments of foreign policy, or what he calls ‘economic 
statecraft’, and the proliferation of academic studies on the subject in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The subject of economic instruments of foreign policy became 
popular not only because of the growing use of economic sanctions, especially when 
compared to the relatively diminishing use of force (among other reasons, due to its 
increasing costs) as an instrument of foreign policy, but also as a reaction to the 
employment of the so-called ‘oil weapon’ by the Arab members of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in protest to the Yom Kippur War in 1973, 
which was a favourite case study in the analysis of economic statecraft. The newfound 
power of the oil-exporting cartel thus became the subject of much interest among 
scholars, who at the time tended to analyse the ‘oil weapon’ as an economic foreign 
policy instrument in general, rather than seeing energy resources as unique and 
intrinsically different from most other economic goods. In 1986, the year after the 
publication of Baldwin’s book, however, the price of oil collapsed, and interest in the 
role of energy in International Relations faded quickly, although the theoretical 
lessons set forth in Economic Statecraft, along with Albert Hirschman’s National 
Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, continue to make up the foundation of 
most subsequent studies on economic instruments of foreign policy. To quote Andreas 
Goldthau: ‘A decade-long period of oversupply on oil and gas markets and resulting 
low prices calmed public debate on these issues. It is only since the turn of the new 
millennium, when supply-demand balances both in global oil markets and in regional 
gas markets tightened again, that energy…has come to receive renewed attention.’2 
                                                
1 Lasswell, H., Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, pp. 7-8, cited in Baldwin, D.A., Economic 
Statecraft, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 29. 
2 Goldthau, A., ‘Energy Diplomacy in Trade and Investment of Oil and Gas’, in Goldthau, A. & Witte, 
J.M. (eds.), Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010), p. 27. 
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 The early twenty-first century witnessed the rise of an international energy 
context plagued by oil prices rising steadily to historic heights, coupled with fears 
over the future availability of oil and increasing concerns over environmental 
degradation, much of it a result of humanity’s wanton burning of fossil fuels. Under a 
tight international oil market, in which producers could not keep up with rising 
demand from emerging economies, a number of oil and gas exporting countries took 
advantage of importing countries’ scramble for energy resources and used their 
energy exports politically to manipulate importing states. This sort of behaviour, 
which the present study terms ‘energy statecraft’ – be it in the form of the coercive 
stick, like Russia’s natural gas ‘pipeline wars’ with Ukraine, or the bribing carrot, like 
Venezuela’s subsidised oil sales to neighbouring countries during Hugo Chávez’s 
regime – rekindled the energy debate in International Relations among scholars, the 
media and policy makers alike. Unlike the energy crises of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
however, the twenty-first century saw the appearance of renewable energy sources as 
viable alternatives to fossil fuels, also as forms of energy statecraft. While most 
attention has been given to ‘traditional’ energy resources such as oil and natural gas, 
few (if any) studies concerned themselves exclusively with energy statecraft using 
renewable energy. The problem with the relative scarcity of studies on renewable 
energy in International Relations is not limited to insufficient research on the matter, 
but also the fact that discussions of alternative energy resources have often been 
biased: ‘their proponents tend to be over the top in their enthusiasm and their 
detractors tend to be exaggeratedly negative.’3 Indeed, Jürgen Maier states that there 
is ‘probably no other energy issue currently being discussed with so much emotion 
and so little facts as bioenergy.’4 The present work seeks to remedy this oversight by 
assessing the use of biofuels as a form of energy statecraft. 
 The term biofuels refers to liquid transportation fuels produced from biological 
feedstocks like agricultural commodities or other organic materials.5 Among different 
kinds of biofuels, ethanol is by far the world’s most widely used biofuel for transport, 
                                                
3 Howell, D. & Nakhle, C., Out of the Energy Labyrinth, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 112. 
4 Maier, J., ‘Bioenergy: Neither Golden Solution nor Prescription for Disaster’, in Dodds, F., Higham, 
A. & Sherman, R. (eds), Climate Change and Energy Insecurity: The Challenge for Peace, Security 
and Development, (London: Earthscan Publications, 2009), p. 35. 
5 Seelke, C.R. & Yacobucci, B.D., ‘Ethanol and Other Biofuels: Potential for U.S.-Brazil Energy 
Cooperation’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 27 September 2007, p. 2. And 
Zarrilli, S., ‘Development of the Emerging Biofuels Market’, in Andreas Goldthau & Jan Martin Witte 
(eds.), Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institute Press, 2010), p.74. 
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accounting for 94 per cent global biofuel production. Ethanol fuel is an alcohol that is 
mostly produced through a process of fermentation and distillation of starch- or sugar-
based crops like corn, beats or sugarcane, the latter of which is the most efficient 
feedstock and is used to produce roughly 60 per cent of the world’s ethanol.6 Seelke 
and Yacobucci remind us that ethanol can also be produced from lignocellulose-based 
feedstocks, like switchgrass and wood chips, although the technology to generate 
lignocellulosic ethanol is in its embryonic stage and is still too expensive to produce 
on a commercial scale without subsidies. The remaining 6 per cent of biofuels include 
biodiesel made from vegetable oils, like palm oil and soybeans, or animal fats, as well 
as butanol made from various biological feedstocks.7 Since ethanol makes up the vast 
majority of biofuels produced globally, this study will focus predominantly on ethanol 
as an instrument of energy statecraft. 
 Among the world’s ethanol producers, Brazil holds a leading position not only 
as one of the two main producers – along with the United States, which together are 
responsible for nearly 90 per cent of the world’s ethanol made for fuel consumption – 
and as the most important exporter thereof, but unlike other countries Brazil also has 
almost forty years’ experience producing ethanol for domestic consumption – a 
success story that Brazil can share with other countries. Coupled with immense 
discoveries of oil and natural gas in recent years, Brazil’s well-established ethanol 
industry has positioned the country to be one of the twenty-first century’s foremost 
global energy players.8 Larry Rother states that Brazil has ‘the abundance of sources 
of energy, which seem, as the twenty-first century advances, more likely than ever to 
become one of the main determinants of a nation’s power, influence, and prestige on 
the world stage. Perhaps that is why the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 
2009 adopted the slogan “Brazil, Fifth World Power,” implying that Brazil’s 
extraordinary energy foundation is capable of projecting the country into the same 
category as the United States, the European Union, China, and India.’9 According to 
one observer, ‘Brazil really does have a concrete chance of participating in and even 
leading an important revolution in the world economy’ by sharing its knowledge and 
experience with biofuels with other countries. Indeed, ‘the world wants what Brazil 
                                                
6 Maier, Op cit., p. 38. 
7 Seelke & Yacobbuci, Op cit., p. 2. 
8 Roett, R., The New Brazil, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), p. 120. 
9 Rother, L., Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), p. 171. 
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has to offer’ where biofuels are concerned: ‘the country has technology that, if 
replicated in other countries, has the capacity to significantly reduce the emission of 
the greenhouse gases’10 (GHGs) as well as costly petroleum imports, while also 
creating jobs and promoting rural development. To that end, Brazil’s National 
Development Bank (BNDES) published a comprehensive study advocating the 
benefits of sugarcane-based ethanol, to be distributed to countries interested in 
developing their own biofuel programmes (with implied Brazilian assistance): 
 
Modern society is facing the worsening of environmental degradation while, at 
the same time, realizing that its reserves of natural resources, be they energy, 
water or metals are limited. In this context, energy plays a central role, 
compelling us to urgently rethink the foundations of an energy-supply model 
that is showing signs of depletion and seeks new resources which will allow 
continued socioeconomic development. … Within this context, bioenergy has 
proven to be one of the best alternatives to capture and store solar energy, 
wherever idle land and favorable climate (sunlight, water and temperature) are 
matched by sufficient knowledge and an entrepreneurial spirit to apply it.11 
 
By showcasing its successful experience with ethanol, Brazil encourages third 
countries to adopt biofuel programmes by emulating its own experience. This ‘soft 
power’ strategy – getting others to want what you want through imitation, rather than 
getting others to do what you want through bribes or coercion12 – has been employed 
by the Brazilian government in the pursuit of its goal to spread the production, use 
and international trade of biofuels, with the aim of creating a global market in which 
ethanol is freely traded as a commodity and Brazil has a natural competitive 
advantage. However, the world has yet to develop a formal commodity market for 
major biofuel transactions with globally-recognised prices, similar to the long-
established international oil market. For this to happen, not only do more biofuels 
need to be produced (and, obviously, consumed), but a much larger number of 
countries need to grow their own biofuels, in order to avoid the reliance on few 
(potentially unreliable) suppliers that currently plagues the international oil market – a 
condition without which only a few countries are willing consume biofuels that are 
not indigenously grown. It is against this backdrop that the Brazilian government 
                                                
10 Nucci, J.P., ‘Fuel to Change the World’, PIB, Year 1, Number 2, Dec 07/Jan 08, pp. 32-33. 
11 Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social & Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos 
(eds.), Sugarcane-Based Ethanol: Energy for Sustainable Development, (Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, 
2008), p. 259. 
12 Nye, J.S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: NY: Public Affairs, 
2004). 
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formulated its foreign policy goal to ‘commoditise’ ethanol and increase its exports 
thereof – a goal that Brazil pursues through energy statecraft by promoting the use of 
biofuels to third countries as an instrument of its foreign policy. 
The present study seeks to analyse and evaluate the relative efficacy and 
potential for success of using biofuels as an instrument of foreign policy – or, as this 
study terms it, ‘energy statecraft’ – with Brazil currently being the only major case 
study on the matter. To inform this analysis, this study draws on the economic 
statecraft literature to set up a theoretical framework in which to test its main 
hypothesis against the only case study available. Within the relatively limited 
literature on economic statecraft – for, as Baldwin draws attention to, the ‘two most 
salient characteristics of the literature on economic statecraft are scarcity and the 
nearly universal tendency to denigrate the utility of such tools of foreign policy’13 – 
positive economic statecraft (the proverbial ‘carrot’) is significantly under-researched 
compared to negative forms of economic statecraft (or ‘sticks’).14 ‘It is not that 
political scientists have said wrong things about the role of positive [economic] 
sanctions in power relations’, writes Baldwin; ‘it is just that they have said little.’15 
The present study therefore seeks to make a contribution not only to the relatively 
scarce literature on positive economic statecraft, but also to the recently emerging 
literature on energy statecraft in general, as well as to the literature on energy 
statecraft using biofuels in particular – which was completely unheard of when the 
research for this study began. 
Three main schools of thought were identified in the economic statecraft 
literature: realism, liberalism and the conditionalist approach, the last of which 
includes a domestic and an international subdivision within that approach. This study 
takes a conditionalist approach to economic and energy statecraft – focusing primarily 
on international conditions, while also acknowledging domestic ones – which strives 
not for definite answers to whether such instruments of foreign policy work or not, 
but asks under what conditions economic and energy statecraft work best. Four such 
conditional variables have been identified in the conditionalist literature on economic 
statecraft: 1) whether the instruments employed are commensurable with the 
                                                
13 Baldwin, Op cit., p. 51. 
14 Mastanduno, M., ‘Economic Statecraft’, in Smith, S., Hadfield, A. & Dunne, T. (eds.), Foreign 
Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 182. 
15 Baldwin, D.A., ‘The Power of Positive Sanctions’, World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 1971), p. 
19, cited in Mastanduno, M., ‘Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security’, Security 
Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1999, p. 301. 
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objective(s) pursued; 2) the magnitude and dependence on an economic interaction; 3) 
the elasticity of demand for a good; and 4) the degree of government control over 
economic actors. While generally applicable to all forms of economic statecraft, these 
factors have been adjusted to fit the specificities of energy resources vis-à-vis most 
other economic goods, for the purposes of this study. In theory, if all of these four 
conditional variables are favourable, energy statecraft is more likely to work. This 
theoretical proposition forms the main hypothesis in this study, which seeks to answer 
the question of whether Brazil’s energy statecraft using biofuels has been successful. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
In addition to this introduction and the conclusion, this thesis is divided into four main 
chapters. The next chapter provides the theoretical framework for the rest of this 
study. It begins by defining the term statecraft, which essentially refers to the foreign 
policy ‘instruments used by policy makers in their attempts to exercise power, i.e., to 
get others to do what they would otherwise not do.’16 Next follows a discussion of 
Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power, which, unlike ‘traditional’ accounts of power, 
such as the one defined in the term of statecraft, also considers the possibility that an 
actor can get others to want what the same things it wants, rather than coercing them 
to do what they would otherwise not do. This distinction is important because Brazil’s 
entire energy statecraft strategy is based (and depends) on soft power. The remainder 
of Chapter 2 is dedicated to explaining economic statecraft. The section starts with a 
definition of the term – ‘all of the economic means by which foreign policy actors 
might try to influence other international actors’17 – before reviewing the literature on 
economic statecraft, identifying the three schools of thought mentioned above: 
realism, liberalism and conditionalist approaches (international and domestic). What 
follows is a description of the different types of economic statecraft, both negative 
and positive, ranging from short- to long-term economic statecraft. Lastly, the chapter 
examines the four conditional variables identified in the literature, which determine 
whether economic statecraft is likely to be effective. First among these are the scope, 
domain and cost of economic statecraft; in other words, measuring economic foreign 
policy instruments in terms of the underlying strategic objectives they are meant to 
                                                
16 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p. 9. 
17 Hanson, P., Western Economic Statecraft in East-West Relations: Embargoes, Sanctions, Linkage, 
Economic Warfare, and Detente, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988), p. 6. 
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achieve. Second is the magnitude of, and dependence on, the economic interaction in 
question. Third is the ‘strategic’ quality of a good, defined in terms of its price 
elasticity. And lastly, the degree to which a government has control over the 
economic actors that implement its economic statecraft in practice is analysed through 
the perspective of principal-agent theory. These four conditional factors are of crucial 
importance to this study, as they form the framework through which the main 
hypothesis is tested throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 3 constitutes the core of this study, providing a thorough and 
comprehensive examination of the diverse roles played by energy resources in foreign 
policy and international relations, with a focus on energy statecraft. The chapter is 
divided into four sections, with the first clarifying and defining three different but 
interrelated energy concepts that often cause confusion in the emerging literature on 
the study of energy in International Relations: energy security, energy diplomacy and 
energy statecraft. In its most fundamental sense, energy security means having the 
‘assurance of the ability to access the energy resources required for the continued 
development of national power’, sustained economic performance and growth.18 More 
specifically, energy security involves four basic elements, all of which need to be 
addressed to ensure the energy security of a state: the availability of energy goods and 
services; reliability in terms of being protected from interruption of energy supplies; 
the economic affordability of energy goods and services for consumers, safeguarded 
against price volatility; and the environmental sustainability of energy resources, 
given the world’s increasing concerns over GHG emissions from burning fossil fuels. 
The role of energy security in foreign policy is then divided into the two remaining 
concepts – energy diplomacy and energy statecraft – with the former representing 
energy as a goal and the latter denoting an instrument of foreign policy. Thus, energy 
diplomacy refers to the use of political instruments of a state’s foreign policy aiming 
to ensure that state’s energy security. Conversely, energy statecraft means the use of a 
state’s native energy resources as an instrument of its foreign policy to attain the 
political objectives of that state – or, more specifically, the manipulation of a target 
state’s energy security in order to get it to do what it would otherwise not do – which 
is the main subject of this study.  
                                                
18 Kalicki, J.H. & Goldwyn, D.L., ‘Introduction: The Need to Integrate Energy and Foreign Policy’, in 
Kalicki, J.H. & Goldwyn, D.L. (eds.), Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press / Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), p. 9. 
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The following section briefly repeats the different types of economic statecraft 
in general – namely, negative, positive, short- and long-term – and applies them to the 
specific case of energy resources, with examples for each. The section also examines 
how different kinds of energy resources (e.g., oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear and 
renewable energy) vary in their application as instruments of energy statecraft. The 
third and most important section in Chapter 3 lists the four conditional variables on 
which successful economic statecraft depends (analysed in Chapter 2) and adjusts 
them to the specific nature of energy resources, as opposed to most other economic 
goods. The first of these sub-sections repeats the proposition that a state’s foreign 
policy goals must be commensurate with the energy instrument employed, illustrating 
it with the case of OPEC’s use of the ‘oil weapon’ following the Yom Kippur War in 
1973. Where energy resources are concerned, the magnitude of the economic 
interaction translates into the market power (including the control of energy transport 
routes) of the state employing energy statecraft and the degree to which target states 
are vulnerable to their dependence on energy imports from the former. Since energy 
resources are, by almost any definition, ‘strategic goods’, the third conditional 
variable focuses on how the low price elasticity for most energy resources are 
reflected in price volatility under tight international oil market conditions, which 
largely favours the energy statecraft of exporters. Interestingly, unlike most other 
economic goods, energy resources are particularly prone to government control under 
the auspices of national oil companies, given the tendency towards ‘resource 
nationalism’ in energy-rich states. This last conditional variable indicates that energy 
resources are, in theory, more effective instruments of economic statecraft than most 
other economic goods.  
Finally, the last section in Chapter 3 avoids merely ‘showcasing’ the efficacy 
of energy statecraft by discussing the several limits and countermeasures to it. First 
among these are the so-called ‘resource curse’ and the export dependence often 
generated in energy-rich states, which can cripple all other sectors of the economy of 
an energy-exporting state, failing to translate their short-term wealth from energy 
sales into long-term economic growth and sustainable development due to poor 
governance and fiscal mismanagement. Though a potential source of control and 
increased effectiveness of energy statecraft, the same ‘resource nationalism’ 
mentioned in the fourth conditional factor for effective energy statecraft mentioned 
above can also be a limitation: while the nationalization of energy resources and the 
15 
 
removal of foreign or private energy companies may accrue more power and revenue 
to energy-rich states in the short term, the long-term ramifications tend to be 
detrimental. The same is true for the creation of energy cartels like OPEC, whose 
strength depends on internal cohesion, without which their energy statecraft loses its 
force. There are also limitations imposed by the demand-side, as energy importers can 
collectively use their monopsony power to form the equivalent of an ‘importer’s 
cartel’, like the International Energy Agency (IEA) linked to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which established that member 
states should create strategic petroleum reserves to be drawn upon in times of 
sustained shortfalls or interruptions in energy supply. Importing countries can also 
counteract exporters’ energy statecraft by reducing their dependence on imports from 
the latter through diversification and conservation of their energy use. 
Chapter 4 explores the new international energy security context that has risen 
in the early twenty-first century. Since the utility of any given instrument of foreign 
policy is, according to Baldwin, ‘a function of the situation and not a quality intrinsic 
to the particular technique’,19 it is crucial to recognise the context in which energy 
statecraft takes place. The conditionalist approach adopted in this study also calls for 
an understanding of the international conditions that have allowed energy statecraft to 
thrive in the past decade. As explained in Chapter 3, energy security involves four 
basic elements: availability, reliability, affordability and sustainability. The risks that 
fossil fuels in general, and oil in particular, pose to all four of these elements have 
created a context in which traditional energy resources have gained value as an 
instrument of state power in international relations. On the other hand, because this 
situation has also allowed renewable energy to compete with fossil fuels in general – 
and biofuels to compete with petroleum in particular – the international energy 
security context has also paved the way for the possibility of using biofuels as a tool 
of energy statecraft – the subject of this study. Chapter 4 therefore assesses the 
concerns that oil raises to each of these elements – availability, reliability, 
affordability and sustainability – in the current international energy security context, 
with secondary consideration paid to other energy sources. The section on availability 
raises the issue of resource scarcity and the finite nature of fossil fuels, tackles the 
‘Peak Oil’ debate, and concludes that while there is still much oil underground in 
                                                
19 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p. 123. 
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physical terms, economic and geopolitical factors may prevent its exploration and 
production. The next section, on reliability, focuses on the fact that only a limited 
number of countries produce the whole world’s oil supply, most of which are OPEC 
members with their own political interests, which are not necessarily convergent with 
those of importing states wishing for uninterrupted energy supplies that are both 
abundant and affordable. On the related subject of affordability of energy resources, 
the third section examines the diverse factors that led to steadily rising oil prices to a 
historic peak of $147 per barrel in July 2008, such as the long-term imbalance 
between supply and demand for oil, and the negative impact that has had on 
investments in the oil sector. Lastly, the section on sustainability raises the relatively 
recent concern over the effect that human energy use is having on the environment, 
particularly in terms of climate change caused by GHG emissions, which gives an 
additional incentive for countries to shift their energy use away from dirty fossil fuels 
towards renewable sources. All of these factors put together, the chapter concludes, 
have created an international energy security context which, on the one hand, has 
allowed energy statecraft to flourish, while on the other hand also serves as an 
incentive to adopt more renewable energy resources like biofuels, thus increasing the 
likelihood that energy statecraft using biofuels may succeed. 
Chapter 5 serves as a case study to test the four conditional variables 
elaborated in previous chapters. As mentioned above, Brazil is chosen as the only 
case study for the simple reason that it is the only country that has employed biofuels 
as an instrument of energy statecraft so far. The chapter begins with a historical 
overview of Brazil’s National Alcohol Program (ProÁlcool), a series of public 
policies aimed at reducing the country’s dependence on costly oil imports as a 
response to the international oil price spikes of the 1970s. Though at first being 
strictly a domestic policy, Brazil’s almost forty year-long success story with ethanol 
fuel gained a foreign policy component during the administration of President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to testing this study’s main 
hypothesis with the four conditional variables that determine whether Brazil’s energy 
statecraft through the use of biofuels has been successful, in order to answer this 
thesis’ research question. The first of these sections describes the formulation of 
Brazil’s twofold declaratory goal of creating an international market where ethanol is 
traded freely as a commodity by promoting the increased production and use of 
biofuels to as many countries as possible, and expanding Brazilian ethanol exports 
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within such a market, as well as illustrating the diverse strategies pursued by the 
Brazilian government to achieve those objectives. Next, the chapter compares Brazil’s 
comfortable but fragile position as the world’s leading exporter and second-largest 
producer of ethanol to other major biofuel producers like the US and the European 
Union, warning that Brazil will need to invest significantly in the expansion of its 
biofuel sector if it is to maintain this leading position. The third conditional variable is 
interesting in the sense that ethanol fuel has a very high price elasticity, which would 
indicate, in theory, that biofuels make a poor instrument of energy statecraft. While 
the demand is inelastic for compulsory biofuel blends into traditional fuels mandated 
by governments, however, the section clarifies that it is precisely ethanol’s elasticity 
that makes it a strong candidate for energy statecraft, in the sense that it can 
complement or substitute gasoline, thereby increasing the latter’s elasticity and 
diminishing countries’ dependence on petroleum imports, thus partially counteracting 
the potential for energy statecraft using oil and enhancing the energy security of 
biofuel-consuming states. The last conditional variable indicates that, unlike its oil 
and gas sector, which is firmly within the government’s control through Brazil’s 
national oil company, Petrobras, the country’s ethanol industry is entirely private. 
Nevertheless, the interests of the Brazilian government and the ethanol industry are 
convergent, which has led to good cooperation and coordination between the 
government and the private companies that implement Brazil’s energy statecraft in 
practice. In sum, the four conditional variables tested in this case study are generally 
favourable, revealing that Brazil’s energy statecraft through the promotion of biofuels 
abroad has the potential to be successful. 
The conclusion starts with a brief summary of the research’s findings, 
followed by suggested questions for further investigation. It then raises a rigorous 
critique of the strategies carried out under Brazil’s energy statecraft. While the 
Brazilian government has invested substantial efforts in promoting the increased 
production of biofuels around the world – in order to commoditise ethanol, the main 
goal of Brazil’s energy statecraft – the fact is that most of the increase in global 
biofuel production over the past decade has for the most part been driven domestically 
in producing states through their own national policies stimulating biofuel production. 
Moreover, the other major foreign policy goal pursued under Brazil’s energy 
statecraft – to open markets for the country’s ethanol exports – has not been achieved, 
as the world’s main demand centres (the United States and Europe) still protect their 
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markets from Brazilian imports through tariff and non-tariff barriers. Brazil’s soft 
power strategy of encouraging other countries to emulate its example is also 
questioned: the specific conditions that made Brazil’s successful domestic experience 
with ethanol possible may not be easily replicated in other countries, suggesting that 
Brazil’s case could be unique in the world and the lessons it has to teach are the 
exception rather than the rule. In particular, the tactic to transfer Brazilian technology 
to developing countries with ideal climactic conditions for biofuel cultivation – 
especially in Africa, which hosts an important share of the target states of Brazil’s 
energy statecraft – faces the obstacle of inadequate human infrastructure and 
governance needed to absorb this technical knowhow. Additionally, Brazil’s recent 
discovery of mammoth offshore oil and gas reserves has dampened the country’s 
enthusiasm for biofuels, somewhat changing its energy policy priority towards being a 
major oil exporter rather than flaunting its international credentials as a ‘green energy 
power’ – a shift that has been more pronounced since Lula’s successor, President 
Dilma Rousseff, took office in 2011. This thesis concludes that Brazil’s energy 
statecraft was potentially effective only as long as the international context made it 
possible, citing David Baldwin in suggesting that the probability of success of an 
energy statecraft initiative – be it through the use of oil, natural gas or biofuels – is ‘a 
function of the situation and not a quality intrinsic to the particular technique’20 of 
foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 Baldwin, Op cit., p. 123. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Economic Statecraft: A Theoretical Framework for Energy Statecraft 
 
 
Statecraft 
A term originating in northern Europe to describe the ‘science of government’,21 
statecraft has come to mean the art of conducting state affairs, both domestic and 
international. Its use by scholars of domestic politics, however, has largely been 
relinquished, making it a term predominantly employed by International Relations 
academics. Its precise definition varies slightly according to the author, but for the 
purposes of this study David Baldwin’s definition is fitting: 
 
Among students of foreign policy and international politics [statecraft] is 
sometimes used to encompass the whole foreign-policy-making process, but 
more often it refers to the selection of means for the pursuit of foreign policy 
goals. Thus, for Harold and Margaret Sprout “statecraft embraces all the 
activities by which statesmen strive to protect cherished values and to attain 
desired objectives vis-à-vis other nations and/or international organizations.” 
Similarly, K. J. Holsti defines “statecraft as the organized actions governments 
take to change the external environment in general or the policies and actions of 
other states in particular to achieve the objectives that have been set by policy 
makers.” Insofar as such definitions depict statecraft as governmental influence 
attempts directed at other actors in the international system, they correspond to 
the conception of statecraft employed here. … To study statecraft…is to 
consider the instruments used by policy makers in their attempts to exercise 
power, i.e., to get others to do what they would otherwise not do.22 
 
In the literature on statecraft, foreign policy instruments are often interchangeably 
referred to as means, tools, techniques, levers, policy options and other synonyms.23 
Although never having written those exact words, the phrase Machiavelli is 
most famous for – ‘the end justifies the means’24 – suggests that the choice of political 
goals precedes the choice of which instrument(s) best to pursue them with. As Brighi 
and Hill explain, a successful foreign policy implementation ‘depends…on the crucial 
relation between ends and means. No matter how powerful or big a state is, the 
pursuit of foreign policy aims is contingent on the ever-important choice of the 
                                                
21 Ping, J.H., Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia Pacific, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005), p. 14. 
22 Baldwin, D.A., Economic Statecraft, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 8-9. 
23 Ping, Op cit., p. 18. See also Baldwin, Op cit., p. 12. 
24 Variations on this phrase date back at least to Ancient Greece, such as Sophocles’ play Electra (c. 
409 B.C.), which includes the line ‘The end excuses any evil’, a thought later represented in the Roman 
poet Ovid’s Heroides ii. 85 (c. 10 B.C.) as ‘exitus acta probat’ or ‘The result justifies the deed’. 
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appropriate means.’25 The relationship between ends and means in foreign policy, 
however, is not simple. The choice of the former need not necessarily precede the 
choice of the latter; in fact, it is often the available means that determine what ends 
are possible to pursue, not to mention that an action can be seen either as means or an 
end depending on the situation. As Baldwin makes clear, the fact that few goals are 
final, but intermediate or even instrumental towards further goals, complicates any 
means-ends analysis: ‘Noting this difficulty, inherent in all means-ends analysis, 
scholars sometimes describe the distinction between instruments and objectives as “no 
more than a convenient analytical device.” For those interested in the effectiveness, 
efficiency, utility, or rationality of a given policy or technique of statecraft, however, 
the distinction is more than a “convenient analytical device”; it is a necessity.’26 
A further problem in analysing ends and means, alluded to above, is similar to 
the ancient ‘chicken and egg’ conundrum: which comes first, the goal or the 
instrument? Assertions such as ‘means determine the ends far more often than ends 
determine means’27 are symptomatic of what has been called the ‘law of the 
instrument’ in social science, a concept which Charles Hermann has applied to 
foreign policy behaviour: 
 
Kaplan has suggested the “law of the instrument” which is well remembered as 
a result of his characterization of the law through an analogy: “Give a small boy 
a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding”. 
Does a similar phenomenon exist in the conduct of foreign policy? Governments 
that invest heavily in the development and maintenance of a certain set of skills 
and resources will tend to apply them widely—perhaps excessively. Wilkinson 
seems to suggest exactly such an effect with respect to the instruments of 
foreign policy. He observes that states “whose military means are notably better 
than their non-military capabilities are subject to a strong pressure to militarize 
their foreign policies”.28 
 
Therefore, in order to understand foreign policy behaviour, careful attention must be 
paid to the instruments available to policy-makers, while acknowledging that these 
means are likely to affect the nature of policy and its goals. As Brighi and Hill remind 
us, ‘[a]ny understanding of how states approach the problem of deciding on the best 
                                                
25 Brighi, E. & Hill, C., ‘Implementation and behaviour’, in Smith, S., A. Hadfield & T. Dunne (eds.), 
Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 128. 
26 Baldwin, Op cit., p. 16. 
27 From the Summer 2004 final examination for the ‘IR 300 – Foreign Policy Analysis’ course at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science. 
28 Hermann, C.F., ‘Instruments of Foreign Policy’, in Callahan, P., L.P. Brady & M.G Hermann (eds.), 
Describing Foreign Policy Behavior, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), p. 156. 
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means of implementing their foreign policy must remember two dicta: firstly, 
instruments are themselves dependent on underlying capabilities, which are in turn a 
function of the resources at the disposal of the society in question; secondly, decision 
makers do not choose instruments as the surgeon selects the scalpel—rather, the 
nature of the available instruments tends to shape their policy choices in the first 
place.’29 
 Resources are what Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle of the French 
school of IR called the ‘basic forces’ of foreign policy: the building blocks derived 
from a country’s geography and history that determine a state’s foreign policy 
choices. These include a country’s geographical position, natural resources, climate, 
population and level of development. Assuming the expansion or loss of territory is 
discounted, these elements take generations to change significantly and are thus 
inherited by governments. Though resources are enormously important, there is no 
automatic correlation between their possession and the ability to exert influence, as 
they are not operational levers of foreign policy by themselves. In order to pursue an 
effective foreign policy, resources need to be operationalised into capabilities before 
they can be translated into a variety of specific instruments at the disposal of policy-
makers to be applied in practical politics.  
Capabilities are ‘the recognizable elements of a modern government’s 
responsibilities for which separate departments might exist and where decisions may 
hope to have an effect, at least in the medium term.’30 These include the armed forces, 
the quality of the civil service, industrial and technological capacity, levels of 
education, agricultural productivity, reputation and prestige, patterns of trade and 
diplomatic representation, GDP and the general strength of a country’s economy, etc. 
Instruments of foreign policy, in turn, are the forms of pressure and influence 
available to decision makers that amount to what Don Puchala called ‘externally 
projectable power’.31 They comprise ‘the inventory of means or capabilities used by a 
government or other foreign policy actor in the formation and implementation of its 
foreign policies.’32 
                                                
29 Brighi & Hill, Op cit., p. 130. 
30 Hill, C., The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 136. 
31 Ibid., p. 138. For a pyramidal model illustrating the interrelationships between the resources, 
capabilities and instruments of foreign policy, see Figure 6.2 on p. 137 of Christopher Hill’s The 
Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. 
32 Hermann, Op cit., p. 154. 
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 From an analytic point of view, according to Hermann, ‘instruments offer a 
way of classifying various foreign policy activities according to the devices and 
procedures employed in the pursuit of some substantive issue or problem.’33 Whereas 
Hermann goes as far as offering an eightfold categorisation of foreign policy 
instruments – diplomacy, domestic politics, military, intelligence, economics, 
science/technology, promotion, and natural resources34 – while acknowledging the 
possibility of significant overlap between some of these, most scholars place the main 
instruments of foreign policy into four broad categories that represent ‘an ascending 
scale of seriousness in terms of commitment of resources, the impact on third parties, 
and the according degree of risk in use…akin to the spectrum of soft to hard power’ 
discussed below:35 cultural/ideological or information/propaganda (words/ideas); 
political/diplomacy (deals/negotiation); economic (money/goods); and military force 
(weapons/violence). While coercive strategies (hard power) draw on policy options 
from the last three categories, persuasive strategies (soft power) can use all four. 
 
Hard and Soft Power 
According to Christopher Hill, there are three different dimensions of power: power 
as an end; power as a means; and power as a context.36 ‘Power as an end in itself 
represents a popular view of politicians and their motives. Actors are seen as out to 
maximize their own personal power, for the psychological satisfaction involved in 
controlling others, and for the glory, money and opportunities that come with it. When 
acting on behalf of states they blur, in this view, the distinction between their own 
aggrandizement and that of the state and come to identify the fate of the latter with 
themselves.’ Power as a means ‘explicitly deals with the question of power as the 
means to further ends derived from other values.’ Power as a context suggests that 
‘foreign policy actors operate in an environment where they cannot sensibly disregard 
power…. Practitioners quite commonly, and disastrously, overlook the external 
“realities”, by which is meant simply those factors outside the control of the actors in 
question.’ The context of power is a complex subject in its own right, and will 
therefore be covered separately in Chapter 4. For now, however, ‘while individual 
cases of power-worship can erupt unpredictably, for most of the time states are in the 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 156. 
35 Brighi & Hill, Op cit., p. 131. 
36 Hill, Op cit., pp. 129-134. 
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hands of those who, however ruthless, are essentially concerned with power for what 
it can do to bring them closer to objectives with a much wider reach.’37 Therefore the 
present chapter will focus on power as a means. 
 At the most basic level, power means the ability to achieve one’s purposes or 
goals; in other words, to get the outcomes one wants.38 Robert Dahl has defined 
power as the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do. But as 
Joseph Nye points out, ‘when we measure our power in terms of the changed 
behaviour of others, we have to know their preferences. Otherwise, we may be 
mistaken about our power. … Knowing in advance how other people or nations would 
behave in the absence of our efforts is often difficult.’39 Baldwin also raises this issue, 
but takes it one step further by advocating the use of counterfactual analysis in 
assessing the utility of different instruments of foreign policy: 
 
Power analysis always requires consideration of counterfactual conditions. If 
power relations involve some people getting other people to do something they 
would not otherwise do, the question of what would otherwise have been done 
cannot be ignored. … Nothing very significant can be said about the utility 
of…techniques of statecraft without addressing the question of what would have 
happened if they had not been used or if some other technique had been used. 
Such discussions may amount to little more than “educated guesses,” but this is 
preferable to ignoring the problem.40 
 
Because the ability to control others is often related to the possession of 
certain resources, a second definition of power is commonly used, which ‘simply 
define[s] it as the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence outcomes. 
Consequently…a country [is considered] powerful if it has a relatively large 
population and territory, extensive natural resources, economic strength, military 
force, and social stability. The virtue of this second definition is that it makes power 
appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable. But this definition also has 
problems. When people define power as synonymous with the resources that produce 
it, they sometimes encounter the paradox that those best endowed with power do not 
always get the outcomes they want.’41 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 130. 
38 Nye, J.S.: Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, (Basic Books, 1991), pp. 25-
26; Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: NY: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 1-
2; The Powers to Lead: Soft, Hard and Smart, (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 27. 
39 Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 26. 
40 Baldwin, Op cit., p. 22. Original emphasis. 
41 Nye, Soft Power, p. 3. See also Bound to Lead, p. 26, and The Powers to Lead, p. 28. 
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 Power conversion, writes Nye, ‘is a basic problem that arises when we think 
of power in terms of resources. Some countries are better than others at converting 
their resources into effective influence…. Power conversion is the capacity to convert 
potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the 
behavior of others. Thus, one has to know about a country’s skill at power conversion 
as well as its possession of power resources to predict outcomes correctly.’42 For Nye, 
skillful leadership and well-designed strategies are necessary to transform resources 
into influence, or realised power in terms of attaining desired outcomes.43 Ned Lebow 
concurs that power is difficult to operationalise, citing Hans Morgenthau’s 
recognition of this, in contrast to mainstream realists and liberals: 
 
Morgenthau, to his credit, recognizes that there is no absolute measure of state 
power because it is always relative and situation-specific. He acknowledges that 
the strategies and tactics that leaders used to transform the potential attributes of 
power into influence are just as important as the attributes themselves. 
 The fundamental problem – most pronounced in Waltz, but evident in other 
realists and many liberals as well – is the tendency to equate material 
capabilities with power, and power with influence. … [M]aterial capabilities are 
only one component of power, and that power is only one basis of influence. … 
This is an anomaly for most realist and liberal understandings of power, but not 
for a theory…that disaggregates influence from power…44 
 
Therefore, as Nye clarifies, ‘proof of power lies not in resources but in the changed 
behavior of nations.’45 
 There are, of course, several different ways of affecting the behaviour of 
others. For Nye, these fall under three broad techniques: coercion through threats 
(‘sticks’); inducement through payment (‘carrots’); and attraction through cooptation. 
The first two are ways to change what other states do, which might be called the 
commanding method of exercising power. The latter works indirectly by getting 
others to want what you want, and might be called the cooptive method of exercising 
power, which contrasts with active command power that makes others do what you 
want. In Nye’s terminology, the resources associated with latter ‘can be thought of as 
soft power, in contrast to the hard command power associated with tangible resources 
                                                
42 Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 27. 
43 Nye, Soft Power, p. 3. 
44 Lebow, R.N., A Cultural Theory of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), p. 557. 
45 Nye, Bound to Lead, pp. 174-175. 
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like military and economic strength.’46 Thus, command and cooptive power refer to 
power as an abstract concept in the form of a continuum from the former at one end to 
the latter at the other, whereas hard and soft power generally represent the types of 
resources and capabilities associated with command and cooptive power, but more 
specifically denote the manner in which instruments are implemented. 
 
Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to 
achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction 
between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the 
tangibility of the resources. Command power—the ability to change what others 
do—can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power—the ability to shape 
what others want—can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and values or 
the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes 
others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. 
The types of behavior between command and co-option range along a spectrum 
from coercion to economic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction. Soft-
power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum, 
whereas hard-power resources are usually associated with command behavior. 
But the relationship is imperfect. For example, sometimes countries may be 
attracted to others with command power by myths of invincibility, and 
command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that later 
become regarded as legitimate. A strong economy not only provides resources 
for sanctions and payments, but can also be a source of attractiveness. On the 
whole, however, the general association between the types of behavior and 
certain resources is strong enough to allow us to employ the useful shorthand 
reference to hard- and soft-power resources.47 
 
Table 1: Hard/Soft Power48 Hard Soft 
Spectrum of Behaviors 
 
 
 
 
                     coercion      inducement 
Command ß—*—————*–—–– 
agenda 
setting          attraction 
–—*——–——*——à Co-opt 
Most Likely Resources 
 
                     force            payments 
                     sanctions     bribes 
institutions    values 
                      culture 
                      policies 
 
 It goes without saying that coercion is a form of hard power; indeed, the very 
term, hard power, seems to suggest it. But why should inducements fall under that 
side of the power continuum? As Richard Sennett explains, ‘the act of giving needn’t 
in itself carry the positive charge of a cooperative act. Giving to others can be a way 
of manipulating them,’ which falls under the category of largesse: ‘The two sides of 
largesse embody two extremes in the act which is at the heart of any welfare system: 
                                                
46 Ibid., pp. 31-32. Emphases added. 
47 Nye, Soft Power, pp. 7-8. See also Nye: Bound to Lead, Chapter 1 endnote 11, p. 267; The Powers to 
Lead, pp. 30 & 39. 
48 Nye, Soft Power, p. 8. 
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making a gift. At the one extreme is a gift freely given, at the other is a manipulative 
gift. The first embodies that aspect of character focused on the sheer fact that others 
lack something, that they are in need; the other act of giving uses it only as a means to 
gain power over them’.49 Similarly, Baldwin cites Klaus Knorr in stating that ‘there is 
a “clear difference in principle” between compliance that is “bought” and that which 
is “freely given.” This distinction leads him to describe “aid given for some advantage 
to be received by the donor” as a “pseudogift”.’ Thus, for Baldwin, ‘aid that is 
completely unilateral cannot be an instrument of statecraft at all, since the statecraft 
perspective implies that aid is a means to an end.’50 However, Baldwin resorts to 
social exchange theory to explain how even a gift that is allegedly freely given is not 
without conditions: 
 
In common parlance, gifts are freely given with no expectation of anything in 
return. It is considered bad taste to insist on a quid pro quo for what is supposed 
to be a gift. … Common parlance is quite misleading with respect to gifts since 
social deception is deeply embedded in the social process of giving and 
receiving gifs. Marcel Mauss identifies a set of social phenomena “which are in 
theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous; but are in fact obligatory and 
interested.” … Thus, while people pretend not to expect a quid pro quo in return 
for a gift, they actually do expect gifts to be reciprocated and are likely to inflict 
social disapprobation on those who fail to reciprocate. Gift giving generates an 
obligation to reciprocate regardless of whether any specific quid pro quo is 
agreed upon at the time the gift is given. Indeed, the giver is likely to—nay, is 
expected to—deny, explicitly or implicitly, that any quid pro quo is expected. 
This, however, is a social lie and is tacitly understood to be such by both giver 
and receiver.51 
 
Moreover, as Nye states, even though the economic part of hard power resting on 
inducements may not seem coercive, threats and inducements are closely related 
because coercion is a matter of degree: ‘Inducements, rewards, and bonuses are more 
pleasant to receive than threats, but the hint of their removal can constitute an 
effective threat. … Some inducements (and the threat of their removal) may be more 
enabling and others more coercive’ in the eyes of those who receive them.52 
 Soft power, on the other hand, should not be discounted as ‘just a question of 
image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity. … [I]t is a form of power—a 
                                                
49 Sennett, R., Respect: The Formation of Character in a World of Inequality, (London: Allen Lane, 
2003), pp. 136-138. 
50 Knorr, K., The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations, (New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 172-175. Cited in Baldwin, Op cit., pp. 292-293. 
51 Ibid., pp. 293-294. Original emphasis. 
52 Nye, The Powers to Lead, pp. 39, 141-142. 
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means of obtaining desired outcomes.’53 Soft power is ‘the ability to get what you 
want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. … A country may obtain 
the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, 
emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to 
follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world 
politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or 
economic sanctions. … Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of 
others.’54 As Nye clarifies, however, the ability to shape preferences should not be 
confused with influence: 
 
Soft power is not merely the same as influence, though it is one source of 
influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or 
payments. Nor is soft power just persuasion or the ability to move people by 
argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to entice and 
attract. Attraction often leads to acquiescence. In behavioral terms, soft power is 
attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets—
tangible and intangible—that produce such attractions.55 
 
 Soft power uses different resources to bring about cooperation or acquiescence 
from other actors than does hard power, which rests on coercion and payments. These 
resources are generally ‘slower, more diffuse and more cumbersome to wield than 
hard-power resources’ and ‘often work indirectly by shaping the environment for 
policy, and sometimes take years to produce the desired outcomes.’56 Hill goes further 
in stating that while hard power tends to focus on the target itself, soft power 
primarily seeks to change the target’s environment, but argues that the use of such 
‘slow-acting, opinion-shaping instruments can still be a form of coercion, albeit 
barely understood by the target.’57 Nye counters this by arguing that while soft power 
may indeed feel threatening and manipulative, ‘it still leaves open a wider range of 
choices in the target’s response. Soft power instruments are not all equal in this 
regard. They differ in the degree of rational appeal and respect for followers’ 
autonomy.’58 
                                                
53 Nye, Soft Power, p. 129. 
54 Ibid., pp.  x, 5. Emphasis added. 
55 Nye, The Powers to Lead, p. 31. See also Soft Power, p. 7. 
56 Nye, Soft Power, pp. 99-100. 
57 Hill, Op cit., p. 135. 
58 Nye, The Powers to Lead, p. 142. 
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For Nye, a country’s soft power derives mainly from three sources: its culture, 
its values and its foreign policy.59 The first two are clearly outside a government’s 
control, but the last one is by definition a government’s responsibility. This work will 
therefore focus on the latter source of soft power – indeed, in Nye’s words, a 
government’s ‘foreign policies strongly affect soft power’, which in turn ‘can attract 
or repel others by the influence of their example.’60 Foreign policies that are perceived 
to have moral authority and are legitimate in terms of the shared values they 
represent, along with ‘the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of 
those values’, will produce ‘an intangible attraction that persuades [others] to go 
along with [one’s] purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place.’61 
Soft power therefore depends on how these objectives are framed: ‘Policies based on 
broadly inclusive and far-sighted definitions of the national interest are easier to make 
attractive to others than policies that take a narrow and myopic perspective.’62 This is 
a point Lebow concurs with, adding that such policies are also likely to cost less: 
 
It is easier to elicit support for policies that reflect shared norms because it is 
possible to persuade other actors that they are in the common interest. Policies 
contrary to accepted values and practices must rely on coercion or bribes, or a 
combination of the two, and are correspondingly more costly in resources. 
Cooperation [achieved] on this basis lasts only so long as the dominant state 
retains the power to punish and reward.63 
 
When a country can entice others to want what it wants, on the other hand, it does not 
need to spend as much on sticks and carrots to change their behaviour towards its own 
preferences. ‘Seduction is always more effective than coercion,’64 according to Nye. 
He warns, however, that whether ‘attraction in turn produces desired policy outcomes 
has to be judged in particular cases. Attraction does not always determine others’ 
preferences, but this gap between power measured as resources and power judged as 
the outcomes of behavior is not unique to soft power. It occurs with all forms of 
power.’65 
 
 
                                                
59 Nye, Soft Power, pp.  x, 6, 11, 14. 
60 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
61 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
62 Ibid., p. 61. 
63 Lebow, Op cit., p. 495. 
64 Nye, Soft Power, p.  x. 
65 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Economic Statecraft 
In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin predicts a long-term trend in 
international relations towards the increased relevance of economics as a result of ‘the 
expansion of a highly interdependent world market economy’ and argues that this has 
‘enhanced the role of economic power as an instrument of statecraft.’66 This assertion 
inevitably calls attention to the need for further academic work on economic 
instruments of foreign policy. In its simplest form, economic statecraft is to study 
economics as an instrument of politics.67 
 
Baldwin defines economic statecraft as “all of the economic means by which 
foreign policy actors might try to influence other international actors”. To 
influence someone, he points out, is to induce someone to do something that 
they would not otherwise have done. Like most other forms of influence, 
economic statecraft will take effect by affecting attitudes, expectations or 
beliefs. It is of necessity a means of sending messages. It may impose or 
threaten to impose costs on the target nation, and such costs may be an 
important part of the message; but it may transmit a message effectively without 
necessarily imposing a cost.68 
 
Although economic policy instruments may be used to pursue economic ends, 
Baldwin illustrates that their use is not confined to such aims through an analogy with 
Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is a continuation of policy by other 
means: ‘Clausewitz argues that what is peculiar about war “is simply the peculiar 
nature of its means.” Likewise, the distinguishing characteristic of economic statecraft 
lies not in its goals but rather in the peculiar nature of its means.’69 Thus, more 
specifically, economic statecraft signifies an international actor’s use of economic 
instruments and relationships (or means) in the pursuit of political goals (ends) in 
foreign policy.70 
 Economic statecraft is analytically distinct from other similarly-named 
concepts – such as foreign economic policy, international economic policy, economic 
diplomacy, economic leverage, economic sanctions, economic warfare or economic 
coercion – in that these ‘are usually defined in terms of actual or intended effects of a 
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policy or in terms of the process by which the policy was made.’71 As Hill notes, 
economic statecraft ‘refers to the extent to which an actor can pursue its goals through 
the use of economic instruments, even when the content of the goal is not centrally 
economic. It is not about foreign economic policy [and other concepts named above] 
in the service of economic goals, important as that is.’72 In comparison with some of 
the available alternative definitions above, Baldwin summarises several advantages to 
the concept of economic statecraft: 
 
• “Economic statecraft” emphasizes means rather than ends. This usage is 
probably closer to ordinary language than definitions in terms of ends. … 
• “Economic statecraft” does not restrict the range of goals that may be sought by 
economic means. It makes it conceptually possible to describe the empirically 
undeniable fact that policy makers sometimes use economic means to pursue a 
wide variety of noneconomic ends. … 
• Unlike most alternative concepts, the definition of “economic statecraft” 
includes a definition of “economic” [i.e. “resources which have a reasonable 
semblance of a market price in terms of money”73]. It thus provides criteria for 
distinguishing economic techniques of statecraft from noneconomic 
techniques.74 
 
However, as Philip Hanson critiques, an underlying problem remains with this 
approach: ‘The economic costs of sanctions, embargoes and economic warfare are 
measurable (however imperfect) for both sender and target nations, but the political 
costs and benefits are not. Net economic costs and net political benefits for the nation 
imposing the sanctions cannot be weighed against one another.’75 The economic-
political cost-benefit analysis of economic statecraft notwithstanding, Baldwin’s 
concept remains appropriate for the purposes of this study. ‘Given the starting point of 
linkage between politics and economics, between foreign policy and the pursuit of 
wealth,’ writes Hill, to study economic statecraft ‘means analysing the extent to which 
economic instruments are indeed at the disposal of the state’:76 whether they are used 
positively as carrots, involving the use of economic relationships as incentives or 
rewards; negatively as sticks, involving the threat or use of sanctions or other forms of 
economic coercion or punishment;77 or even as a form of soft power. 
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The Literature 
Much like the wider discipline of International Relations itself, the study of economic 
sanctions (more specifically, negative sanctions or economic coercion) began with 
optimism following the First World War, with high expectations that sanctions could 
deter future wars. However, the failure of sanctions to restrain military aggression and 
to achieve other important goals – most prominently such ‘classic cases’ as League of 
Nations sanctions against Italy, US sanctions against Cuba, UN sanctions against 
Rhodesia, NATO sanctions against the Communist bloc and Arab sanctions against 
Israel – led to a generalised scepticism concerning their use among post-Second 
World War IR scholars. Indeed, the overall impression derived from the literature, 
writes Baldwin, ‘is that economic statecraft is so obviously useless as to raise 
questions about the good judgment of any policy maker who gives serious 
consideration to such techniques’ of statecraft.78 The publication of Baldwin’s 
Economic Statecraft in 1985, however, marks a turning point in the literature on 
economic means of interstate influence, and has ‘profoundly influenced how the 
current generation of scholars approaches the study of economic statecraft and 
sanctions.’79 
 
Baldwin reconceptualized the scholarly literature and argued that the use of 
economic sanctions—more generally economic statecraft—typically involved 
multiple objectives and targets, and that the assessment of success or failure 
could only be made convincingly by comparing the costs and benefits of 
economic statecraft to that of other forms of statecraft. Baldwin did not claim 
that economic sanctions were likely to succeed. His conceptual framework and 
reconsideration of classic cases, however, did suggest that the economic 
instrument was considerably more useful than scholars generally 
acknowledged.80 
 
For instance, as Michael Mastanduno states, ‘even if sanctions do not solve major 
foreign policy problems, a variety of economic instruments…may still be useful to 
governments in signalling intentions, complementing diplomacy, building a political 
consensus, or even paving the way for the use of military force.’81 Thus, Hanson 
considers Baldwin’s view of economic sanctions as being primarily a form of 
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signalling: ‘An effective signal can change the expectations of decision-makers in the 
target nation about the sender’s response to the original action that triggered the 
sanction. If it does so, this signalling may be more important on the whole than the 
costs directly imposed by the sanctions.’82 
Baldwin critiqued the bulk of existing literature for the short-sighted 
assumption that no political end can possibly be achieved unless the economic means 
is effective: ‘Some writers…argue that economic techniques of statecraft can succeed 
only through economic effects on the target. [Donald] Losman, for example,…views 
infliction of economic damage on the target country as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for political success.’ Baldwin counters this argument by reminding us that 
economic sanctions ‘may have diplomatic, psychological, political, military, or other 
effects when their economic effect is nil. Ignoring this fact severely impairs one’s 
ability to evaluate the costs and effectiveness of economic sanctions as instruments of 
foreign policy.’ Indeed, he concludes ‘it seems unwise to rule out in advance the 
possibility that economic techniques may succeed because of their connection with 
noneconomic causal conditions.’83 However, the drawback in Baldwin’s 
methodology, in Hanson’s words, is that ‘his multiple and unqualified success criteria 
make it hard ever to conclude that an economic sanctions episode is a clear failure. 
Perhaps that is as it should be in the unclear world of international relations.’84 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, Baldwin notes that the ‘two most salient 
characteristics of the literature on economic statecraft are scarcity’ – whose neglect he 
attributes partly to a tendency to focus on policy-making processes in detriment to 
policy techniques and outputs – ‘and the nearly universal tendency to denigrate the 
utility of such tools of foreign policy.’85 Despite these limitations, Jean-Marc 
Blanchard and Norrin Ripsman have listed three broad schools of thought in the 
economic statecraft literature: realism, economic liberalism and conditionalist 
approaches. 
Realist stances on economic statecraft are straightforward and largely 
responsible for the popular view that economic instruments are not useful tools of 
statecraft. For realists, political and strategic goals always take precedence over 
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economic ones, so states are unlikely to relinquish important political goals because 
of economic considerations, leading to the conclusion that economic instruments 
almost never succeed in achieving foreign policy goals. Thus, according to realists, 
‘economic statecraft—premised as it is on the exchange of political concessions for 
economic gains or the avoidance of economic losses—should usually fail, unless 
economic pressures are consonant with political ones or the sender’s political 
demands are inconsequential.’86  
Economic liberalism, on the other hand, draws almost opposite conclusions on 
economic statecraft than does realism, but has an equally straightforward logic. 
‘Economic liberals expect policy success to correlate directly with the magnitude of 
economic incentives or punishments offered. … By focusing on the magnitude of 
economic signals, liberals implicitly acknowledge that compliance with economic 
statecraft is not automatic, but is the product of a calculation of the costs and benefits 
of compliance versus the costs and benefits of defiance.’87 However, since economic 
statecraft, as defined above, entails the use of economic means for the purposes of 
achieving political goals, concentrating exclusively on the economic effects of 
statecraft may not tell us much about their efficacy in reaching political objectives. 
Being an inherently political act due to the nature of its ends, the economic effect of 
statecraft by itself, even if extreme, is ‘unlikely to result in changes in behavior if the 
right political conditions are not present. … Since economic sanctions are designed to 
influence target governments in large part by generating domestic political opposition 
to the proscribed policy, their political costs are more significant than their economic 
bite.’88 As Robin Renwick puts it, ‘the idea of an automatic correlation between 
economic deprivation and the loss of the political will to resist it is, to say the least, 
questionable.’89 The same is true of economic incentives. 
As Blanchard and Ripsman note, however, much of the literature on economic 
statecraft ‘consists of a rather sterile debate about whether economic sanctions or 
incentives can achieve important foreign-policy objectives, with less attention to the 
more policy-relevant issue of when and under what conditions economic statecraft 
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can achieve these goals.’90 Since economic statecraft succeeds more frequently than 
the realist perspective predicts, but fails more often than economic liberalism 
suggests, they conclude not only that these two schools of thought are ‘unsatisfying 
theoretically and unable to explain important, high profile cases’, but also that a 
conditional model of economic statecraft is needed to understand when such 
instruments of statecraft are likely to be effective. Indeed, for Blanchard and 
Ripsman, ‘conditionalist approaches represent a significant step forward for the study 
of economic statecraft by identifying the importance of intervening factors that 
influence how states view economic signals.’91 
Conditionalist approaches stress that ‘the economic costs and benefits 
associated with economic statecraft are only likely to have an important impact on 
decision making under certain political conditions.’92 Within this broad school, 
scholars tend to focus on the international environment as a conditioning factor for 
economic statecraft, while a smaller number of studies concentrate on domestic 
conditions in the target state. 
International conditionalists argue that the economic considerations brought 
on by economic statecraft are weighed against geopolitical interests like power, 
prestige and sovereignty, and list international political conditions necessary for 
effective economic statecraft such as ‘the sender and target states’ relative military 
power, the strength of international regimes, the sender’s strategic relationship with 
the target, and the international threat situation’,93 to mention but a few. The 
international environment is complex in its own right and can include a myriad of 
conditions modifying the probabilities of success of economic statecraft depending on 
the context in which it takes place, and therefore warrants its own chapter in the 
present study (Chapter 4). 
Meanwhile, domestic conditionalists focus on the internal circumstances in the 
target states as the key variable in an influence attempt through economic statecraft. 
As Mastanduno points out, ‘the study of economic statecraft must proceed not only 
with an appreciation of the domestic level of analysis but with a sophisticated 
understanding of it. Economic sanctions involve the exploitation of power 
asymmetries, but the effectiveness of sanctions, that is whether those asymmetries can 
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be exploited, depends vitally on how their effects are transmitted domestically. This is 
true of both positive and negative sanctions, although the mechanics of transmission 
are somewhat different.’94 Therefore, domestic conditionalists ‘view the success or 
failure of economic statecraft as a function of the extent to which economic pressure 
might harm vital domestic constituencies or to which economic inducements might 
enrich key powerbrokers.’95 Most such studies tend to concentrate on the target state’s 
regime type, with their most common contention being that negative sanctions are less 
effective against authoritarian regimes while being more effective against 
democracies, whereas economic inducements are more likely to work best on 
authoritarian states. But in doing so, these studies neglect the complexity of any given 
target state’s internal political setting. 
However, more recent domestic conditionalist studies, such as Blanchard and 
Ripsman’s, stress that focusing only on target states’ regime type is insufficient, since 
‘similar regimes can vary along critical dimensions, including autonomy of the state 
from society and the policy instruments at its disposal.’ Instead, they separate 
domestic interest groups from the government, and propose a more detailed and 
sophisticated domestic condition in the form of a target state’s ability to buffer its 
government against disaffected groups – or what they call ‘stateness,’ which 
comprises three factors: ‘(1) autonomy, or a state’s ability to take decisions in the face 
of domestic political opposition; (2) capacity, or the state’s capability either to 
compensate or coerce those who stand to lose from defying the sender; and (3) 
legitimacy, or the ability of the state to rally disaffected domestic groups.’ They 
conclude that ‘when economic statecraft co-opts domestic interest groups, high 
stateness will interfere with an economic statecraft attempt by allowing leaders to 
ignore pressures to comply. Conversely, when economic statecraft resonates with the 
target government, rather than domestic interest groups, stateness can actually foster 
compliance by allowing the leadership to overcome domestic resistance to 
compliance.’96 But even such ardent advocates of domestic conditions admit that in 
order to explain completely the dynamics of economic statecraft, ‘we must not only 
consider the internal dynamics of the target state, but also international political 
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variables that can alter the political costs facing the regime.’97 In other words, even 
though conditionalist approaches to economic statecraft are preferable to, if not more 
accurate than, realist and liberal perspectives, both domestic as well as international 
conditions should be taken into account when analysing a state’s attempt at economic 
statecraft on another. 
 In addition to being divided among different schools of thought, the economic 
statecraft literature is also separated by the types of techniques used by governments 
in their attempts to influence other states – mainly between negative and positive 
sanctions, the proverbial ‘sticks and carrots’, respectively. No matter what 
conclusions were reached – i.e. whether or not sanctions ‘work’, or under what 
conditions they might – up to the end of the Cold War, the literature focused almost 
exclusively on negative economic statecraft, or economic coercion. Indeed, as 
Mastanduno draws attention to, ‘[p]olitical scientists have traditionally devoted 
relatively little attention to positive economic statecraft. … Economic sticks have 
commanded more attention than economic carrots.’98 As Baldwin has suggested, 
perhaps this is because ‘researchers typically have tended to overestimate threats 
(negative sanctions) relative to promises (positive sanctions) in the study of 
international politics.’99 Insofar as these studies compare negative sanctions to other 
alternative forms of statecraft, they tend to focus on economic versus military 
coercion,100 rather than comparing negative and positive forms of economic statecraft. 
However, Mastanduno points out that ‘the more carefully we examine the historical 
record, the more cases—successes and failures—we are likely to find’, both of 
negative sanctions and of positive sanctions, which ‘political scientists have only 
began to investigate.’101 
 Baldwin made an observation in 1971 regarding research on positive 
economic statecraft that remained accurate for the next two decades: ‘It is not that 
political scientists have said wrong things about the role of positive sanctions in 
power relations; it is just that they have said little.’102 However, the end of the Cold 
War, and the shift in focus away from primary (security) to secondary (economic) and 
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tertiary (human rights, environment, etc.) agenda topics in IR scholarship, led to a 
rediscovery of positive economic statecraft: 
 
The end of the Cold War has brought a changed global situation and a revival of 
scholarly interest in positive economic statecraft. The major powers of the world 
are now economically interdependent, as they were during the late nineteenth 
century. An understanding of great power politics once again requires an 
understanding of economic relationships and of the links between economics 
and foreign policy. … As economic relations take centre stage in foreign policy, 
the traditional lines between high politics and low politics become blurred. It is 
not surprising that scholars have begun to rediscover the agenda of positive 
economic statecraft. … Since the end of the Cold War, economic engagement 
has proved to be a key foreign policy strategy in relations both among major 
powers and between stronger and weaker states.103 
 
The new research focusing on economic incentives that has emerged in the post-Cold 
War era, however, has been inclined to flaunt the successes of positive sanctions in 
carefully selected case studies, to some extent as a response to the predominance of 
the negative sanctions in the literature up to that point.104 But as Mastanduno makes 
clear, ‘the positive use of economic incentives has considerable promise as an 
instrument of statecraft, and deserves more systematic attention from students of the 
subject.’105 
 In terms of which schools of thought tend to write about positive economic 
statecraft, many are liberals. For instance, Randall Newnham argues that if an 
economic incentive is strong enough, it can be more effective in changing a target 
state’s behaviour than negative sanctions.106 Meanwhile, there are few, if any, realists 
writing about economic incentives, which Blanchard and Ripsman attribute to a self-
selection process: ‘The few authors who write about incentives implicitly begin with 
the assumption that they can be of significance. However, [Blanchard and Ripsman] 
interpret the dearth of attention paid to economic incentives as evidence of the 
widespread realist attitude that economic gains are unlikely to move states to alter 
their policies.’107 
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 According to Blanchard and Ripsman, the economic statecraft literature 
suffers from a crucial weakness: namely that it treats negative and positive sanctions 
as analytically distinct from one another, ‘despite Baldwin’s observation that various 
forms of economic statecraft follow a similar logic and Hirschman’s assertion that 
economic incentives influence states because of the possibility they create for future 
economic sanctions’.108 Yet the connection between negative and positive sanctions is 
‘relatively unexplored territory’ in International Relations. ‘Now that positive 
measures have been rediscovered,’ writes Mastanduno, the next step will be to study 
their effectiveness more systematically, both on their own, and in relation to the more 
familiar forms of economic sanctions.’109 
 
Basic Types of Economic Statecraft: Negative, Positive, and Short- versus Long-Term 
When policy makers talk about ‘economic sanctions’, more often than not they are 
referring to negative sanctions – in other words, the sticks (rather than carrots) of 
economic statecraft – which include the boycott of imports, embargoes on exports, 
restrictions on private business and travel, and the imposition of price rises through 
punitive duties.110 Moreover, as Hill reminds us, ‘[i]t is important to distinguish 
between sanctions as an instrument of collective security, used by the League of 
Nations and the United Nations (where they have almost always proved a failure) and 
sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy, where they have been a qualified success 
in a number of cases despite the smaller number of enforcing states.’111 The present 
study concerns itself exclusively with the latter. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to 
discuss the source of power behind the use of negative sanctions, rather than merely 
listing different instruments in which they might be manifested. 
In a pioneering work on economic instruments of foreign policy, National 
Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945), Albert Hirschman states that ‘the 
power to interrupt commercial or financial relations with any country, considered as 
an attribute of national sovereignty, is the root cause of the influence or power 
position which a country acquires in other countries’.112 
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He calls the “two main effects” of foreign trade on “the power position of a 
country” the “supply effect” and the “influence effect”. “The first effect is 
certain to be positive: By providing a more plentiful supply of goods or by 
replacing goods wanted less by goods wanted more (from the power standpoint), 
foreign trade enhances the potential military force of a country”. Hirschman, 
however, regards the implications of the supply effect as “obvious” and hardly 
in need of “further elaboration”; therefore, he devotes the bulk of his attention to 
the more theoretically interesting and less well understood influence effect. 
Whereas the first effect derives from the would-be power wielder’s “gain from 
trade,” the second effect derives from the ability to deprive one’s trading 
partners of their gains from trade by exercising the right of every sovereign state 
to interrupt its own export and import trade. Hirschman views the influence 
effect as more important than the supply effect and asserts “that economic 
pressure upon a country consists mainly of the threat of severance and 
ultimately of actual interruption of external economic relations with that 
country.”113 
 
In Hirschman’s own words, ‘[t]he stoppage of this trade obliges the other countries to 
find alternative markets and sources of supply and, should this prove impossible, it 
forces upon them economic adjustments and lasting impoverishment. True, the 
stoppage of trade will also do harm to the economy of the country taking the initiative 
in bringing about the stoppage, but this is not unlike the harm an aggressive country 
can do to itself in making war on another. A country trying to make the most out of its 
strategic position with respect to its own trade will try precisely to create conditions 
which will make the interruption of trade of much graver concern to its trading 
partners than to itself.’114 Abdelal and Kirshner recall how Hirschman demonstrates 
that asymmetric economic relations between states afford more power to the larger 
state involved in the relationship: ‘If large country A trades with small country B, 
commerce between them might account for only two or three percent of country A’s 
exports and imports, but might well represent over half of country B’s. Such a 
relationship gives the larger country coercive power over the smaller, because an 
interruption of the relationship would cause much greater distress in B than in A. 
Threats of interruptions, then, both explicit and implicit, give A power.’115 In other 
words, the power accrued by country A over country B is a form of hard power, and 
the threat of, if not an actual, trade interruption lies at the extreme end of the hard-soft 
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power scale as an act of (economic) coercion, usually implemented as sanctions, as 
illustrated in Table 1 above. 
 The conception of power in Hirschman’s book is cast primarily in terms of 
negative sanctions, but it is important to recall that economic statecraft can also be 
positive – used as a carrot, rather than a stick. Although Baldwin claims that 
‘Hirschman neither considers nor allows for the possibility that country A may want 
to enhance the supply effect in country B as a direct means of influence’,116 a closer 
inspection of Hirschman’s book reveals that he does, in fact, briefly consider this 
possibility: ‘country A, seeking to increase its influence in country B, might have an 
interest in altering the terms of trade in B’s favor. Here, then, it would seem, we have 
an ideal instance of the opposition between a policy trying to maximize national 
income and a policy setting out to maximize national power.’117 As Abdelal and 
Kirshner summarise, Hirschman illustrates how influence can be exercised indirectly 
by engaging in trade with another country, even without the threat of severing 
economic relations, although Hirschman dedicates much less attention to this dynamic 
than he does to his more fully and systematically developed argument on economic 
coercion: 
 
Simply put, National Power [and the Structure of Foreign Trade] shows that the 
pattern of international economic relations affects domestic politics, which in 
turn shapes national interests. This is always true but is most vivid in 
asymmetric relations, where the effects are typically large, visible, and almost 
wholly found within the smaller economy. Consider, for example, a free trade 
agreement between a large and a small state. The likely result is a change in the 
smaller state’s perception of its own interest: it will converge toward that of the 
larger. Why? Because the simple act of participation in the arrangement 
strengthens those who benefit from it relative to those who do not (by 
definition). This strength should translate into political power. Further, because 
firms and sectors engage in patterns of activity based on economic incentives, 
and since this constellation of incentives will be transformed by the trade 
agreement, the subsequent reshuffling of behavior will lead to new interests and 
the formation of political coalitions to advance those interests. Most 
importantly, decisions based on these new incentives give firms a stake in their 
country’s continued participation [in the trade agreement], and they will direct 
their political energies to that end. In Hirschman’s words, “…these regions or 
industries will exert a powerful influence in favor of a ‘friendly’ attitude toward 
the state to the imports of which they owe their interests.” Finally, the central 
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government can find its own interests reshaped, above and beyond that which 
results from domestic political pressures.118 
 
Abdelal and Kirshner rightly find it important to distinguish between two 
different components, or sources, of Hirschman’s influence effects: ‘Hirschman 
considers “influence effects” to include both power that accrues to one state from 
asymmetric costs of exit and changes in domestic politics that result from 
international economic relations. [Abdelal and Kirshner] call the former “coercion” 
and the latter “influence.” In other words, coercion refers to changes in policy, 
influence refers to changes in definition of interest.’119 This distinction is important 
because it relates to Nye’s hard and soft power dichotomy explained above, as 
Abdelal and Kirshner also acknowledge, while advocating the superior effectiveness 
of the latter: ‘Hirschmanesque effects are more profoundly felt with regard to 
influence than coercion. … [C]hanges in international political behavior do not occur 
because of pressure, but because new incentives alter perceptions of interest. This is 
akin to what Joseph S. Nye has called “soft power.” Rather than forcing others to do 
what you want them to do, soft power, or influence, is about “getting others to want 
what you want.”’120 Thus, Hirschman’s influence effects have the potential to be 
manifested as both hard and soft power, depending on how they are employed, either 
as trade severance or altered interest perception. 
 Meanwhile, Mastanduno focuses more on the deliberate use of positive 
sanctions than on influence as a nuanced side effect of trade. He defines positive 
economic statecraft as ‘the provision or promise of economic benefits to induce 
changes in the behaviour of a target state.’121 Furthermore, he argues that positive 
economic statecraft can bring about the same results as the use of their negative 
counterparts: ‘Just as trade denial can be used to change behaviour, weaken 
capabilities, or induce regime change, so trade promotion—the promise or actuality of 
expanded trade—can be a means to influence a government’s domestic or foreign 
policies or to strengthen its capabilities. Governments can promise to increase aid, 
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encourage foreign investment, or support a country’s currency in exchange for 
desirable changes in that country’s behaviour.’122 
 Mastanduno then goes on to argue that there are several reasons why positive 
economic statecraft might be more effective in achieving foreign policy goals than 
their negative counterparts, which bear repeating here: 
 
Threats tend to inspire resistance and resentment in the target government; a 
typical response to the promise of rewards is hope and expectation. Negative 
sanctions often produce the ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Positive sanctions do 
not, and have the potential to undermine the target government by creating 
transnational coalitions between groups in the sanctioning and target countries at 
the societal [and business] level. Positive sanctions have a tendency to 
encourage the target government to cooperate with the sanctioning government 
on other issues; negative sanctions create a general reluctance to cooperate. 
With negative sanctions, multilateral cooperation is a necessity and there are 
strong incentives for third parties to break the embargo in order to gain above-
normal profits. Positive sanctions do not require multilateral support, and 
alternative economic partners typically cannot gain by undercutting the 
sanctions. Business interests in the sanctioning state tend to mobilize against 
negative sanctions. But they are likely to support positive ones that coincide 
with their natural interest in expanding economic integration.123 
 
Based on such advantages, Abdelal and Kirshner conclude that nations are loath to 
engage in economic coercion because doing so forgoes the possibility of exercising 
positive sanctions, which they consider more valuable.124 
 However, there are also reasons to be sceptical of the overall utility of positive 
economic statecraft. Making a habit of handing out carrots to induce good foreign 
policy behaviour in a target state, as Mastanduno suggests, may well ‘subject the 
sanctioning state to potential blackmail, since the state that hands out bribes in one 
context is likely to be pressured to do the same in others.’125 The sanctioning state 
thus becomes a victim to perpetual demands for payments in exchange for the target 
state’s sustained good behaviour. Mastanduno relates this to the subsequent problem 
pertaining to ‘the political repercussions of “trading with an enemy”. Even if positive 
economic measures stand a relative chance of success, governments might be 
reluctant to reward a government that they otherwise find to be politically or morally 
                                                
122 Mastanduno, ‘Economic Statecraft’ (2008), p. 175. 
123 Ibid., pp. 183-184. See also Mastanduno, ‘Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National 
Security’ (1999), p. 309. 
124 Abdelal & Kirshner, Op cit., p. 122. 
125 Mastanduno, ‘Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security’ (1999), p. 309. 
43 
 
repugnant.’126 Moreover, insofar as economic statecraft is employed to make an 
immediate or short-term change in another state’s behaviour, policy makers tend to 
resort more often to negative sanctions than to positive ones, which Daniel Drezner 
attributes to the former’s cost effectiveness relative to the latter.127 It might be argued 
that the cost borne by the sanctioning state through economic coercion, though 
potentially high in the short term, is likely to be lower than the long-term costs of 
positive sanctions, especially if the target state involves the sanctioning state in 
recurring blackmail for further bribes. This argument is in line with Hirschman’s 
dictum, cited above, that the cost of coercion to the sanctioning state ‘is not unlike the 
harm an aggressive country can do to itself in making war on another’; whereas 
positive sanctions can be compared to appeasement, which will not necessarily 
change the behaviour of the target state. However, as Mastanduno reminds us, 
negative and positive forms of economic statecraft need not be mutually exclusive: 
‘Positive and negative measures can be used as complementary instruments of 
statecraft. Positive economic sanctions can set up the threat or use of negative ones by 
developing the economic dependence of the target on the sanctioning country. 
Similarly, negative sanctions can structure opportunities for the use of positive 
measures. Once negative sanctions have been in place, lifting them is a change from 
the status quo for which sanctioning states can derive some concession in return.’128 
 This, in turn, leads to the important issue of the short- versus long-term 
effectiveness of economic statecraft. There seems to be a general consensus that 
economic statecraft is more, if not only, efficacious in the long run: ‘From whichever 
viewpoint economic instruments [of foreign policy] are viewed there can be little 
doubt that they are slow-moving in their impact,’ writes Hill.129 Even so, Mastanduno 
distinguishes between two types of positive sanctions, the first of which is short-term 
and whose logic might also be applied to negative sanctions. ‘The first [type] involves 
the promise of a well-specified economic concession in an effort to alter specific 
foreign or domestic policies of the target government’, he writes, calling ‘this version 
tactical linkage; others refer to “carrots,” or “specific positive linkage.” … Specific 
sanctions operate at a more immediate level: The sanctioning state calculates that the 
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provision of a particular type of economic reward will be sufficient to convince 
policymakers in the target state to reconsider their existing foreign or domestic 
policies.’130 The same might be said of punitive economic measures when enforcing 
negative sanctions in (often vain) hopes of short-term success in economic statecraft. 
The other type of positive sanctions Mastanduno discusses is informed by a 
different logic, in line with Hirschman’s argument that the influence effect alters the 
interests of the target state, but which bears repeating. This second version, which 
Mastanduno terms ‘structural linkage and which others refer to as “general positive 
linkage” or “long-term engagement”, involves an effort to use a steady stream of 
economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of political interests within a target 
country. Structural linkage tends to be unconditional; the benefits are not turned on 
and off according to changes in target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects 
instead that sustained economic engagement will eventually produce a political 
transformation and desirable changes in target behaviour.’131 Hill states that it is in the 
long run that the use of economic statecraft has the most profound impact,132 but in 
order to be effective, Mastanduno reminds us, ‘economic engagement requires a 
patient, sustained commitment on the part of the sanctioning state.’133 Though the 
slow but long-term effects of economic statecraft have often been criticised in the 
literature, particularly by realists, Baldwin counters that ‘this is not necessarily the 
“inherent weakness” it is often made out to be. Quicker is not always better.’134 The 
altered interests of countries resulting from economic engagement is not without 
drawbacks, however, as the vested interests of the sanctioning state are also changed 
in favour of maintaining these economic relations: ‘The deepening of interdependence 
has the potential to tie the hands of sanctioning state policy officials, should they 
decide in the future that they need to abandon engagement and adopt a more 
confrontational foreign policy strategy.’135 
 Lastly, as a rebuttal to those who denigrate the utility and effectiveness even 
of long-term economic statecraft, Baldwin stresses that ‘[t]he effects of economic 
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statecraft are rarely sudden or dramatic but rather tend to be slow, circuitous, and 
unexciting. “Economic variables,” as Gilpin observes, “tend to be accretive. Although 
sudden and dramatic economic changes can and do take place, in general the 
influence of economic changes tends to be cumulative, building up over decades or 
even centuries.” This low profile makes it easy to overlook the effects of economic 
statecraft.’136 He recalls that ‘one of the most important foreign policy goals for most 
countries is how to get other countries to contribute to the enhancement of their 
economic welfare’, and concludes: 
 
No other technique of statecraft even begins to approach international trade for 
effectiveness in promoting this important foreign policy goal. International 
economic exchange is one of the most spectacularly successful examples of 
international influence in history; yet it is rarely so described. Why? Because 
routine, mundane, day-to-day economic exchange is often defined as either not 
involving power or as not being “real” foreign policy. Such conceptions of 
power or foreign policy have important effects on conclusions about the efficacy 
of economic techniques of statecraft. … It is easy to overestimate the 
importance of the spectacular, the unusual, the dramatic, the extraordinary while 
underestimating the cumulative impact of everyday things that we take for 
granted. The “low politics” of economic exchange may not be very noticeable 
on any given day; but over the long haul, it is one of the most important 
influence mechanisms in the world.137 
 
 
Causal Factors That Determine Effective Economic Statecraft 
Fairly early in his seminal work on the subject, Economic Statecraft, Baldwin 
advocates that what is clearly needed in this sub-field of International Relations and 
Foreign Policy Analysis is ‘a conception of the instruments of policy that is 
independent of the causal conditions that determine success…. The instruments of 
policy, or techniques of statecraft, should thus be treated as properties of a single state 
and should be discussed without implying anything whatsoever about the probable 
effectiveness of an influence attempt employing a particular instrument.’138 Instead, 
he dedicates the bulk of his work to redefine, in the broadest terms, what ‘successful 
economic statecraft’ means. His statement was in large part a reaction to what he saw 
as a disproportionate focus on prescriptive approaches to the subject, rather than a 
systematic and more descriptive theory of economic statecraft, prior to the publication 
of his book. Though this is a valid point, given the scarcity of theoretical work on the 
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matter at that time, Lebow reminds us of perhaps an even more significant 
observation, made by Morgenthau, that ‘the role of international relations theory 
should never be limited to describing reality; it must educate actors about the 
necessity and feasibility of improving it.’139 More specifically, with regards to 
economic statecraft, William Norris agrees that ‘understanding exactly how states 
employ economics in practice to achieve their grand strategic objectives constitutes an 
important contribution to policy makers’ understanding of how states behave in the 
international system.’140 In that spirit, and since numerous authors have discussed the 
determining factors behind the effective use of economic instruments of statecraft, 
this sub-section will explore some of the main, and most addressed, criteria for 
successful economic statecraft. 
 Before analysing each of these factors individually, a crucial interpolation 
must first be made. Mastanduno states that economic statecraft is ‘part of the wider 
array of foreign policy instruments that states have at their disposal; more often than 
not, economic measures are used in conjunction with diplomatic and military ones as 
part of any government’s overall approach to addressing foreign policy problems and 
opportunities.’141 It is therefore a widespread and popular (if not completely accurate) 
view in International Relations that ‘[e]conomic sanctions are more effective when 
used in conjunction other techniques of statecraft.’ However, Baldwin quotes Harold 
Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan’s Power and Society in stating that the previous 
proposition is generally applicable to all forms of power: 
 
The forms of power are interdependent: a certain amount of several forms of 
power is a necessary condition for a great amount of any form. … Each form of 
power always involves a number of others, to degrees and in ways which must 
be separately determined, in principle, in each case. … In short, none of the 
forms of power can stand alone: each requires, for its acquisition as well as 
maintenance, the simultaneous exercise of other forms of power as well.142 
 
Which is why, as recognised by Hirschman, any examination of economic statecraft 
in general, and of the separate causal factors that determine its success in particular, 
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must presuppose all other things being equal: ‘In order to analyze the way in which 
foreign trade contributes to a certain distribution of power among the various nations, 
it must be isolated temporarily from the other determinants; for the purpose of this 
inquiry these other determinants may be impounded in a vast ceteris paribus upon 
which, for the sake of rendering our analysis more realistic, we shall have to draw 
from time to time.’143 
 In a recent paper,144 Norris argues there are four principal factors that 
determine the success of economic instruments of foreign policy, the first three of 
which are drawn from previous works on economic statecraft, while he further 
develops the fourth, which ‘has received comparatively little attention.’ These are: 
first, the relative importance of the issue at stake, which includes the scope and scale 
of the objectives(s) to which economic statecraft is directed, along with the costs 
incurred (economic and political) for both sanctioning and target states; second, the 
relative magnitude of, or overall dependence on, the economic interaction; third, the 
price elasticity of certain goods in the economic interaction, or how ‘strategic’ these 
goods are; (it should be noted that the second and third factors are somewhat related, 
in that they both amount to a form of dependence: on aggregate trade and on a 
specific good or commodity, respectively); and, fourth, the degree to which the state 
is able to control and implement that economic interaction, or the extent to which 
commercial actors are agents of the government. 
 
1. Scope, domain and cost of economic statecraft 
The first, and perhaps most important, determining factor behind an effective attempt 
at economic statecraft is reflected in Baldwin’s warning that ‘it may…be 
inappropriate to judge economic instruments without reference to underlying strategic 
purposes.’145 Indeed, economic sanctions have different purposes, from changing the 
domestic or international behaviour of a state, to affecting a target state’s economic or 
military capabilities, and even to undermine the very existence of a government, by 
attempting to bring about regime change.146 Thus, for Norris, the primary determinant 
of effective economic statecraft is the relationship between the ends sought and the 
means used to achieve those objectives: 
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The first factor that determines the likelihood of success is the purpose that 
economic statecraft is designed to achieve and how that end matches with the 
target state’s own objectives. As has been noted in the sanctions literature, 
success of economic statecraft often depends on the relative importance of the 
jeopardized economic interaction vis a vis the contentious issue area. The ends 
sought cannot be out of proportion with the economic means available to realize 
those ends. … Ceteris paribus, economic statecraft that has a more modest 
objective targeting a less recalcitrant state will meet with success more readily 
than economic statecraft with a grandiose goal targeting a state whose domestic 
political climate is not conducive to the sought objective. … In other words, for 
economic statecraft to be successful, the ends must be commensurate with the 
means. To the extent that the objective sought is out of proportion to the 
economic tools available, economic statecraft is unlikely to succeed.147 
 
However, Baldwin clarifies that it is useful to distinguish between the targets 
(or what he calls ‘domain’) and the objectives (what he calls the ‘scope’) of an 
influence attempt in foreign policy: 
 
The distinction refers to who is to be influenced (the target) and in what ways 
(the scope). Targets and objectives vary in number, specificity, and importance. 
In any given influence attempt, states may—and usually do—pursue more than 
one goal with respect to more than one target. … Not all goals or targets are 
equally important, but none is intrinsically unimportant. Thus, it may be useful 
to sort out the primary, secondary, and perhaps even tertiary goals and targets of 
a given influence attempt; but it is a mistake to assume that the content of such 
categories never varies. … Recognition that a given influence attempt may 
involve multiple goals and targets of varying generality and significance is an 
important first step for assessing the utility of various techniques of statecraft, 
especially economic ones.148 
 
Mastanduno, in turn, corroborates this point by stating that ‘Baldwin’s argument on 
the need to recognize that multiple objectives are at play in any sanctions attempt is 
compelling. The identification of sender objectives is obviously crucial to any 
assessment of the utility of economic sanctions in any particular case.’149 
 A further dimension of this causal factor is cost. The costs involved in an 
economic influence attempt, for both sanctioning and target state, are a key 
determinant in whether or not economic statecraft is likely to succeed. From the 
sender country’s standpoint, Baldwin notes, costs do not only have negative 
connotations, since ‘incurring costs adds to the credibility of mere words. Costs are 
widely regarded as a standard indicator of the intensity of one’s resolve. In statecraft, 
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observes [Thomas] Schelling, “words are cheap, not inherently credible when they 
emanate from an adversary. … Actions also prove something; significant actions 
incur some cost or risk and [thus] carry some evidence of their credibility.”’150 Thus, 
in Hanson’s recount of Baldwin’s argument, ‘[t]he message conveyed to the target 
nation is more imposing if it is sent at some evident cost to the sender. Cost is a 
disadvantage in itself, but it is also a sign of seriousness, and that may heighten the 
impact of the message.’151 
Baldwin then goes on to argue that even if strict compliance to a sanctioning 
country’s demands is not observed, some degree of success still takes place: 
 
[T]o the extent that economic sanctions increase a target country’s costs of 
noncompliance, power is being exerted even though no change occurs in the 
policies of the target country. … Thus, a typical conclusion is that sanctions 
succeeded in increasing the costs of intransigence to the target but failed to 
produce a political effect. From the standpoint of conventional power analysis, 
however, increased costs are political effects. Not all influence is manifest in 
terms of changes in policy; changes in the costs of noncompliance also 
constitute influence. The tendency to overlook this point contributes to 
underestimating the effectiveness of economic statecraft. 
 This problem may also be viewed in terms of the target country’s costs of 
compliance. The higher the costs of compliance, the more difficult the 
undertaking, and the higher the costs of noncompliance will have to be if the 
costs of compliance are to be offset by the influence attempt.152 
 
 Blanchard and Ripsman acknowledge this last point and further elaborate it by 
analysing target states’ incentives to resist or yield to economic statecraft based on 
costs to the target nation. Unlike Baldwin, their focus is not on the economic costs of 
compliance, but the political costs, ‘which are more important for target state 
calculations.’153 It should be noted, however, that despite concentrating on economic 
costs, Baldwin does acknowledge other forms of costs involved in economic 
statecraft: 
 
The tools of economic statecraft involve things measurable in terms of money, 
but that does not mean that the costs of using such techniques are measurable 
solely in economic terms. The costs of using economic statecraft, like the costs 
of any other kind of influence attempt, may be political, military, or 
psychological as well as economic. To pretend that the costs or benefits of 
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influence attempts can be calculated with great precision by even the most 
rational of decision makers would be false and misleading.154 
 
Because previous (mostly liberal) scholars have not been successful in their attempts 
to correlate the effectiveness of economic statecraft with the economic costs the 
sender state is able to impose on the target country – thus neglecting ‘the essentially 
political nature of the policy changes that sanctions seek to achieve’ – Blanchard and 
Ripsman’s argument is that ‘the efficacy of economic sanctions should depend not on 
the economic pain they promise, but on the corresponding political costs that the 
target state faces if it refuses to comply with the sender’s wishes as well as the 
political costs it will incur if it accedes to the sanctioning state’s demands.’155 The 
political costs of compliance to economic statecraft are, in turn, affected by a variety 
of international and domestic conditions, some of which will be explored more 
specifically in Chapter 4. 
 Thus, the variation in targets, objectives and the costs for both sender and 
target states should be taken into consideration before evaluating the effectiveness of 
an influence attempt through economic statecraft, including whether or not such an 
attempt has been successful, as Baldwin concludes: 
 
Power varies not only in degree but on several dimensions, including scope, 
domain, and cost. Thus, a simple dichotomy of “success/failure” obscures not 
only variations in degree but also the various dimensions for measuring success. 
Establishing the intended scope and domain of an influence attempt is a basic 
first step in assessing effectiveness. … To view the use of economic statecraft 
strictly in terms of securing compliance with explicit and publicly stated 
demands is to load the dice in favor of failure. Third parties, secondary goals, 
implicit and unstated goals are all likely to be significant components of such 
undertakings.156 
 
 
2. Magnitude of, and dependence on, the economic interaction 
The second determining factor for effective economic statecraft that Norris lists is the 
relative magnitude of the economic interaction – in other words, the relative 
importance of trade to one country vis-à-vis the other and the extent to which a target 
state is dependent on the economic relations it maintains with the sender or 
sanctioning state. Hirschman explains that  
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the difficulty of substituting country A as a market or supply source for country 
B may be said to depend not only on the absolute amount of A’s trade with B, 
but also on the importance of this trade relatively to B’s total trade. … The 
greater the percentage of exports and imports involved in a dominant market, the 
more difficult it will be to provide substitute markets and sources of supply. … 
If a nation with an absolute volume of trade imports from or exports to, a small 
trading nation, the trade they conduct together will inevitably result in a much 
higher percentage for the small than for the large trading nation.157 
 
As Norris exemplifies, ‘a country whose trade comprises 80% of its GDP will be 
much more sensitive to disruptions of that trade than one for whom trade plays only a 
minor role in its overall economy. The relative magnitude of the economic interaction 
ought to be fairly large for economic statecraft to be effective.’158  
This kind of exploitable trade dependence for the purposes of extracting 
benefits for political goals is analogous to Hirschman’s influence effect: 
 
What [Hirschman has] called the influence effect of foreign trade derives from 
the fact that the trade conducted between country A, on the one hand, and 
countries B, C, D, etc., on the other, is worth something to B, C, D, etc., and that 
they would therefore consent to grant A certain advantages—military, political, 
economic—in order to retain the possibility of trading with A. If A wants to 
increase its hold on B, C, D, etc., it must create a situation in which these 
countries would do anything in order to retain their foreign trade with A. Such a 
situation arises when it is extremely difficult and onerous for these countries: 
1) to dispense entirely with the trade they conduct with A, or 
2) to replace A as a market and a source of supply with other countries. 
The principles of a power policy relying on the influence effect of foreign 
trade are in their essence extremely simple: They are all designed to bring about 
this “ideal” situation. … The difficulty for country B, C, D, etc., of dispensing 
with the trade conducted with A seems to depend on three main factors: 
1) The total net gain to B, C, D, etc., of their trade with A; 
2) The length and the painfulness of the adjustment process which A may 
impose upon B, C, D, etc., by interrupting trade; 
3) The strength of the vested interests which A has created by its trade within 
the economies of B, C, D, etc.159 
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Thus Hirschman concludes that ‘the influence which one country exercises upon 
another through foreign trade is…likely to be larger the greater the immediate loss 
which it can inflict by stoppage of trade.’160 In other words, the more a target state 
benefits from trade with a sender state, the more dependent it is on that trade and the 
more vulnerable it is to interruption, thereby increasing the potential for effective 
(negative) economic statecraft. This is precisely the contention George Shambaugh 
makes, who also concurs that ‘the higher the level of dependence, the more likely it is 
that economic sanctions will work.’161 
 Baldwin takes this argument one step further by demonstrating that a similar 
logic of dependence is also at work in positive forms of economic statecraft, such as 
giving foreign aid to target or recipient states: 
 
Dependency on aid, like dependency on trade, stems from the opportunity costs 
of forgoing the relationship. Thus, the larger the gains from aid, the larger the 
costs of forgoing aid, and the greater the dependency on aid. The most 
asymmetrical case of aid dependency would be one in which one party…values 
the relationship very highly…and the other party…places little or no value on 
the relationship. Such a situation maximizes the potential influence of the 
indifferent party with respect to the dependent party. Since the former can make 
costless and credible threats to end the relationship.162 
 
For these reasons, the relative magnitude of an economic interaction between two 
countries, reflected in the level of economic dependence of a target state on a sender 
state, is a crucial factor in determining the effectiveness of economic statecraft, be it 
negative or positive. 
 
 3. ‘Strategic’ goods and their price elasticity 
The third factor that determines the effectiveness of economic statecraft is the extent 
to which a good involved in the economic interaction is ‘strategic’. Before delving 
into what is meant by a ‘strategic good’ for the purposes of this study, however, it is 
necessary first to point out what the concept usually refers to and why that narrow use 
of the concept is inappropriate. According to Baldwin, the basic intuitive notion 
behind the ‘strategic goods’ concept is that some goods ‘have more strategic value 
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than others. That is, for any given strategy, some things have more utility than 
others’.163 The traditional view that some goods are inherently more strategic than 
others – what Baldwin calls the ‘strategic goods fallacy’ – derives from the premise 
that ‘some goods are only strategic if they can be used for war, or converted for war, 
or processed into war-type goods.’ But as Schelling clarifies, this assumption ‘ignores 
the fact that a nation’s resources can be used to produce alternative goods.’164 
 Instead, Baldwin suggests that the ‘strategic’ value of a good is not inherent, 
but context-specific: 
 
The “strategic” quality of a good is a function of the situation; it is not intrinsic 
to the good itself. Thus, the question of how strategic an item is cannot be 
determined by examining the item itself; nor can it be determined by analyzing 
all the possible uses to which the item may be put. What is highly “strategic” 
with respect to one target country may not be very “strategic” at all with respect 
to another. … From the standpoint of international trade a “strategic” item is 
anything that is needed to pursue a given strategy and that is relatively 
inefficient to produce at home.165 
 
As Hanson notes, this is a common theme throughout the works of a number of key 
authors on the subject: ‘Schelling, Baldwin and [Peter] Wiles all consider that in 
particular circumstances, and when particular time-horizons are being considered, it 
can make sense to treat some goods as “strategic”. For Baldwin, however, these are 
not items identified by their being usable directly for military purposes. He suggests 
that the term is best reserved for items for which the target nation has a low price-
elasticity of demand and little scope for replacement with substitutes.’166 
 Hirschman also hints at demand inelasticity as a source of power between 
nations. A country (‘A’) that wants to gain power or influence over other nations 
through economic statecraft, he explains, ‘has to seek trading partners with an 
“urgent” demand for its export goods…which have no possibilities of themselves 
producing the commodities country A exports.’167 This in turn leads to another form 
of dependence of the target state on the exporting country (‘A’) – but on a single, 
‘strategic’ good produced by the sender state, rather than on the aggregate amount of 
trade conducted between the two nations – which will persist unless the target country 
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manages to diversify its consumption of the strategic good in question – (a topic 
which will be explored more specifically and in depth in the next chapter). Hirschman 
then goes on to prescribe a more concrete way to maintain such a power position over 
other countries: ‘A more specific policy by which a country could try to prevent its 
trading partners from diverting their trade to other countries would consist in the 
creation of monopolistic or monopsonistic conditions with regard to certain 
products.’168 
 Based on the arguments exposed above – and other, similar ones in the 
literature – Norris lists the price elasticity of ‘strategic’ goods as one of the four key 
determinants for the successful use of economic statecraft, and even illustrates it with 
an example that is directly relevant to this study, which will be elaborated further in 
the following chapter in this study: 
 
The third factor is the elasticity of demand (or, in some cases, supply) for the 
economic interaction. For economic statecraft to be effective, the nature of the 
economic interaction ought to be fairly inelastic. For example, a country whose 
domestic energy grid is based on light, sweet crude oil is not easily able to 
substitute alternative goods in place of this type of crude oil. Since energy also 
provides such a fundamental input for the rest of the economy, this country’s 
demand for light sweet crude would be said to be fairly inelastic. Thus, we can 
hypothesize that economic statecraft based on large, inelastic economic 
interaction has a greater likelihood of success, ceteris paribus.169 
 
 
 4. Principal-agent theory and government control of economic actors  
As Hill notes, ‘[m]ost economic statecraft is a question of making some use of what is 
happening anyway, through trade, investment or development aid.’170 However, 
Norris points out that even though ‘states have some discretion over the elasticity and 
relative magnitude of their various types of economic interactions, for the most part 
these conditions are driven by relatively exogenous, long-run economic 
dynamics…rather than deliberate state action per se.’ Although the three 
aforementioned factors – cost and scope of objectives, relative magnitude and 
dependence, and price elasticity of strategic goods – are ‘important for determining 
the ultimate effectiveness of economic statecraft,’ writes Norris, ‘the degree to which 
a government is able to control or direct the behavior of its commercial actors is the 
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critical element that has not been as well developed in the existing work on economic 
statecraft.’ This is conceptually significant because ‘the study of economic power, 
like most works in [I]nternational [R]elations, has focused on states as the unit of 
analysis. This analytical perspective risks overlooking the importance of commercial 
actors and the role that commercial actors play in attempts to realize strategic national 
objectives using economic means.’ Norris therefore devotes the bulk of his paper to 
answer the question of how states manipulate their commercial actors to behave in 
ways that support their political goals: ‘Despite the centrality of economic actors in 
explaining international economic power, these actors have not been adequately 
incorporated into a general theory of economic statecraft. As a result, we have little 
sense of the micro-foundations of economic statecraft as practiced in [the] grand 
strategy’ of a state’s foreign policy.171 
 The main problem in conceptualising a government’s control of its foreign 
economic relations to serve its political objectives, as Hill reminds us, is that 
‘international economic activity derives for the most part from the private sector, 
while foreign policy is largely the business of states. There is therefore an uneasy 
public-private relationship at the heart of economic statecraft.’172 Hirschman 
downplays this predicament by arguing that ‘it is not essential that the state should 
exercise positive action, i.e., organize and direct trade centrally’ for a state to derive 
power from its international economic relations; ‘the negative right of veto on trade 
with which every sovereign state is invested is quite sufficient.’173 While his 
contention may have made more sense at the time of his writing in the early 1940s, 
today it is too simple a dismissal, particularly in an age of globalisation and economic 
interdependence. In the current international system, writes Hill, ‘where capital moves 
far more freely and trade liberalization has become entrenched, it is far more difficult 
for governments either to act unilaterally on major aspects of political economy or to 
disrupt the normal workings of the market for anything less than a national 
emergency.’174 However, Norris maintains that ‘even in a modern, liberal economic 
system in which states themselves are not directly responsible for conducting the 
majority of economic interaction, states can create incentives for commercial actors to 
behave in ways that…are conducive to a state’s strategic interests.’ In fact, it is 
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precisely this sort of state manipulation of economic interaction that Norris defines as 
economic statecraft,175 which is in line with Baldwin’s definition of statecraft, which 
is not necessarily practised only by governments, but also by other (non-state) actors. 
This then leads to the final causal factor for effective economic statecraft, according 
to Norris: 
 
The fourth factor determining the likelihood of success [in economic statecraft] 
is the state’s ability to control or direct its economic interaction. The degree to 
which a state is able to direct its economic interaction is largely a function of its 
domestic economic system—in particular, the nature of its business-government 
relations. … The nature of these relations often determines the degree to which 
the state has control over the specific conduct of its economic interaction with 
other states. Ceteris paribus, states with a greater degree of control over their 
domestic economy will be better suited to direct their economic interaction and 
thus more likely to realize success in their attempts to engage in economic 
statecraft.176 
 
It is important to remember, though, as Hill recalls, that ‘despite the ambiguities of 
the public-private relationship from the point of view of the [sanctioning] actor, from 
that of the recipient the distinction may seem trivial and the reality that of external 
pressure, even neo-colonialism.’177 
 On the other hand, Hill also raises the issue that while the long-run use of 
economic power by states ‘has proved over the past fifty years to be the most 
effective way of pursuing foreign policy goals – so long as you are rich, powerful and 
capitalist’ – it is nevertheless much ‘more complex to operate in an era of laissez-faire 
than one of autarky’.178 This in turn leads to a fundamental contradiction, identified 
by Norris, concerning the government-business relations of a state and its foreign 
policy ramifications: 
 
A basic paradox confronts states seeking to exercise economic power. To be 
effective at directing its economic power, a state needs to be able to direct its 
economic activities. However, as demonstrated by states with centrally directed 
economies, the more a government, rather than markets, is in charge of directing 
a state’s economic behavior, the less efficient the state’s economic productivity 
tends to be.179 Over time, this lower economic productivity limits the size of a 
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nation’s economy. The smaller or less powerful a state’s economy is, the less 
intrinsic weight the state has to throw around… [‘Of course, if the economy 
provides a unique, critical good (e.g. something with highly inelastic demand), 
the state can also derive considerable influence from the inelasticity (rather than 
the magnitude) dimension of its international economic relations.’]180 So 
although a state needs to be able to direct its economic might for economic 
statecraft to be effective, too much state direction tends to lead to inefficiency 
and a less robust economy overtime. Likewise an economy in which the state is 
relegated to a very small role may grow to exceptional proportions, but the state 
will find it difficult to meaningfully direct this latent economic power in any 
concerted way. This is the essence of the paradox inherent in the exercise of 
national economic power.181 
 
Governments then resolve this paradox by making a fundamental choice with regards 
to the economic system, and resulting government-business relations, of their states, 
depending on the extent to which they wish to interfere in (if not control) their 
economy. It is therefore not surprising, for Mastanduno, that ‘powerful states—those 
with strong economies and many economic instruments at their disposal—are more 
likely than weaker states to initiate economic statecraft as a key foreign policy 
measure.’182 
 From a theoretical perspective, this choice is reflected in a diversity of 
possible mechanisms of interaction between principals and their agents, postulated in 
the ‘principal-agent problem’ (or ‘agency dilemma’), which provides an appropriate 
conceptual framework for analysing states’ implementation of economic statecraft 
through commercial actors. To recapitulate, Norris’ summary of the principal-agent 
relationship is instructive: 
 
At the heart of principal-agent theory lies a very simple concept: principals have 
one set of goals and objectives but they must rely on agents to act on their behalf 
to realize them. The wrinkle lies in that agents often have a different set of goals 
and objectives derived from the incentives that they face as autonomous actors. 
So the challenge becomes one of aligning the agents’ incentives such that they 
will act in a manner that furthers the principal’s goals. This is the principal-
agent…problem in brief. 
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 The dynamics present in the principal-agent relationship mirror those present 
in the relationship between the state and commercial actors when the state 
exercises economic statecraft. The state (acting as the principal) desires to 
achieve some strategic national objective through the use of economics. 
However, in many economies, the practice of economic interaction is actually 
conducted by commercial actors. As such, if the state seeks to manipulate [its] 
economic interaction [with another country,] and this economic interaction is 
being conducted on a day-to-day basis by commercial actors, the state must face 
up to the challenges of working through a proxy—namely, the commercial 
actors. Thus, the dynamics highlighted by principal-agent theory provide a 
useful guide for framing the issues that arise when states must work with 
commercial actors.183 
 
Consequently, states that do not have full control over their economic actors must be 
able to surmount the principal-agent problem involved in their government-business 
relations, in order for their economic statecraft to be successful. 
 
In conclusion, all four determining factors proposed by Norris are required for an 
effective implementation of economic statecraft to take place: 
 
If a state can overcome the principal-agent challenges, and the other 
three…variables (Relative Magnitude, Elasticity and Commensurate Purpose) 
are present, then we are likely to see states being able to realize their strategic 
goals through the use of economics. In this manner, overcoming the principal-
agent challenges are a necessary but not sufficient requirement for economic 
statecraft. Without state manipulation of commercial actors, economic 
statecraft does not exist. At the same time, although state manipulation of 
commercial actors is an important factor for the success of economic 
statecraft, on its own it is not sufficient for effectiveness—state manipulation 
also relies on favorable values across the other three…variables for effective 
economic statecraft to occur.184 
 
However, it is important to bear in mind, as Hill reminds us, that ‘sanctions are not 
precise tools whose impact can be predicted with confidence. Rather, they can usually 
be parried, if the target is prepared (as they usually are, given the threat to their 
reputation for sovereign independence) to pay the inevitable price for defying states 
on whom they are dependent, and at times the whole international community.’ This 
is why a further factor is crucial in analysing whether any economic statecraft attempt 
can be successful: the context in which it takes place – a topic which will be explored 
at length in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Energy Statecraft: Energy Resources as Foreign Policy Instruments 
 
 
For more than a century, write Carlos Pascual and Evie Zambetakis, ‘energy, politics 
and power have been clearly intertwined as a force in international security.’185 
Despite the centrality of energy to a state’s national security and the role of energy in 
international relations, Brenda Shaffer reminds us that ‘professional journals in 
international relations and political science have paid scant attention to publishing 
research on the topic.’ During periods of tight energy market conditions, however, 
‘there has generally been an increase in scholarly publications dealing with energy. 
For instance, following the 1973-74 oil crisis, a number of publications in major 
political science and international relations outlets appeared that dealt with energy.’186 
This is also true of the more recent five-year steady rise in oil prices since 2003 – 
which culminated in the summer of 2008 with a historical record price of $147.27 a 
barrel – during which time renewed academic attention was paid to the role of energy 
in international relations. 
Energy as an instrument of foreign policy is a more specific form of economic 
statecraft, for energy resources are economic resources, after all. As such, they have 
essentially similar conceptual characteristics. They are also alike academically in the 
sense that what relatively little research has been done on energy in International 
Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis, like the literature on economic statecraft up to 
David Baldwin’s seminal work by the same title in 1985, ‘tends to be narrowly 
focused and topical rather than general and theoretical.’187 Thus, given the relative 
lack of theoretical research on energy statecraft so far, the current chapter will use the 
theoretical framework of economic statecraft delineated in the previous chapter as a 
conceptual model for the present study, while also building on some of the more 
recent works on energy in International Relations. 
 This chapter follows a similar structure to the previous one – although more 
narrowly focused on energy, rather than economic, statecraft – while exploring the 
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characteristics that are specific to energy resources in contrast to most other economic 
instruments of foreign policy. It begins with a conceptual discrimination between 
three distinct but interrelated terms that are often applied interchangeably to energy in 
International Relations – security, diplomacy and statecraft – in order to clarify a 
certain level of theoretical confusion in the literature. Next is a brief discussion of the 
different types of energy statecraft, which is not just limited to the same typology as 
economic statecraft – namely negative, positive, short and long term – but also 
explores how the various types of primary energy sources can (or cannot) be 
implemented as instruments of statecraft. Then, following the same model used in the 
previous chapter, the four causal factors that determine the effective use of economic 
techniques of statecraft – ends-means commensurability, market power and 
dependence, price elasticity, and government control of economic agents – will be 
applied specifically to energy statecraft. Lastly, in order to avoid merely ‘showcasing’ 
the efficacy of energy statecraft, this chapter lists a series of inherent and potential 
obstacles and limits to the use of energy resources as instruments of foreign policy. 
 
Security, Diplomacy & Statecraft: 3 Different but Interrelated Energy Concepts 
‘Even though David Baldwin’s work has been of seminal importance for the academic 
recognition of economic statecraft as an indispensable “portfolio” of policy means in 
the service of a nation’s strategic goals,’ Theodore Tsakiris calls attention to the fact 
that nowhere does Baldwin make a specific reference to energy-related concepts188 – 
such as security, diplomacy or statecraft – despite energy resources permeating every 
‘aspect of social life in terms of the production and consumption of wealth that is 
measurable in terms of money’, as Baldwin defines.189 However, energy resources are 
distinct from all other goods and commodities that can be utilised for economic 
statecraft. In fact, Baldwin’s disdain for the idea of ‘strategic goods’ notwithstanding 
– namely that ‘for any given strategy, some things have more utility than others’190  – 
energy resources are probably among the few (if not the only) goods that qualify as 
being strategic for any given strategy. Energy resources also fit Baldwin’s more 
restrictive use of the term, seen from most energy-importers’ position, in that they are 
‘items for which the target nation has a low price-elasticity of demand and little scope 
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for replacement with substitutes.’191 Yet energy resources are not only strategic to 
importers, but are strategically vital commodities for all civilized countries. 
 Having access to energy supplies is crucial for the survival of a state both in 
security and in economic terms, and has been ‘fundamental to any position of power 
in the world’ since the Industrial Revolution, according to the first US Secretary of 
Energy, James Schlesinger,192 whose Department was created in 1977 as a response to 
the extended energy crisis of the 1970s and the ensuing ‘need for unified energy 
organization and planning’ in the US government.193 Like many others, Michael Klare 
asks why energy has come to play such a pivotal role in world affairs, and gives a 
thorough answer on its importance to the power of states: 
 
To begin with, its continued availability—in great profusion—has never been as 
critical to the healthy operation of the global economy. Energy is required to 
keep the factories humming, power the cities and suburbs that house the world’s 
rising population, and produce the crops that feed the planet. Most important, 
petroleum products are utterly essential to sustain the international sinews of 
globalization—the planes, trains, trucks, and ships that carry goods and people 
from one region of the planet to another. … Without…additional energy, the 
world economy will fall into recession or depression, the globalization project 
will fail, and the planet could descend into chaos. 
But the wheels of industry are not the only ones to slow down without an 
abundant supply of energy; military forces are equally dependent on a copious 
infusion of critical fuels. For major powers like United States that rely on 
airpower and mechanized ground forces to prevail in conflict, the need for 
petroleum products multiplies with each new advance in weapons technology.194 
 
The ubiquitous need for energy in almost every possible way of modern, 
civilized life inevitably makes energy inseparable from politics in all countries and 
often also with each other, as Shaffer notes: ‘Energy trends and international politics 
are innately interconnected and energy security is an integral part of the foreign and 
national security policy of states.’195 Because energy is so intertwined with everything 
else, it generates interdisciplinary debates, often brandishing different terms 
interchangeably to mean the same thing or employing the same expression with 
different meanings. Thus, before delving into the subject of energy as an instrument 
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of foreign policy, a distinction must first be made between three different energy-
related concepts – energy security, energy diplomacy and energy statecraft – whose 
definitions are sometimes confused or overlapping in the literature, and how they 
relate to each other. 
 
Energy Security 
Given the basic need for energy to fuel all aspects of a state’s economic activity, 
energy security, in its most fundamental sense, means having the ‘assurance of the 
ability to access the energy resources required for the continued development of 
national power’,196 sustained economic performance and growth. In the simplest, un-
politicised, economic terms, it is defined as ‘reliable supply at affordable prices in the 
case of consuming nations and as reliable demand at sustainable prices in the case of 
producing nations.’197 More specifically, the concept comprises a different number of 
elements, depending on the author, that constitute an overall definition of the term 
energy security. Among many similar classifications – most of which consist of 
reliability and affordability of energy supplies, but increasingly also environmental 
sustainability – Jonathan Elkind provides one of the most comprehensive definitions 
of the term, involving four basic elements, including one that is often taken for 
granted and only mentioned implicitly, namely availability: 
 
Availability 
First and foremost, energy security stems from the availability of energy goods 
and services—consumers’ ability to secure the energy that they need. 
Availability requires the existence of commercial energy markets in which 
buyers and sellers trade energy goods and services, markets that take shape only 
when parties agree on terms that accommodate the commercial, economic, 
political strategic, and other interests of buyers, sellers, and shippers. Mutuality 
of interest among the players in the value chain is therefore a prerequisite for 
energy security. … 
Reliability 
Reliability involves the extent to which energy services are protected from 
interruption. Energy is an essential building block of economic activity; it 
enables daily life. Interruptions jeopardize the ability to run factories, illuminate 
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hospitals, and heat homes continuously. In certain cases, therefore, energy 
reliability can be a matter of life and limb. … 
Affordability 
Energy that is not affordable in absolute terms is energy that cannot be used… 
However, the affordability element of energy security is not just a question of 
whether energy prices are low or high relative to disposable income. The 
volatility of prices is even more central. Price shocks often cause serious 
humanitarian or economic hardship, even political instability, as energy 
consumers struggle to cope with unexpected financial burdens. Prices reflect 
market circumstances and signal market expectations, which in turn influence 
consumer choices and investment decisions, whether in favor of consumption or 
conservation. However, even in wealthy countries, when prices deviate seriously 
from established expectations, consumers find it hard to make rapid changes in 
their energy consumption. 
Sustainability 
In the past, definitions of energy security typically did not include 
environmental considerations. However, a contemporary approach to energy 
security must place emphasis on environmental sustainability, for several 
reasons: 
 —Energy infrastructure typically is long-lived. Decisions made today will 
have long-term implications for how energy is produced, converted, stored, and 
used. … 
 —Promoting energy security without including sustainability will promote use 
of technologies and practices that will exacerbate climate change. … 
 —Climate change clearly will affect energy systems profoundly. For example, 
rising sea levels will require redesign and re-construction of the transportation 
infrastructure that serves energy systems—from oil terminals to shoreline rail 
and road systems.198 
 
Even so, despite the fact that all elements are essential to ensure the overall energy 
security of a state, countries tend to prioritise some elements of energy security over 
others – with the exception of availability, whose necessity is self-explanatory – as 
Shaffer exemplifies: ‘the United States gives deference to reliability of supplies. The 
EU and its component states tend to place priority on affordability and friendliness to 
the environment, taking bigger risks with supply reliability. China emphasizes 
reliability of supply more than affordability or friendliness to the environment.’199 
These elements have also been emphasised differently though time, not just space, 
with reliability being the main concern in the 1920s, for instance, while affordability 
became a crucial concern during the oil crises of the 1970s, and sustainability 
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appeared as an issue from the 1980s onwards, as the environmental movement gained 
momentum. 
 Access to energy resources is so critical to a state that Henry Kissinger 
remarked in 1982, only a couple of years after the second oil price spike of the 1970s, 
that ‘aside from military defense, there is no project of more central importance to 
national security and indeed independence as a sovereign nation than energy 
security’200 – a proposition many agree with. However, the underlying problem with 
this prioritisation is that military forces also depend on energy to fuel the diverse 
modes of transportation required to mobilise them, not to mention the production of 
their weapons and transports. Thus, in that sense, one could argue that energy security 
trumps military defence in national security priority, since the latter cannot function 
fully without ensuring the former. 
‘Notwithstanding obvious market concerns,’ with such high importance 
attached to it, Adam Stulberg argues, it follows that ‘energy security is fundamentally 
“politicized,” as states allow foreign ambitions to alter their behavior in energy 
markets; employ political instruments to advance their position in energy markets; 
and exploit this standing to influence the strategic behavior of target states.’201 What 
is interesting about Stulberg’s statement is that it implicitly takes account of all three 
energy-related concepts, without distinguishing them as separate: energy security as 
being politicised; energy diplomacy in the use of political instruments to acquire 
energy resources; and energy statecraft in using energy as a tool to change the 
behaviour of other states, respectively. This, in turn, raises the analytical need to 
differentiate between these concepts, which relates back to the ends-means analysis 
problem described at the beginning of the previous chapter. States’ need for energy 
security gives rise both to energy diplomacy for energy importers in search of the 
former (or producers in search of markets), and to energy statecraft for energy 
exporters that exploit importers’ energy dependence that ensures their energy security. 
Whereas energy diplomacy is a political instrument used to achieve a strictly energy-
related goal (namely, energy security), energy statecraft makes use of energy 
resources as an instrument – by manipulating another actor’s need for energy security 
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with one’s own energy resources – to advance political aims that are not necessarily 
energy related. In simpler terms, energy diplomacy uses political means for energy 
ends, while energy statecraft uses energy means for political ends. 
 
Energy Diplomacy 
Sascha Müller-Kraenner describes ‘the political discipline aimed at making states 
more “energy secure” as energy foreign policy.’202 However, foreign policy includes 
both goals and instruments, and the previous definition portrays energy security as the 
objective of ‘energy foreign policy’. Insofar as energy security has a different 
meaning for consumers and producers, in their search for supplies and markets, 
respectively, Müller-Kraenner’s definition denotes increased energy exchange 
between importers and exporters as an end in itself – in other words, energy 
diplomacy – rather than the manipulation of this exchange for other political goals, 
which is better termed energy statecraft, in order to be distinguished from the former 
term. Taking this distinction into account, one of the most complete definitions of 
energy diplomacy – that does not implicitly reference or encompass elements of 
statecraft – is provided by Andreas Goldthau: 
 
The term commonly connotes the way countries give their energy companies a 
competitive edge in bidding for resources by using the state’s power: consumer 
countries strengthen their supply situation by diplomatically flanking energy 
contracts, whereas producer countries use diplomacy to enhance access to 
markets or reserves. 
… Despite a myriad of contributions linking the term to the nexus of energy, 
foreign policy, and supply security, there is no consensus on what exactly the 
term energy diplomacy means. … As a general pattern, the term is used mostly 
in the geopolitics-informed debate on access to resources and points to a 
strategic and instrumental use of foreign policy to secure a country’s energy 
supplies. … 
 While a generally accepted definition of energy diplomacy does not exist, it 
would seem appropriate to define the term as the use of foreign policy to secure 
access to energy supplies abroad and to promote (mostly bilateral, that is, 
government to government) cooperation in the energy sector. This definition 
suggests that the primary units of analysis are states or state actors; that the 
primary driver behind the conclusion of oil and gas deals is not necessarily 
maximizing business opportunities but national security goals; and that the 
underlying cost-benefit calculations do not follow an economic logic but rather a 
political one.203 
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 The above description, as much recent academic literature and media coverage 
have revealed, is illustrative of the behaviour of some of the rising powers of the past 
decade, China in particular. Such states ‘have backstopped the activities of their state 
companies, donated or sold arms to producers at reduced prices, and offered 
construction projects as side payments for access to resources’, writes Edward 
Morse.204 Despite the latest hype in public discourse about energy security in general 
and energy diplomacy in particular, Goldthau explains that the phenomenon of energy 
diplomacy is nothing new: 
 
Oil and gas have always been politically charged commodities and, hence, have 
been subject to significant government intervention. … Yet the current trend 
toward energy diplomacy coincides with the general perception that global 
energy politics has become a zero-sum game, in which one country’s energy 
security is another’s lack thereof. Energy diplomacy has thus emerged as a 
powerful concept in public discourse. … A decade-long period of oversupply on 
oil and gas and resulting low prices calmed public debate on these issues. It is 
only since the turn of the new millennium, when supply-demand balances both 
in global oil markets and in regional gas markets tightened again, that energy 
diplomacy has come to receive renewed attention.205 
 
In spite of this renewed academic attention to the general subject of energy politics, 
what little literature there is on energy security is mostly focused on energy 
diplomacy, while comparatively little has been written on the concept of energy 
statecraft, which is the subject of this study and to which we now turn. 
 
Energy Statecraft 
‘Energy is both a factor that influences a state’s foreign policy outcomes and a 
potential tool of foreign policy’ writes Shaffer. ‘During periods of tight international 
energy market conditions, energy tends to become a more prominent factor and tool in 
states’ foreign policies and a higher priority on their policy agenda. At these times, 
energy needs affect the foreign policies of importers as well as exporters.’206 Energy 
statecraft as an instrument of foreign policy – in contrast to energy diplomacy, which 
is used by net energy importers to reach the objective of securing their energy needs – 
is reserved for energy-exporting countries for a very simple reason, as Christopher 
Hill elucidates: ‘When it comes to choosing the instruments with which to act, the 
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differences between states do come into play. The wide variation in state capacities is 
a key determinant of what can even be attempted in the outside world.’207 
Consequently, only states that possess sufficient reserves of energy resources to be net 
exporters thereof, ipso facto, can make use of energy statecraft as one of their foreign 
policy instruments. In the simplest terms, therefore, energy statecraft means the use of 
a sender state’s domestic energy resources as a means to get one or more other 
international actors to do what they would otherwise not do, in order to achieve the 
political goals of the sender state’s foreign policy. This is achieved by manipulating 
or exploiting another actor’s fundamental need for energy security, without which 
energy statecraft is likely to be ineffective, if not an outright exercise in futility. 
 While some scholars treat energy statecraft as a subset of economic statecraft, 
others view it as its own category of foreign policy instruments. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter’s first section, Charles Hermann’s broader typology of foreign 
policy instruments  includes eight, rather than the usual four categories (cultural, 
diplomatic, economic and military), in which energy statecraft falls into the category 
of natural resources, as opposed to being a specific type of economic statecraft: 
 
Natural resources instruments involve the potential or actual use of natural 
resources, or knowledge thereof, in the conduct of foreign policy activities. 
Skills and resources used in the development and protection of natural resources 
as well as their cultivation or extraction are included. No assumption is made 
concerning the level of expertise involved in these activities (for example, 
primitive farming could be included). Resources include not only the natural 
products (for example, fossil fuels, food, ores, timber, water) but also equipment 
necessary for their development and use. A potential overlap exists between this 
category of instruments and those classified as scientific/technological.208 There 
is an important distinction, however. The natural resources category makes no 
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necessary presumption of the application of the methods of science. In some 
parts of the world enormous technological investments have been made to 
capture and use natural resources, but in other areas the use of natural resources 
has not necessarily involved modern technology. … The government of a 
developing country may engage in considerable foreign policy activity using a 
recognized natural resource as an instrument even before it has the capability to 
employ that resource…209 
 
However, there are also good reasons to view energy statecraft as part of a 
wider array of economic instruments of foreign policy, given their similarity in the 
sense that they both use resources that can be measured in terms of money, as 
Stulberg explains: 
 
Typically, the practice of statecraft involves the use of diverse policy 
instruments. Economic statecraft, for example, relies primarily on applying 
resources that have discernable market prices. The most widely analyzed forms 
are sanctions and inducements that entail the actual or threatened 
withdrawal/extension of economic resources to prompt policy change. Similarly, 
energy statecraft involves increasing or decreasing access to a resource, as well 
as to related property rights, pipelines, investment capital, prices and tariffs that 
are extended to deter, contain, or coerce a target. These tools of statecraft 
contrast with the value of military and diplomatic techniques that are generally 
stipulated in terms of violence, symbols, or negotiation.210 
 
The key difference, and main reason why energy statecraft is treated as its own 
category of statecraft in this study, is that the resources used in energy statecraft are 
‘strategic goods’ vital to any functioning economy and whose price elasticity is low 
and is not easily substitutable, unlike most other resources employed in economic 
statecraft more generally. 
 ‘Energy supplies are frequently viewed by suppliers, consumers, and transit 
states as a potential tool to promote foreign policy and security goals’, notes Shaffer, 
and recently ‘there has been considerable commentary warning about the danger of 
the “oil weapon” and the “gas weapon.” For example, U.S. senator Richard Lugar (R-
Ind.), a leading U.S. lawmaker on foreign policy issues, has stated that “the use of 
energy as an overt weapon is not a theoretical threat of the future; it is happening 
now.”’211 When exporters such as Russia, Venezuela and Iran overtly use energy 
exports as a tool to promote their foreign policy goals, Shaffer writes, ‘Europe and the 
United States regularly decry the use of energy as a “weapon” rather than accept it as 
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a standard and legitimate tool of foreign policy.’ She further argues that ‘for energy 
exporters and important energy-transit states, energy supply is as much a part of the 
policy arsenal as other economic tools, military power, and diplomatic tactics. States 
are no more likely to refrain from using energy to promote their policy goals than to 
ignore economic or military means of doing so.’212 
 Such commentaries coincide with the increasing use of the ‘energy weapon’ at 
the onset of the twenty-first century, when runaway demand for energy resources 
outstripped supply and oil and other energy prices rose to unprecedented levels, 
leading to academic speculation that the world has entered a new era for energy 
security – a topic which will be explored in depth in the next chapter. As a 
consequence, Klare reasons, ‘the problem of “energy security”—as it is widely 
termed—has climbed toward the top rung of the international ladder of unease and 
concern. Not surprisingly, this has fundamentally changed the perception of what 
constitutes “power” and “influence” in a dramatically altered international system, 
forcing policymakers to view the global power equation in entirely new ways.’213 To 
cite Senator Lugar again, in this allegedly new energy era, power in the international 
system shifts to countries with energy reserves.214 Klare goes even further, arguing 
that  
 
military superiority does not constitute the decisive, or even necessarily the 
leading, determinant of global paramountcy in this troubled new era. Other 
factors have come to rival military power in importance, and one—energy—has 
acquired unexpectedly vast significance. 
 In this new, challenging political landscape, the possession of potent military 
arsenals can be upstaged by the ownership of mammoth reserves of oil, natural 
gas, and other sources of primary energy. Hence, Russia, which escaped the 
Cold War era in a shattered, demoralized condition, has reemerged as a major 
actor in the international arena by virtue of its colossal energy resources. For all 
its military might, the United States has, in contrast, sometimes found itself 
reduced to cajoling its foreign oil suppliers…to increase their petroleum output 
in order to slow the upward spiral in energy prices. The “sole superpower” has, 
in short, found itself scrambling…to somehow come to terms with what U.S. 
Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) has termed “petro-superpowers”—nations 
that wield disproportionate power in the international system by virtue of their 
superior energy reserves. … 
When military power was the principal determinant of a nation’s global 
ranking, nuclear-armed behemoths like the United States and the Soviet Union 
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occupied the top stratum and were able to influence the behavior of lower-
ranked powers. Admittedly, military prowess still conveys an advantage in 
today’s world, but it increasingly finds itself overshadowed by the clout of 
energy abundance. Saudi Arabia, for example, with a negligible military, 
commands substantial leverage in world affairs due to its possession of the 
world’s largest known petroleum reserves. Even countries with smaller oil 
inheritances, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Angola, and Sudan, are coming to 
enjoy influence disproportionate to their size and condition. The governing elites 
of these energy-surplus states have been able to exploit their privileged status to 
wring concessions of various sorts from their principal customers—whether in 
the form of political support at international institutions like the U.N. Security 
Council, the transfer of arms and military assistance, or even a disinclination by 
their clients to probe conspicuous human rights abuses.215  
 
 However, like energy diplomacy, energy statecraft is nothing new. The most 
blatant and infamous use of energy statecraft, in the form of the ‘oil weapon’, was 
employed by the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) on 16 October 1973, ten days after the Yom Kippur War erupted 
between Israel and an Egyptian-Syrian alliance. These countries unilaterally 
announced a 70 per cent increase in the price of oil, and on the next day announced 
production cuts of 5 per cent and an additional 5 per cent for every following month 
until Israel withdrew from the territories it had occupied since 1967, in addition to a 
full oil embargo on the countries that had supported Israel during the war, causing 
severe economic damage to energy-importing countries around the globe. The 
ensuing recession – by then the worst since the Great Depression – led many member 
states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to 
change their stance on the Israeli conflict and take heed to the plight of the Palestinian 
people, two of the goals behind OPEC’s use of the ‘oil weapon’ (though the main goal 
of Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967 was not achieved).  
Nevertheless, the 1973 embargo and the resulting oil price spike ‘led to the 
emergence of new power centers in international affairs. Oil-exporting countries, 
either individually or through OPEC, began to play a more prominent role in 
[international] politics.’ In Daoudi and Dajani’s view, ‘one cannot but observe the 
impressive economic and political impact of the oil weapon, which led Professor 
Harmut Brosche to describe it as “one of the most successful weapons introduced into 
world politics during the last years.”’216 The unexpected effectiveness of the oil 
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weapon against rich, industrialised countries has led Tsakiris to characterise energy 
statecraft as ‘asymmetric since the aforementioned consequences of the 1973 embargo 
occurred despite the fact that OPEC’s Arab producers had only a fraction of the 
combined political, economic and military power of the OECD states.’217 Ian Smart 
further illustrates how, despite this power asymmetry, the embargo’s target states did 
not counterattack: 
 
It is a fact that a small number of countries whose military strength, separately 
or together, is relatively trivial were able to impose a politically motivated 
embargo on nations much stronger militarily without even having to consider 
seriously the possibility of a military reaction. The Western countries, against 
which Arab economic strength was primarily turned, did not seek to transform 
their own superior military strength into countervailing power.218 
 
This reinforces the point made by Senator Lugar and Klare, among others, that energy 
statecraft is on par with military power as an effective foreign policy instrument in 
terms of changing the behaviour of other states by getting them to do what they would 
otherwise not do. 
 
Different Types of Energy Statecraft 
In theory, the most basic types of energy statecraft follow essentially the same logic 
as economic statecraft: they can be negative or positive, as well as short term or long 
term. The most important caveat is the indispensable nature of energy resources to the 
economy of any state, which should hypothetically make the use of energy statecraft 
more effective than most other economic instruments that can be employed in foreign 
policy. In practice, however, the diverse forms of energy statecraft are much more 
differentiated by the specific kinds of primary energy resources used, than by the way 
in which they are implemented (i.e. coercively, cooperatively, in the short or long 
term). 
 Negative energy statecraft is used as a disincentive or coercively in order ‘to 
dictate/influence the political/security or economic behavior of a state or corporate 
actor in the international arena.’ It can be implemented as embargos, sanctions, 
licensing denials, production quota manipulation to reduce price elasticity, exclusion 
from tenders, among many other ways. Apart from the ‘celebrated’ cases of oil 
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embargos such as the one in 1973, negative energy statecraft ‘usually takes the form 
of oil and natural gas sanctions directed to impede domestic energy companies from 
developing the resources of a geopolitical competitor or adversary (actual or 
prospective), since such a development would enhance its military and diplomatic 
clout. … Sanctions can also take the form of secondary sanctions targeting the 
technological equipment (pipeline tubes, compressors, turbines, refinery equipment) 
necessary for the construction of energy infrastructure.’219  
Perhaps the most obvious current example of a country’s use of negative 
energy statecraft is Russia, whose ‘officials have made no secret of their use of energy 
for political purposes.’ In 2005, ‘Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov commented on 
the abrupt energy price hikes that Russia was demanding of its neighbors, linking 
energy issues to Russia’s broader foreign policy objectives. If a neighbor wished to 
join NATO, it would be viewed as disloyal, and “if you are not loyal then you [make 
the jump to higher energy prices] immediately,” he said.’220 Over the following two 
winters, in 2006 and 2007, ‘a string of crises between Russia and the bordering former 
Soviet republics resulted in temporary energy cuts to those now independent states. 
Georgia and Ukraine claimed that Moscow tried to punish them for their Western 
orientations and color revolutions that had removed regimes that were 
accommodating to Russia’s demands, and to use the gas weapon to destabilize their 
regimes.’221 Indeed, as Müller-Kraenner reminds us, ‘Russia has hardly any neighbour 
that is not threatened with energy deprivation as a weapon in the event of any political 
insubordination.’222 
 Positive energy statecraft is used cooperatively and ‘has primarily taken the 
form of oil and natural gas subsidies that are used as an incentive for the 
harmonisation of foreign policy goals between the sender and the targeted state.’ But 
it can also be implemented as preferential access to energy resource developments 
contracts, technological cooperation in order to increase energy efficiency or decrease 
energy intensity, state-sponsored investment guarantees, granting most favoured 
nation status, or simply using energy rents to give overseas development aid, among 
other ways.223 For example, when Saudi Arabia demonstrates willingness to assist 
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China in upgrading its refining capacity to use more Saudi crude oil224 or Hugo 
Chávez sells heavily subsidised Venezuelan petroleum to several Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, they are not doing so out of generosity; they are pursuing their 
long-term national interest by creating dependence for their oil in these countries, in 
case their main markets – the United States and other OECD countries – one day 
decide to import less or none of their petroleum, if not demanding an outright political 
quid pro quo for their assistance. It should be noted that, unlike the ‘celebrated’ cases 
of oil embargos and Russia’s more recent overt uses of the ‘gas weapon’, positive 
energy statecraft has received much less attention academically than its negative 
counterpart, and therefore warrants more research into the subject. 
 As to whether energy statecraft is implemented over the short or long term, its 
negative manifestation tends to be short term, or tactical: its use or threat thereof is 
linked to a specific change in target state behaviour, such as Western support for 
Israel during the Yom Kippur War that led to the 1973 oil embargo by OPEC’s Arab 
producers, or the Russian examples cited above. The long-term use of negative energy 
statecraft is ultimately counterproductive in foreign policy, as energy-rich states 
engaged in it would eventually lose money by not earning rents from their energy 
exports, which is often their governments’ main source of revenue.  
Positive energy statecraft, on the other hand, can be either short term or long 
term, following the same logic as positive economic statecraft: tactical linkage 
(‘carrots’) seeking a short-term quid pro quo, or structural linkage (‘long-term 
engagement’) which strategically ‘involves an effort to use a steady stream of 
economic benefits [or, in this case, energy resources] to reconfigure the balance of 
political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be unconditional; 
the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in target behaviour. The 
sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic [or energy] engagement will 
eventually produce a political transformation and desirable changes in target 
behaviour.’225 Again, as with academic research dedicated to negative compared to 
positive energy statecraft, short-term tactical linkage in energy statecraft has 
commanded much more scholarly attention than strategic long-term engagement. 
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 As mentioned above, in spite of these variations in implementation, the 
different types of energy statecraft are more distinguished by the specific kind of 
energy resource employed. There are numerous forms of what are called primary 
energy sources – ‘energy [resources] found in nature that has not been subjected to 
any conversion or transformation process’226 – but only a few of them are, or even can 
be, used as instruments of foreign policy. The main defining attribute of whether a 
primary energy source is exploitable as a technique of statecraft is its share of the 
world’s total primary energy supply (TPES). In that respect, hydrocarbons (or fossil 
fuels) have by far the leading potential to be implemented as instruments of energy 
statecraft, due to their overwhelming share of TPES: a total of 81.2 per cent in 2008, 
according to the International Energy Agency, of which 33.1 per cent is petroleum, 27 
per cent is coal and 21.1 per cent is natural gas.227 Because of the long lead-times in 
energy projects, writes Christoph Rühl, ‘one can make reasonable estimates ten, or 
even 20, years ahead. By all accounts, the foreseeable future in energy markets will 
remain dominated by fossil fuels.’228 According to the US Department of Energy, for 
example, ‘these [fossil] fuels will still be satisfying an estimated 87 percent of global 
energy needs in 2030…[and] petroleum, which, for the last half century, has been—
and remains—the world’s most important source of energy…is expected to remain 
number one in 2030.’229 
Shaffer reminds us that the predominance of petroleum among primary energy 
sources stems from its multiple, if not ubiquitous, uses: 
 
Oil is a popular energy source because it can be easily and cheaply transported 
and because it has flexible applications, including a range of uses: to generate 
electricity, provide heat and transportation, and fuel industry. Other fossil fuels 
can substitute for most of these functions. However, current modes of 
transportation were developed based on the availability of copious and mostly 
inexpensive quantities of oil during the twentieth century. … In the 
transportation sector, there are no good substitutes for oil, unless radical changes 
are made in the way people transport themselves and goods.230 
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Thus, the widespread use of petroleum, as well as the ever-increasing demand for it 
globally, makes oil a suitable resource for energy statecraft. This is particularly the 
case considering most of petroleum reserves and production is concentrated in 
relatively few countries, some of which have formed the OPEC cartel, which was the 
first to make use of negative energy statecraft overtly during the 1973 oil embargo. 
Meanwhile, ‘Moscow’s recent rhetoric seems to suggest that natural gas is also 
regarded as a potential tool in fostering foreign policy objectives.’231 This is in large 
part due to its rapidly increasing use – particularly in Europe, which imports a 
considerable amount of natural gas from Russia – but also because of its predominant 
mode of transportation through pipelines, which in principle fosters dependence on 
suppliers, leaving consumers vulnerable to energy statecraft. The wider share of TPES 
natural gas occupies in the future, the more it will have the potential to be the main 
primary energy source used for energy statecraft, which seems likely given its 
projected growth in consumption: 
 
Natural gas is the world’s fastest growing primary energy source. Global 
consumption is anticipated to double by 2030. Natural gas will soon overtake 
coal as the second most important energy source, and among the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries it has already 
supplanted it. If current trends continue, natural gas consumption will overtake 
that of oil within a couple of decades and become the leading global energy 
source. Natural gas is especially attractive because it releases significantly lower 
emissions that cause air pollution and lead to climate change.232 
 
In addition to the overall share of how much energy is consumed worldwide, 
another factor that determines what kinds of energy resources can be used in statecraft 
is its relative scarcity or abundance. In that sense, some fossil fuels are more 
implementable as instruments of statecraft than others. While coal comprises over a 
quarter of TPES and is the predominant source of the world’s electricity production, 
its ease of transportation, ‘relatively low cost, especially in electricity production, and 
the extensive reserves of exporters…make it low risk in terms of security of supply’, 
and is therefore unsuitable for energy statecraft given the relative lack of international 
competition over its access. Moreover, the fact that coal is highly polluting – indeed, 
it is ‘the major source of climate-altering greenhouse gases’ – makes its continued 
widespread use unattractive unless ‘significant research and investment efforts are 
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[made] in carbon dioxide capture and sequestration’,233 thus potentially decreasing its 
relative demand in the long term due to environmental concerns. 
The remaining primary energy sources – nuclear power and several forms of 
renewable energy – together comprise such a relatively marginal share of TPES that 
their use as instruments of energy statecraft currently lacks potential. Where nuclear 
energy is concerned, it is limited not only by its high cost, but also by the fact that it is 
only used to generate electricity and therefore has restricted reach in terms of 
transportation and export to potential target states of energy statecraft. Moreover, as 
Tsakiris rightly recalls, ‘it would be academically inept to analyze nuclear power 
without dedicating [part of the] analysis to its potentially devastating military uses. 
Such an analysis, though interesting, would fall outside the framework of economic 
statecraft’. As for renewable energy resources, most of them are limited by their focus 
on ‘electricity generation,…their limited impact on the overall economic 
sphere…[and] oil’s domination of the transportation and petrochemical sectors of the 
economy’.234 
Though fossil fuels will continue to dominate energy consumption – and 
therefore also energy statecraft – Klare reminds us that the current drive to combat 
climate change by reducing greenhouse-gas emissions has at least the potential to 
increase the share and significance of renewables for energy security: 
 
Scientists are avidly seeking ways to develop a new spectrum of fuels to replace 
those now at risk of depletion while releasing far fewer or zero climate-altering 
“greenhouse gases” into the atmosphere. But no major energy-consuming nation 
has yet devoted sufficient resources to this problem to ensure that these 
alternatives will be available on a large enough scale to replace existing energy 
sources in the foreseeable future.235 
 
However, should certain forms of renewable energy resources – for instance, biofuels 
– extend their reach beyond electricity generation, particularly to the transportation 
sector, and increase their share of TPES to a significant amount, they could 
potentially be used as an instrument of energy statecraft. To date, very little academic 
research has explored this potential, which merits further scholarly attention. 
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Causal Factors That Determine Effective Energy Statecraft 
Tsakiris postulates that ‘energy...statecraft has always been a powerful foreign policy-
making instrument, which has been proven to be – under specific conditions – much 
more effective than the use of force or threat of the use of force in enticing or 
coercing a state to “do something he would not otherwise do”.’236 But in order to be 
effective, energy statecraft (like economic statecraft in general) first needs to meet 
certain conditions. The list of criteria for successful energy statecraft varies from one 
author to another. 
Stulberg, for instance, focuses on just two factors, namely market power and 
regulatory authority: ‘the more market and regulatory power a state enjoys in a 
particular energy sector, the more successful it should be at securing strategic 
concessions from a target. Possessing both elements, an initiator can structure the 
framing effects and guide a target’s risk-taking propensity toward compliance.’237  
Meanwhile, Tsakiris enumerates four other criteria, whose ‘control’ thereof 
define what he calls ‘energy power’: exploitable reserves, net export capacity, 
transportation routes and pricing mechanisms (price elasticity), whilst also specifying 
that the energy resources employed must necessarily be hydrocarbons (oil and natural 
gas).238  
The causal factors listed by both authors, though not necessarily overlapping, 
are all valid, but incomplete. Tsakiris’ first three criteria fall largely under Stulberg’s 
first factor, market power over a specific energy sector, though in different forms (as 
will be explained below). On the other hand, the remaining criterion in each author’s 
list – regulatory power and price elasticity, respectively – is not considered by the 
other, leaving a gap in their coverage of the subject.  
Therefore, the present study favours translating William Norris’ four factors 
for successful economic statecraft,239 delineated in the previous chapter, since the 
causal factors that determine effective energy statecraft broadly match those for 
economic statecraft, but with certain unique characteristics that are specific to energy 
resources in contrast to most other economic instruments. Moreover, these four 
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factors not only encompass all criteria listed by Stulberg and Tsakiris – exploitable 
reserves, net export capacity and transportation routes in the form of market power; 
price elasticity; and governmental authority over the energy sector – but also include a 
fourth, often overlooked, factor that is inherent to all forms of statecraft: namely the 
commensurability between the means used for the ends sought, to which we now turn. 
 
1. Goal-instrument commensurability 
The first factor is by now obvious, but nevertheless bears repeating, for the sake of the 
argument: the effectiveness of ‘a state’s international influence turns on the 
leadership’s capacity to balance the ends and means of statecraft.’240 In other words, 
the foreign policy goals sought must be commensurate with the energy instrument 
employed.  
For example, after the so-called ‘oil weapon’ was first used successfully in 
1973, evaluation of its effectiveness has been mixed depending on which perspective 
is taken with regards to the scope of the objectives. On the one hand, when seen in 
light of the (somewhat ambitious) primary goals sought by the Arab member states of 
OPEC – namely to compel Israel to retreat back to its 1967 borders and fully to 
restore Palestinian rights – the oil weapon is often dismissed as having been 
ineffective. On the other hand, as Baldwin advocates, secondary and tertiary goals 
should not be ignored when determining the ‘success’ of an economic technique of 
statecraft, and in that respect the Arab oil weapon of 1973 was to some extent 
effective in that it called international attention to the plight of the Palestinian people 
and even led some (mostly European) countries to change or adapt their policies 
towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Baldwin’s conceptual separation of the domain (or targets) from the scope 
(objective) of an influence attempt is also instructive when evaluating the relative 
success of the oil weapon in 1973. While the oil weapon was more effective against 
Western European states in the OECD and Japan, in terms of their changed policies 
towards the Middle East, it was less effective against a much stronger country like the 
United States, let alone against Israel, for which the stakes in the conflict were 
obviously considerably higher and had much more to lose by yielding to the Arab 
states’ demands.  
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With regards to the United States, the use of the oil weapon by the Arab 
members of OPEC was relatively successful in bringing their grievances to the top of 
the US foreign policy agenda and even encouraged the US ‘to play a more 
conciliatory role in arranging the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute in the 
aftermath of the Yom Kippur War’, though ultimately it ‘did not change the basic 
policy of the United States in the Middle East.’241  
Meanwhile, with regards to the effectiveness of the oil weapon against Israel, 
Daoudi and Dajani remind us that the Arab states’ two primary objectives mentioned 
above ‘were the ultimate political goals of the Arab military initiative of 6 October 
1973. The oil weapon was unsheathed to complement the Arab war effort, not to 
replace it’, which is why ‘one needs to be aware that there is inevitable overlapping 
among the political, economic, and military dimensions’ of an influence attempt when 
considering the impact and achievements of the oil weapon alone.242 Thus, as Stulberg 
concludes, ‘all else being equal, energy statecraft will be more successful when a 
central executive can affect the domain and value that a target assigns to an exchange 
of the strategic good [i.e., energy resources], and can ensure that domestic agents will 
pursue complementary policies.’243 
 The remaining causal factors that determine effective economic statecraft 
deserve further detailed analysis when applied to energy resources because of the 
specific ways in which these factors operate in the energy sector compared to other 
goods and services that can be employed in economic statecraft more widely. To 
recapitulate, these are: the magnitude of the economic interaction and target states’ 
dependence on it, translated into a sender state’s market power and target state’s 
vulnerability in the energy sector; the price elasticity or ‘strategicness’ of a good, 
which is normally low and high, respectively, for most energy resources, and which 
translates into volatility during tight markets; and, finally, the extent to which a state 
has control over an economic resource, which is usually higher in the energy sector 
compared to other sectors of the economy in most countries, particularly in those that 
are energy-rich. 
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2. Market power, dependence and vulnerability 
The first determinant of whether a state can effectively implement energy statecraft is 
its market power in a given energy sector. This is not as obvious as might seem at 
first, for in this case market power does not only mean the possession of great energy 
reserves or being a large producer thereof. The United States and China, for instance, 
are both great petroleum producers, but they are also even greater oil consumers, 
meaning they consume most of their domestic production and must also import 
additional petroleum, making both countries net oil importers. Thus, in the energy 
sector in general and for energy statecraft in particular, market power refers to export 
capacity, rather than merely production capacity and reserves.  
But given certain distinguishing characteristics between the international oil and 
natural gas markets – the two most commonly used energy resources in statecraft – 
market power also involves control of export and transport routes. Despite a certain 
arbitrariness concerning the specific percentages involved, Stulberg’s definition of 
market power is appropriate for taking both export market share and transportation 
routes into account: 
 
Market power is measured in terms of both aggregate percentages of supply and 
competitive advantages at delivering energy to international markets. A state is 
traditionally considered to wield significant influence over markets if it controls 
nearly half the supply of the good. In the case of strategic goods, such as energy, 
however, the relevant percentages are typically much lower. This is because 
energy is essential to all aspects of a state’s military, industrial, and consumer 
sectors, and that even marginal fluctuations in supply have potentially severe 
implications for the breadth of a target’s national activities. Moreover, market 
power in the energy sector is not determined solely by raw supply, as states must 
be able to deliver energy to foreign markets. … Accordingly, [Stulberg] 
regard[s] an initiator as wielding significant market power in the oil and gas 
sector if it controls roughly 30 percent of supply and export to foreign markets, 
as well as possesses competitive advantages at reliably delivering low-cost 
energy via shorter-distance and wider-diameter pipelines than available through 
other routes.244 
 
 This then begs the question of whether each of these two elements of market 
power has higher significance in one energy sector than in another. Though the 
relationship is imperfect, a high percentage of aggregate supply bears more 
significance in the international oil market, whereas control of transport routes plays a 
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stronger role in (mostly regional) natural gas markets. This, in turn, means that energy 
statecraft works differently depending on the energy resource employed.  
The principal distinction stems from the fact that petroleum is a global, 
fungible commodity, ‘traded primarily on international markets with little connection 
between the supplier and the consumer,…which allow[s] states to import from a 
variety of sources and quickly find new sources of supply on the open global 
market’.245 As such, having control of transport routes for oil, specifically, has little if 
any impact on a state’s ability to use petroleum as a form of energy statecraft, since a 
potential target state would be able to find alternative supplies on the open market, 
provided a higher price is paid. In that sense, it is mostly poor countries that are 
vulnerable to energy statecraft in the form of the oil weapon, as Klare points out, 
since wealthy countries ‘will be able to buy their way out of scarcity, though no doubt 
damaging their economies in the process; poorer countries, lacking such advantages, 
will suffer egregiously.’246 Therefore, market power in terms of share of aggregate 
supply is a more important element for energy statecraft using petroleum than control 
of transport routes. 
But given oil’s fungibility as a traded commodity, and the relative ease of 
consumers to diversify their sources of supply, in order for states to muster sufficient 
market power in the petroleum sector to employ that resource in their energy 
statecraft, they have had to resort to cartel formation. In increasing their collective 
market power by pooling their resources, the oil weapon is made ‘most effective when 
it is collectively rather than unilaterally deployed,’ which is why ‘cohesion and 
cooperation among the various oil-producing nations is essential’247 for energy 
statecraft to be effective with petroleum.  
Although OPEC formed as a cartel in 1960, it was not until 1973 that its 
member states successfully managed to exploit their collective market power as a 
cartel, despite previously having tried to impose oil embargoes on consumer countries 
during the Middle East wars of 1956 and 1967. These two attempts at energy 
statecraft were unsuccessful, according to Nye, ‘because the United States was 
producing enough oil to supply Europe when it was cut off by the Arab countries. 
Once American production peaked in 1971 and the United States began to import oil, 
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the power to balance the oil market switched to such countries as Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. The United States was no longer the supplier of last resort that could make up 
for any missing oil’,248 thus transferring the bulk of market power in the petroleum 
sector to OPEC. On 16 October 1973, ten days after the Yom Kippur War erupted, 
OPEC members from the Persian Gulf unilaterally announced a 70 per cent increase 
in the price of oil, and on the next day announced production cuts of 5 per cent and an 
additional 5 per cent for every following month until Israel withdrew from the 
territories it had occupied since 1967, in addition to a full oil embargo on the 
countries that had supported Israel during the war. This represented the first time that 
OPEC countries collectively used oil as a weapon to achieve political goals, which, in 
Henry Kissinger’s words, ‘altered irrevocably the world as it had grown up in the 
postwar period.’249 
Now controlling approximately 70 per cent of the world’s known oil reserves 
and circa 40 per cent of its production, OPEC derives its strength as a petroleum cartel 
from its ability to export most of its production, whereas most non-OPEC producers 
consume most of their oil, having to import the remainder of their domestic demand 
for oil,250 thus giving OPEC leverage over the countries that depend on its exports. 
Such a dependence on oil by importing countries is defined by Greene and 
Tishchishyna as the result of an uncompetitive global oil market dominated by OPEC 
and high levels of energy imports that are vital to these countries’ economies.251 
Indeed, the more energy-consuming countries import, the more they become 
dependent on producing countries, which in turn gives the latter the ability to use their 
energy resources against the former, thus creating a higher degree of vulnerability in 
energy-importing countries. OPEC countries are keenly aware of this, and underlying 
their ideology is ‘the view that the future is theirs and worth waiting for…bank[ing] 
their future on a combination of growth in oil demand and a presumed “natural” limit 
to the growth of non-OPEC production.’252 
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In its power projection, OPEC uses two interrelated instruments: spare 
production capacity and its role as ‘swing producer’, both of which are uniquely 
strongest in Saudi Arabia’s case. Spare capacity – the capacity to produce additional 
oil above normal output levels that can be put into production quickly, or leave 
production idle depending on market conditions253 – serves as a supply-side ‘security 
margin’ in the international energy market that can buffer against supply shocks by 
producing additional oil to replace the oil missing from the market due to 
disruptions.254 
However, maintaining spare capacity is expensive: it costs billions to develop 
excess capacity to allow prompt, additional oil production in case of emergencies; 
and, being unable to sell it due to generally inexistent demand for the superfluous oil, 
there is no return on the investment made in spare capacity. Economically speaking, 
the opposite is preferable: ‘The decision to minimize excess production capacity 
represents optimal economic behavior for any producer of any good. As Western 
economic textbooks teach, it is simply absurd to spend money to create something 
that will not be sold, and will probably induce a general fall of price of that very 
product.’255 Following this economic rationale, all non-OPEC producing countries sell 
all the oil they produce internally or for export; private international oil companies do 
the same, in order to maximise their shareholder value.256 ‘The problem with this 
approach’, writes Leonardo Maugeri, ‘is that it takes a long time to put onstream new 
production when it becomes necessary, so that inevitably a razor-thin spare capacity 
generally turns into higher prices, and make any sudden supply disruption or 
consumption peak a lethal blow.’257   
As a result, virtually all of the world’s spare production capacity rests in 
OPEC countries, with Saudi Arabia alone responsible for nearly 80 per cent thereof, 
allowing them to manipulate the short-term price of oil according to their spare 
capacity level. Also being responsible for one-tenth of the world’s oil supply, Saudi 
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Arabia therefore holds a unique position in the global oil market, as its prime ‘swing 
producer’, by being ‘the only oil producer in the world that can singlehandedly 
replace, within a short period of time, the total loss of exports for any other oil 
producer in the globe’.258 It is that role which gives OPEC and Saudi Arabia in 
particular their international clout and geopolitical influence, lowering production to 
raise prices, or increasing production to accommodate the interests of importing 
nations, normally in return for other economic or political compensations – a role 
Saudi Arabia does not want to relinquish. Therefore, it should be recognized that 
‘Saudi Arabia uses its spare capacity not as a favour to the West but as an instrument 
designed to enhance its power and influence in the world.’259 
Meanwhile, market power in terms of control of energy transport routes is 
much more relevant to the use of natural gas as an instrument of foreign policy. This 
is essentially because natural gas, due to its gaseous form, is not as easily or 
inexpensively transported as petroleum under current technology, and relies either on 
pipelines or liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, both of which demand high 
investments in infrastructure. The result of this, particularly where pipelines are 
concerned, is that direct, long-term linkages are created between energy suppliers and 
consumers. These commercial relations are further solidified not only due to the 
physical infrastructural ties between supplier and consumer states, but also because of 
the high costs involved – both for pipelines and for LNG terminals – which lead to 
long-term contracts between the states involved.  
According to Shaffer,260 these direct and fixed long-term linkages foster much 
more dependence and vulnerability between natural gas suppliers and consumers than 
in the oil market, which in turn lead to more opportunities for political manipulation 
through energy statecraft. Unlike petroleum, where a disruption in supply from one 
source can be compensated for by buying from another source (albeit normally at a 
higher price), the fixed nature of gas supply through pipelines means that most natural 
gas importers have little flexibility or alternatives when faced with a disruption in 
supply. Which is why ‘states rarely have options of diversifying their natural gas 
supplies or creating multiple parallel supply mechanisms to enhance their energy 
security. … Because of the lack of commercial or government interest, states rarely 
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have multiple gas supply infrastructures. … In theory, all natural gas importers that 
lack extensive alternative import capability, such as extensive LNG import capacity, 
are potentially at risk for supply disruptions and accordingly dependent on their 
suppliers, rendering them vulnerable to the dictates of the supplier state.’261 
A further factor that has repercussions for energy statecraft, which may arise 
specifically for energy resources transported through pipelines – be it oil or natural 
gas, though not LNG – is transit through third countries between supplier and 
consumer states. ‘With the increasing internationalization of the oil and gas trade, 
rising consumption of natural gas, and initiation of the export of oil and gas from 
landlocked states,’ Shaffer explains, ‘energy transit states are emerging regionally and 
in the international system. Their role affects their strategic value and position. … The 
main potential value of achieving a role as a major energy transit state is geopolitical, 
since transit is not especially lucrative financially for the transit states.’262  
What is interesting with regards to market power in the form of control of 
energy transport routes (i.e. pipelines) as an enabling factor for effective energy 
statecraft is the fact that it is a tool mostly employed by transit countries, rather than 
by producing states let alone consumers. This is due to the interdependence 
established between suppliers and end-users connected by pipelines, as they both lose 
from disruptions in energy supply: consumers do not get access to energy resources 
vital to the healthy functioning of their economies and producers lose revenue from 
lost markets, while transit states have comparatively little to lose by disrupting the 
energy supply going through their countries. ‘This has been seen in Ukraine and 
Belarus,’ writes Shaffer, ‘which have at times inhibited the flow of Russian oil and 
gas to markets in Western Europe in an attempt to attain political and economic goals. 
… While energy suppliers and consumers are cautious in their denial of supplies or 
markets, transit states are more likely to be tempted to use their role to elicit 
economic, security, and other gains. As a result, supply arrangements that have transit 
states in between supplier and the consumer are less stable than direct ones.’263  
Of course, it is not just transit states that can use transnational pipeline transit 
as a tool in their energy statecraft; producing states can also use transit to their 
advantage in their own use of energy statecraft. Again, Shaffer illustrates that 
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‘exporting states, while not enjoying their vulnerability to supply disruptions, 
recognize that transit can be an important carrot in their relations with transit states. In 
the 1990s, Moscow used the transit carrot effectively with neighboring Baltic states, 
even playing them against each other to offer Moscow better conditions to retain its 
transport facilities in their respective states. Once Russia stops using transit routes 
through these states, it will also lose a tool for influence in them.’264 
 Ultimately, market power in the energy sector – be it a high share of aggregate 
supply or though control of transport routes – is a determining factor behind effective 
energy statecraft because it translates into target-state dependence on the energy 
resources in question, which is exacerbated by a lack of alternative sources of supply. 
This, in turn, makes target states vulnerable to political influence and manipulation by 
sender (or transit) states that employ energy statecraft against them. It follows 
logically, writes Stulberg, that ‘the capacity to manipulate a target’s domain rests on 
the net vulnerability of that target’265 – a term he further defines: 
 
In the energy sector, vulnerability can be measured in terms of market power. 
Market power is a function of the percentages of global imports/exports 
accounted for by a state’s consumption/supply of a specific resource. The 
greater the percentage, the greater the concentration of exchange, the lower the 
probability that alternate trade partners will be available, the higher the costs of 
adjustment, and the greater the capacity of a state to orchestrate the framing 
effects for foreign targets in that sector. Conversely, the weaker the market 
power, the lower the concentration of exchange, the more likely opportunities 
exist to diversify relations, the lower the costs of changing the terms of an 
existing relationship, and the more difficult it will be for a state to manipulate a 
target’s decision choices. All things being equal, the lower the opportunity costs 
of compliance for other states, the more likely a state will be able to exploit 
strategic energy advantages to shape a target’s reference point, decision domain, 
and risk-taking propensity.266 
 
Thus, if an energy-producing and -exporting state enjoys high market power – either 
in terms of share of aggregate supply and/or by controlling pipelines – it has a better 
chance of engaging in effective energy statecraft towards energy-consuming states. 
 This formula is made even more powerful for the state initiating energy 
statecraft if it has several potential consumer states competing for its energy 
resources. Shaffer illustrates this point by quoting the managers of Russia’s state-
controlled natural gas company, Gazprom, who demonstrated a propensity for 
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political blackmail in response to European energy security concerns regarding 
Russia’s reliability as a natural gas supplier: ‘We want European countries to 
understand that we have other alternatives in terms of gas sales. We have a fast 
growing Chinese market, and a market for liquefied natural gas in the U.S. If the 
European Union wants our gas it has to consider our interests as well.’267 This is a 
typical stance adopted by energy-exporting countries during tight market conditions, 
when demand for energy outstrips supply, and which brings us to the next 
determining factor for effective energy statecraft. 
 
3. Price elasticity and volatility under tight market conditions 
As is the case with economic statecraft in general, price elasticity is somewhat related 
to the previous determining factor in that they both amount to a form of dependence: 
on a specific good or commodity and on aggregate trade, respectively. Yet, when 
viewing this distinction in terms of a single kind of commodity (in this case, energy 
resources), the discrepancy becomes even more subtle. Dependence on energy refers 
to a situation in which a country imports much of its energy needs from a single or 
few, undiversified sources; whereas elasticity refers to the fact that not only are 
energy resources (in general) a prerequisite for a modern, functioning economy, but 
also that some of these resources are not easily substitutable with other energy 
resources in certain sectors of the economy.  
Ultimately, the elasticity of an energy resource depends on its end-use. For 
instance, electricity can be generated by a wide variety of energy resources – coal, 
petroleum, natural gas, nuclear power, hydropower, solar power and other 
renewables, etc. – and a shortfall in the supply of one of these resources could 
theoretically be compensated with another, provided the appropriate infrastructure is 
in place. Of course, lack of infrastructural fungibility among different kinds of energy 
resources would lower their price elasticity. Meanwhile, some energy resources are 
much less elastic due to an economic sector’s complete dependence on that specific 
kind of energy source, such as the ‘limited elasticity of oil demand in the short run, a 
result of the transportation sector’s high level of reliance on gasoline and other 
petroleum-based motor fuels.’268 
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 Inelasticity of demand (and supply) for an energy resource is, therefore, an 
important factor in determining effective energy statecraft. Where petroleum is 
concerned, OPEC has mostly been successful at using its market power to keep the 
price of oil well above production costs (which in the Persian Gulf has generally been 
less than $2 per barrel or $4 when exploration and development costs are included) 
since the 1970s. In this regard, OPEC’s success has derived from the relative 
inelasticity of demand and, to a lesser extent, supply of oil, meaning they do not 
respond quickly to changes in the price of oil, on the demand side, because consumers 
take a long time to adapt and change their habits and lifestyles to reflect new, high 
market prices for oil and limited readily available alternatives, particularly in the 
transportation sector;269 and, on the supply side, because it takes several years to 
develop new production capacity to meet faster-rising demand.  
But there are also seasonal factors affecting not just oil’s, but other energy 
resources’ elasticity. ‘An oil embargo imposed at the beginning of winter [in the 
northern hemisphere], when there is a high, inelastic demand on oil for heating,’ 
Daoudi and Dajani remind us, ‘is more effective than an embargo imposed in early 
summer, when an elastic demand on oil for traveling represents a large share of the 
market’270 – which can also be applied, albeit for different reasons, to other energy 
resources, such as increased gas demand during winter for heating or hydropower 
supply varying seasonally according to precipitation levels, for example. 
 Nevertheless, the relative price elasticity of energy resources becomes a much 
stronger factor in influencing the potential success of energy statecraft during times of 
tight energy markets, when demand outstrips supply. In such scenarios, energy 
markets become much more volatile and vulnerable even to minor disruptions in 
supply, for whatever reason: ‘International economic and political developments can 
exacerbate the effects of inelastic supply and demand on global energy markets, 
causing massive price fluctuations even when the underlying nature of the market 
remains unchanged. Under such volatile conditions, political power has accrued in the 
hands of energy exporters,’ write Pascual and Zambetakis.271 
 Morse calls attention to the fact that ‘when prices are low, resource-rich 
countries are at least as dependent on energy markets as their markets are on them. 
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This means that they cannot simply take advantage of their customers or make gains 
at their expense. Rather, sellers and buyers must think in terms of relative gains and 
losses: they might both gain or both lose, but one will gain or lose more than the 
other. In tight markets, however, some producers nakedly resort to using energy as a 
tool of leverage.’272 This is in large part because tight markets translate into higher 
energy prices, which in turn increase the revenue of energy-exporting states, giving 
them not only more economic resources in terms of money, but also affords them 
more leverage against energy-importers who are competing for scarce energy 
resources. This can then become a vicious cycle in which producers are emboldened 
to take measures to tighten energy markets further – e.g., through production cuts – in 
an attempt to increase the power and international influence derived from their energy 
resources. ‘During periods of high oil and gas prices and thus windfall profits,’ 
Shaffer reminds us, ‘energy exporters often conduct a more assertive foreign policy, 
increasing their regional and at times international involvement. Indeed, their energy 
and political interests can overlap, with oil exporters initiating crises that lead to 
further oil price hikes.’273 
 The increased effectiveness of energy statecraft under tight market conditions 
was first realised by OPEC after first successfully employing the oil weapon in 1973. 
As mentioned above, OPEC’s previous oil embargo attempts had failed because the 
market had been oversupplied and the United States retained a significant spare 
production capacity. In 1973, however, the market was already tight, and under such 
conditions, ‘removal or threat of removal of even a small amount of oil can 
significantly affect world prices.’274 Even though the actual amount of oil removed 
from the market (7.5 per cent)275 was not as staggering as OPEC had threatened, ‘the 
insecurity and uncertainty created by the war and the embargo declaration triggered a 
400 percent increase in world oil prices in a short period. These tight market 
conditions allowed OPEC’s declarations further to boost already rising oil prices.  
In periods when oil production significantly outstretches demand, these political 
declarations and developments have less impact on oil prices.’276 The lesson that ‘the 
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oil weapon is most effective if it is accompanied by production cuts’277 would not be 
forgotten by OPEC, which since then also increased its overall effectiveness as a 
cartel by limiting its members’ production through quotas, in order to maintain a 
certain tightness in the international oil market, as Nye explains: 
 
Cartels generally have a problem because there is a tendency to cheat on 
production quotas when markets are soft and the price drops. … OPEC was 
unable to enforce price discipline from the year it was founded, 1960, until the 
early 1970s. But after oil supplies tightened, OPEC’s role in coordinating the 
bargaining power of the producers increased. 
 The Middle East war of 1973 gave OPEC a boost, a signal that now it could 
use its power. The Arab countries cut off access to oil during the 1973 war for 
political reasons, but that created a situation in which OPEC could become 
effective.278 
 
 The situation referred to above is, of course, a tight international oil market – 
kept that way through limited petroleum production quotas agreed amongst OPEC, 
when its member states’ interest are unified or when global demand for oil outstrips 
even OPEC’s capacity to supply the market fully. Most of the 1970s through the early 
1980s saw a tight oil market provoked by OPEC production cuts (both deliberate as 
well as by supply disruption due to the Iranian Revolution), whereas the first decade 
of the twenty-first century saw the latter case of a tight market built up by runaway 
demand for oil in rapidly-emerging countries.  
Regardless of differing reasons behind the tight market of the 1970s and the 
most recent one, the result has been the same for the relative power of energy-
exporters in the international system: ‘rising demand for oil and gas imports and 
limited capacity to expand short-term supply drove up prices, supplier wealth, and 
producer leverage, allowing producers such as Russia, Venezuela and Iran to punch 
above their weight in regional and international politics.’279 As Nye complements, oil-
sale windfalls gave oil-exporting countries ‘extra cash [that] provided money for 
payments and aid to advance their foreign policy objectives.’280  
Yet the reverse is also true: countries that need to rely on exorbitant energy-
export revenues to support assertive foreign policies, as well as to fund domestic 
stability and social programmes, lose much of their power and international leverage 
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when energy markets are not tight and prices are low. Russia, for instance, is a 
prominent recent example of this trend, as Morse illustrates:  
 
In Russia, revenues from taxes on energy sales, domestic or foreign, are critical 
to the legitimacy of the state and to its hopes of pursuing assertive policies 
abroad. Especially during the years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, when oil 
prices rose steadily, the former superpower grew critically dependent on its oil 
and gas sales as a form of influence. Russia has built its foreign policy on 
controlling the resources of former Soviet states and their access to pipelines 
that would connect them to third-party markets around the Mediterranean, in 
northern Europe, and in East Asia. But having pegged its hopes—and its 
budget—on oil priced at $140 a barrel, Moscow has found its plans challenged 
when oil is $90 and almost impossible to meet when it is $40. … And yet the 
Russian government has been slow to recognize that the effectiveness of its 
energy weapon has declined.281 
 
 Being emboldened to pursue more assertive foreign policies by using energy 
resources as a tool of leverage, however, is not the only practice that becomes 
prevalent among large energy exporters during periods of tight markets and high 
energy prices. Higher revenue from energy sales often prove too tempting for most 
governments of energy-exporting states to stand by idly while private companies reap 
the profits themselves. This brings us to the next factor that determines effective 
energy statecraft: namely, the trend among energy-rich countries, during extended 
periods of high energy prices, towards resource nationalism, or what Morse describes 
as ‘the tendency of producing countries to concentrate control over their resources in 
the hands of state-run entities, that has characterized energy politics for most of the 
last decade.’282 
 
4. Resource nationalism and government control of National Oil Companies 
‘Are instruments that are more directly and uniquely susceptible to government 
control in a given society more frequently used?’ asks Hermann. ‘This question 
suggests the possibility that ease of access rather than appropriateness for a given 
problem may influence the use of certain skills and resources.’283 Hermann’s answer 
might seem obvious in the sense that the possession of, or ease of access to, energy 
resources allows the states that have them to use them as instruments of their domestic 
and foreign policies, whereas those that do not possess them, ipso facto, cannot. 
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However, it does not fully answer his own question in terms of why certain 
instruments are particularly susceptible to government control, compared to other 
resources at the disposal of a state. 
 One such instrument is energy. In paraphrasing the French Prime Minister 
during the last year of the First World War, Georges Clemenceau, who famously said 
that ‘war is too important a matter to be left to the military’, former US 
Representative Lee Hamilton has written that ‘energy is too important to be left just to 
the engineers and geologists.’284 As mentioned above, because energy security is so 
ubiquitously important to every aspect of a functioning modern society and economy, 
energy as an instrument of state policy becomes highly susceptible to politicisation.  
This is also true in the international arena, where some states are unable to 
ensure their own energy security by themselves and therefore need to procure their 
energy needs from other states that have them in surplus through energy diplomacy. 
For that reason, it is important to bear in mind that it is precisely the politicised nature 
of energy resources in general, and of the fundamental need for energy security of a 
state in particular, that attributes any power and leverage to the use of energy 
statecraft by one state on another. Which is why an energy-exporting state’s ability 
effectively to pursue energy statecraft hinges on its capacity to cater not only to its 
own energy security, but also (and particularly) to that of other states, especially those 
that the sender state wishes to influence. The way in which a state chooses to pursue 
the goal of energy security – for itself and/or for others – goes a long way to explain 
the manner in which it engages in energy diplomacy and statecraft, as well as how 
effective it is in those endeavours. Thus, energy statecraft, defined as the 
manipulation of another state’s energy security for one’s own political purposes, 
inevitably becomes politicised as well, given energy-importing states’ inelastic need 
for these resources to ensure their energy security. 
Energy security is a ‘public good’, and is therefore also a government 
responsibility285 – regardless of whether a country has nationalised or private energy 
companies and other energy-provision mechanisms – because ‘as long as there are 
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externalities, market forces alone cannot achieve…energy security’.286 Out of the four 
elements of energy security, only availability and affordability are provided by the 
free market (although geology also plays a role in the former, while the volatility 
component of affordability can be politically induced), while the other two – 
reliability and sustainability – are not, as Shaffer explains: ‘Environmental 
friendliness [sustainability] and security of supply [reliability] are not provided by the 
market. This means that the state will need to stay involved in crafting energy security 
policies. The market does not create the diverse sources, infrastructures, or storage 
policies that can enhance security of supply. The market does not know how to 
fashion wider political relations in a way to foil [the] use of the energy weapon. In 
addition, the market can lead to decisions to promote short-term personal interests and 
not the long-term energy security of the state.’287 
 Therefore, regardless of whether a country is a net importer or exporter of 
energy, the fundamental need for such resources to ensure the proper functioning of 
any state makes energy a particularly politicised economic resource, usually with a 
high level of government involvement in the sector, which Klare terms ‘resource 
nationalism’: 
 
One way to describe the growing role of senior government officials in national 
energy policy is to brandish the term “resource nationalism,” which might be 
defined as the management of energy flows in accordance to vital state 
interests. Some analysts have tended to apply this term solely to nations with an 
abundance of energy that have maximized state control over domestic oil and 
gas deposits and sought to leverage this latent power into a source of political 
advantage. But there is no conceptual reason to limit the term’s use that way; it 
also applies to efforts by leaders of the deficit states to protect their national 
interests in a world of intense competition over the available pool of supply. … 
However one applies “resource nationalism,” one thing is clear: The state, itself, 
is acquiring greater authority over national energy sectors—as the owner of key 
assets and/or as a key actor in the procurement, transportation, and disposition 
of energy flows.288 
 
Again, because the need for energy security is so prevalent in modern societies, 
resource nationalism manifests itself both in the search for energy resources by 
energy-deficit states through energy diplomacy and in the increased control of 
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domestic energy resources by energy-surplus states for political use through energy 
statecraft. 
 Resource nationalism first emerged in Latin America during the first oil 
concessions in the early twentieth century and gained momentum after the Second 
World War, culminating with the ‘overturn of OPEC’ in the 1970s. As an ideology, it 
extends the traditional nationalist principle of territorial sovereignty to its subsoil, thus 
claiming the state’s ownership and administration of all the natural resources it 
contains. It also envisions the creation or strengthening of national companies while 
either restricting access to, or increasing the state’s share of rents from, international 
companies operating in the country.289 The right to nationalise natural resources is 
recognized by the United Nations: 
 
In order to safeguard its resources, each state is entitled to exercise effective 
control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, 
including the right to nationalize or transfer ownership of such resources to its 
nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the 
state. No state may be subjected to economic, political, or any type of coercion 
to prevent the free full exercise of this inalienable right.290 
 
However, resource nationalism is not a constant factor in international relations, and it 
usually emerges when conditions are favourable – i.e. higher prices and/or demand for 
a natural resource during a tight market – while it wanes when conditions are 
inauspicious. 
 Even though petroleum is traded today as a fungible commodity and a global 
market for LNG is currently in its fledgling stages, Tsakiris contends that the oil and 
gas industries have ‘not followed the typical model of economic liberalisation’ of 
other commodities.291 Through much of the Cold War (particularly during its first two 
to three decades), Klare argues, ‘the United States and other Western powers largely 
relied on market forces and the international oil companies rather than state-directed 
efforts and outright military intervention, to ensure adequate supplies of energy. 
Freeing these companies to establish worldwide operations in the pursuit of corporate 
profit, so the argument went, was the best way to ensure the maximum production of 
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energy and avoid crippling inefficiencies.’292 However, with the ‘overturn of OPEC’ 
in the 1970s, when almost every major oil-producing country had nationalised their 
petroleum industries, the nature of the international oil market changed dramatically, 
paving the way for the increased use of energy statecraft. 
The oil embargo imposed by Arab members of OPEC on Western countries in 
1973 gave OPEC countries greater control over their domestic energy resources, 
boosted their economic and even political power and international influence, 
advanced their autonomy to pursue their own oil-production policies and 
demonstrated OPEC’s (and that of its Arab members in particular) ability to act as a 
unified body in international relations. Accordingly, the majority of worldwide oil 
production shifted from private, multinational ownership to national government 
control, leading to ‘the curtailment of the traditional domination of the oil trade by the 
integrated international oil companies known as the “seven sisters” by the new power 
of the oil-exporting countries who now controlled both the volume of production and 
the price of crude oil.’ Since then, ‘[n]ew nationalistic governments with radically 
different economic and political approaches from their predecessors have emerged in 
a number of the oil-exporting countries. Their say in their national oil industries has 
increased tremendously, and their share in the profits has been greatly enlarged. 
Furthermore, they have been more inclined to give higher priority to politics than to 
economics. Some have exhibited an increased tendency to put their natural resources 
to political use.’293  
This is true not only of OPEC member states, but also of non-OPEC oil and 
gas exporters, among which perhaps the most prominent example is currently 
Russia’s Gazprom, where the state ‘owns 50 percent plus one share of the company, 
and almost all of the company’s top executives are devout Kremlin loyalists. The 
current Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was Gazprom’s Chairman. He replaced 
Putin, who became Prime Minister, replacing Victor Zubkov who became Gazprom’s 
Chairman.’294 As a result, given the deep involvement of top politicians in the Russian 
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hydrocarbon sector, Gazprom ‘has come to be portrayed as the Kremlin’s foreign 
policy arm.’295 
 Among other reasons, due to the highly politicised nature of energy resources 
and their use in domestic and foreign policy, today by far the largest part of the oil 
and gas industry is state-controlled through governments’ majority share, if not 
outright monopolistically state-owned. While private international oil companies 
(IOCs) have full access to merely 15 per cent of oil reserves worldwide, national oil 
companies (NOCs) are currently responsible for at least 55 per cent of petroleum 
production and control 85 per cent of the world’s proven conventional oil reserves296 
– ‘an enormous source of latent power for the states that control them. And because 
they operate in the countries with the most promising untapped energy fields, they are 
bound to retain their dominant position for years to come.’297  
Following Klare’s logic that it is not just energy-rich countries that engage in 
resource nationalism, government leaders in energy-importing states are getting 
progressively more involved in the acquisition of foreign energy reserves to ensure 
their countries’ energy security through energy diplomacy, ‘[l]acking confidence in 
the capacity of private firms to overcome many [of the] challenges’ posed by 
increasingly politicised and state-controlled energy resources.298  
Similarly, energy-exporting states’ ability to ensure energy security – for 
themselves and especially for other states – is a crucial determinant of how effectively 
they will be able to engage in energy statecraft, since the latter is the manipulation of 
another state’s energy security for the sender state’s own political purposes, thus 
increasing the incentive for government control of its energy resources, as Stulberg 
explains: 
 
A manipulator [i.e., national government]…must ensure that domestic actors 
with direct responsibility for controlling energy resources and extraterritorial 
activities line up behind its statecraft. This requires that a national leadership 
possesses discrete regulatory authority to mobilize national resources so that 
domestic energy firms pursue policies that align the substantive appeal of 
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compliance with a target’s risk-taking propensity. This does not necessitate the 
political capacity to impose or enforce compliance at home, as much as the 
authority to shape the commercial and political incentives for domestic agents 
and firms in ways that make upholding national interests more rewarding.299 
 
But energy monopolies are not a prerequisite to ensure the energy security of a 
state, nor, by consequence, to be able to pursue energy diplomacy or statecraft. What 
matters is how much influence a country’s government has over energy companies to 
implement its energy security strategy in tandem with them, be they nationalised or 
private. Because ‘formal authority to oversee the formulation and implementation of 
foreign policy is hierarchical’, writes Stulberg, ‘foreign policy decisions are the 
product of interaction between principals—central executives empowered to devise 
and oversee policy—and agents—administrative actors tasked with carrying them out. 
To influence the behavior of another state, a central executive must convince foreign 
targets to sacrifice preferred policies or to take a risk on compliance, as well as secure 
the dutiful implementation of statecraft by functionaries and interest groups at home.’ 
Therefore, in order to engage in energy statecraft, ‘statesmen must be able to devise a 
strategy and secure the cooperation of domestic actors (both government and private) 
that possess the critical expertise and control over respective policy resources.’300 
This resonates with the principal-agent dilemma explained in the previous 
chapter, which also suggests that national monopolies are often less efficient than 
their private, international counterparts. With a few notable exceptions – such as 
Saudi Aramco, Norway’s Statoil, Brazil’s Petrobras and Malaysia’s Petronas – 
precisely because nationalist or protectionist sentiments tend to limit the access of 
foreign investment in a country’s energy sector, national companies seldom have the 
same technical expertise, organisational skills and capital as IOCs, giving the latter a 
better record at developing energy-production capacity, and with it energy security, 
than the former. As Shaffer explains, 
 
Resource nationalism policies usually make little economic sense, since they 
tend to harm production and export capabilities and thus ultimately state 
revenues. Substituting state oil companies for foreign and private partners often 
means less efficient operation and more limited access to advanced exploration 
and production technologies. These policies also hurt the climate for future 
foreign and private investment in the states. As stated by William Ramsay, 
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deputy director of the International Energy Agency, “The rise of nationalism is 
a concern for future (oil and gas) production.”301 
 
Therefore, the need for more capital and better technical knowhow often drives 
producing countries to invite IOCs to participate in their energy sectors by promising 
them equity stakes in their operations. Since the mid-1970s, according to Adam 
Sieminski, ‘there have been very few examples of national oil companies making 
significant net increases in production capacity without some form of direct 
participation by the IOCs.’302 Moreover, IOCs are much better at managing their 
revenues over the long term than NOCs because they set aside parts of their profits 
during booms in order to avoid deficits during business troughs. 
Meanwhile, governments with energy monopolies habitually take away from 
their NOC’s profits to spend on national development programmes and/or more 
assertive foreign policies, thus creating budgetary constraints that limit these 
companies’ ability to reinvest in future production capacity and energy security: ‘In 
contrast to private firms, largely motivated by the lure of profits and a desire to 
increase shareholder value, the NOCs are often driven by what the Congressional 
Research Service terms “governmentally mandated objectives.” … But for many of 
the countries involved, the national oil companies are also being wielded by their 
governments as a tool of foreign policy. “It is no surprise,” the James A. Baker III 
Institute of Rice University in Texas, U.S., reported, “that NOCs, with their vast 
access to the world’s resources, are becoming important players in global power 
politics.”’303 
 In principle, because NOCs act in accordance with their government’s national 
interests, while IOCs follow their shareholders’ interests, energy security can 
sometimes better be served by NOCs than by IOCs, which ‘cannot be expected 
automatically to consider the energy security concerns of client nations as they are 
driven mainly by commercial pressures.’304 This, in turn, compromises the ability of 
states relying on private energy companies not only to pursue their energy security, 
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but also to convert that ability into effective energy diplomacy and statecraft. 
Conversely, NOCs with a strong international projection, whose chairmen are 
typically also their country’s energy minister, are increasingly able to outbid IOCs for 
new oil concessions abroad by providing the host country’s government with 
additional political incentives that may well be more attractive than the (usually 
purely economic) offers made by IOCs.305 
However, as Goldthau calls attention to, a quick assessment of the motivations 
behind China’s energy diplomacy and Russia’s energy statecraft challenges the 
assumption that the primary driver is energy security or national security. Rather, he 
argues, ‘both strategic government goals and corporate business interests—which may 
often coincide but not necessarily be identical—are reflected in energy diplomacy 
[and statecraft]. As the cases of China and Russia reveal, the driving force of (energy-
related) foreign policy is not necessarily only the Kremlin or the Chinese presidency 
but may be also the headquarters of Gazprom or PetroChina.’306  
In that respect, the principal-agent dynamic can work both ways: the 
government using energy companies as agents to carry out their political strategy, and 
energy companies using the governments where they are based as instruments to 
achieve their (usually profit-driven) goals. But, in any case, in order for more 
effective energy statecraft (or diplomacy) to take place, a solid principal-agent 
relationship should be in place between national governments and their energy 
companies, national or otherwise. 
 
Limits to Energy Statecraft 
In order to avoid one of the criticisms that Michael Mastanduno has directed at the 
new literature on positive economic statecraft – namely that it ‘has tended to focus 
research on “showcasing” the effectiveness of economic inducements in carefully 
selected case studies’307 – it is important to list and assess the limits and potential 
hindrances to the successful implementation of energy statecraft, be it negative or 
positive. As Daoudi and Dajani remind us, ‘in their efforts to use oil leverage most 
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effectively, the oil producers need to consider the counterleverage options open to the 
target nations.’308  
With regards to negative energy statecraft, Shaffer has noted that ‘oil supply 
embargos by producers have been an infrequently used and very ineffectual tool’ of 
foreign policy, while reminding us that it is more often the oil- and gas-producing 
countries that are the targets of consuming countries’ sanctions, given the large 
investment necessary to develop their hydrocarbon industry.309 It is, after all, ‘in the 
national interests of major oil consumers who may eventually find themselves the 
targets of the oil weapon to guard themselves against such a possibility by seeking to 
minimize conflict with the producers and having multiple policy options available 
should those conflicts fail to be resolved. …  [Therefore, p]otential target nations need 
to adopt energy policies that will make them less vulnerable to drastic supply 
restrictions.’310  
For Pascual and Zambetakis, the short-term options are limited for consumer 
states and those ‘who see the wider risks of vesting so much political power in 
energy-rich states’ (particularly during tight market conditions), since energy 
production is managed by producer states.311 However, there are several inherent 
limits to energy statecraft as well as a number of long-term options available to 
energy-importing states against exporters’ energy statecraft, and many such energy 
security countermeasures have been put in place. These include the resource curse and 
export dependence; resource nationalism; OPEC’s lack of cohesion as a cartel; the 
International Energy Agency and strategic petroleum reserves; and diversification and 
conservation of energy resources. 
 
The resource curse and export dependence 
Though being richly endowed with energy and other natural resources can be a boon 
and a source of power for some countries, it can have the opposite effect if their 
resources and revenues are not well managed. This is the so-called ‘resource curse’: 
countries that are dependent on revenues from the sales of their hydrocarbons or other 
natural resources often fail to translate their short-term wealth into long-term 
economic growth and sustainable development due to poor governance and fiscal 
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mismanagement.312 And the resource curse is not just limited to countries lacking 
good governance; it can also happen in advanced, industrialised countries like The 
Netherlands, which has given its name to a particular form of economic malaise 
caused by its first discovery of natural gas in the North Sea in the 1960s – ‘Dutch 
disease’: 
 
The affliction hits when a country becomes a significant producer and exporter 
of natural resources. Rising resource exports push up the value of the country’s 
currency, which makes its other exports, such as manufactured and agricultural 
goods, less competitive abroad. Export figures for those products then decline, 
depriving the country of the benefits of dynamic manufacturing and agricultural 
bases and leaving it dependent on its resource sector and so at the mercy of 
often volatile international markets.313 
 
 But the resource curse goes well beyond ‘Dutch disease’, especially where less 
developed countries with poor governance are concerned. High energy prices and 
their resulting windfalls in the coffers of less developed energy-producing and 
exporting countries can lead to other economic problems, excessive and wasteful 
government spending, corruption and internal conflict. The ‘easy money’ resulting 
from high energy prices reduces incentives to invest in future production capacity, 
meaning that energy-producing countries could derive less revenues over a twenty-
year period than if prices had been low.314 Paul Collier’s research has shown that 
countries benefitting from an oil boom grow on average 7 per cent during the first five 
years but shrink an average of 17 per cent over the following ten years.315 This means 
that energy producers are ultimately much more dependent on their exports than 
consumers are on energy imports, which can be illustrated by comparing the United 
States and Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest oil importer and exporter, respectively: 
 
From the exporters’ point of view, “energy security,” or perhaps, to be more 
precise, “demand security,” is at least as important, perhaps more so, than for 
the importers. Energy represents about 15 percent of the U.S. total import bill 
and 2 percent of GDP but 90 percent of Saudi exports and 45 percent of GDP. 
The Saudis need the United States more than the United States needs them. In 
extremis, the United States can turn to coal and nuclear power; Saudi Arabia has 
neither of these nor any other realistic way of earning a living. If the United 
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States manages to cut oil demand by just a few percent, it might not import any 
Saudi oil. During the period of the oil crises, say from 1973 to 1980, real U.S. 
GDP per head rose by 9 percent. The production cutbacks and low prices that 
followed led to real Saudi per capita GDP falling by 42 percent, taking them 
from parity with Switzerland to lying just ahead of Mexico.316 
 
Thus, during low-price scenarios, the export dependence created by the resource curse 
severely hampers the ability of producing countries to engage in energy statecraft, 
since their revenues depend on these exports, like ‘Russia’s now-critical need for 
revenue from natural gas exports [that] limits the credibility of its threats to deny 
supplies to buyers.’317 
And, as is often the case under high prices, importing countries become more 
efficient in their oil use through conservation and look to other sources of energy to 
substitute for expensive oil, thus curbing future demand for exporting countries’ oil 
even under low price scenarios.  
 
Despite the sustained tight oil market conditions in the early twenty-first 
century, the major industrial states are less vulnerable to the price surges and 
spikes caused by threat of supply disruptions then they were in the 1970s. 
Today the United States and Europe use half the amount of oil per dollar of 
GDP produced that they did in the 1970s. … Moreover, the major oil exporters 
are much less prepared to sustain extended export disruptions than in the past, 
with their economies increasingly dependent on oil revenues. Those oil 
exporters with large populations supported by the oil revenues, such as Iran and 
Venezuela, are particularly dependent on continuing high exports.318 
 
Instead of making wise investments, such governments often lack fiscal 
discipline and spend their windfalls on projects that they cannot afford when prices 
are low, which given the nature of the business cycle, inevitably happens after booms. 
In that sense, in Yahia Said’s words, the oil curse ‘is similar to financial crises where 
problems are created on the up-side even if they are only manifested when the bubble 
bursts. Thus the mismanagement of the oil windfalls from the 1970s boom 
contributed to the debt crisis in the 1980s. Having squandered the windfalls from the 
1970s boom many resource rich countries experienced economic, social and political 
upheavals in the 1990s which did not spare even the wealthiest ones.’319 
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 Even worse than their economic side-effects are the political repercussions of 
oil windfalls. Sudden and huge amounts of revenue not only tend to increase 
corruption at the expense of democracy and good governance, often solidifying 
dictatorships, but they also tend to delay badly needed reforms, instead spending the 
windfalls on payoffs and patronage in order for the regime to stay in power while 
silencing their opponents. This, in turn, is likely to increase economic disparities 
inside the country, which often lead to internal conflicts and civil wars – the so-called 
‘Arab spring’ of 2011 in Libya and other Middle Eastern and North African countries 
is a case in point. Indeed, Collier also argues that resource-rich countries are nine 
times more likely than ‘resource-poor’ countries to experience violent internal 
conflicts.320 Thus, higher revenues from energy windfalls tend to create increased 
dependence on export rents in energy-producing countries. 
 
Resource nationalism 
Resource nationalism, though a potential source of control and increased effectiveness 
of energy statecraft, can also be a limitation. When oil prices are high over extended 
periods of time, writes Shaffer, ‘states often become emboldened and reduce or 
remove the participation of foreign or private companies in energy exploration, 
production, or export. They adopt a policy of resource nationalism, and take 
advantage of their newly acquired power under tight oil markets to attempt to revise 
agreements with foreign energy companies, nationalize energy industries, and 
advance state ownership of energy resources.’321 While such actions may accrue more 
power and revenue to energy-rich states in the short term, the long-term ramifications 
tend to be detrimental, as explained above. Robert Mills clarifies that ‘recurrent 
attempts by petro-states to found their economies primarily on oil and gas will 
lead…to stagnation. The temporary feeling of power given their leaders by their 
possession of a scarce resource will turn out to be illusory; it will cause them to dally 
in making fundamental reforms and thus, ironically, make them weaker than their 
rivals, not stronger.’322 
 This can be illustrated by the fall in OPEC’s market share of oil production 
relative to non-OPEC producers over the years: from 53 per cent at the time of the 
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1973 boycott to around 35 per cent today,323 which, according to Mills, is ‘too low for 
a really effective cartel, even if all its members were perfectly aligned, and OPEC is 
not itself homogeneous.’ Moreover, with so many more producers and exporters in 
the international oil market, the fungible nature of oil ‘make[s] it impossible to 
enforce a selective boycott or preferential supply’,324 since a buyer can always 
procure oil elsewhere (though probably for a higher price) in case of a supply 
disruption. This is also true of most commodities, and was realised at least as far back 
as the publication of Albert Hirschman’s National Power and the Structure of 
International Trade (1945): ‘A country menaced with an interruption of trade with a 
given country has the alternative of diverting its trade to a third country; by so doing it 
evades more or less completely the damaging consequences of the stoppage of its 
trade with one particular country. The stoppage or the threat of it would thus lose all 
its force.’325 
In addition to competition from non-OPEC producers, there are several factors 
that limit OPEC’s ability to manage the world’s oil supply and price as a cartel, as the 
former Deputy Secretary General of OPEC, Fadhil al-Chalabi, enumerates.326 One of 
OPEC’s key limitations is its short-termism both politically and economically. The 
intense politicisation of OPEC became apparent once it took over the pricing of oil, 
which its members immediately turned into a political weapon to gain ‘short-term 
benefits with little regard for the long-term consequences of their decisions.’ OPEC’s 
short-termism has also been reflected economically due to its members’ almost total 
dependence on oil revenues – over 90 per cent of their total exports – for their 
national budgets, making their decisions based on the immediate financial 
requirements of their treasuries rather than long-term economic rationale. Indeed, as 
Chalabi himself puts it, ‘OPEC’s decision-making process had little to do with sound 
economics.’ The politicisation of oil by OPEC has led, time and again, to disruptions 
in supply and wide price fluctuations caused above all by political events than by 
market forces: ‘World oil markets can be seen as simply reacting to interruption of 
supplies caused by political events.’ This is in stark contrast to how the IOCs 
managed the market before OPEC took over its control. The former ‘controlled the 
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upstream in response to downstream requirements, all of which were controlled by the 
major oil companies in a way as to create a stable market by avoiding a shortage or 
surplus of crude oil. In OPEC’s case, decisions on crude oil production are not 
organically related to downstream requirements. OPEC production is based simply on 
the difference between world demand and the production from outside the 
organization, without any knowledge of the downstream exigencies of consumer 
countries’, thus inevitably leading to worldwide price volatility and less control over 
markets, limiting OPEC’s ability effectively to pursue energy statecraft. 
As natural gas augments its share of overall energy demand, securing gas 
supplies will increasingly be considered as part of gas-importing countries’ national 
interests. This raises fears that a few countries could dominate international gas 
markets, particularly LNG trade, and form a natural gas cartel emulating OPEC, an 
idea that has existed almost as long as OPEC but has only recently started to come to 
fruition. In May 2001, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) held its inaugural 
meeting in Tehran, seeking to increase the coordination of gas production among its 
members.327 Since then, GECF has tried without success to influence Europe’s natural 
gas market: ‘GECF helped to catalyse the formation of a working group headed by 
Russia and Algeria who sought to resist EU attempts to outlaw destination clauses 
that prevent contracted gas buyers from reselling to third parties. (The option to resell 
gas is a pivotal mechanism for market arbitrage and efficiency, as it helps to prevent 
the segregation of markets that allows gas sellers to exert monopoly power.)’328 
 Despite its creation, there are several factors keeping GECF or other future gas 
cartels from being able to act collectively with the same relative success as OPEC. 
First and foremost, because of its insubstantial characteristic in its natural state, gas is 
mostly transported through fixed pipelines that require long-term contracts and good 
relations between gas-producing and -consuming countries, which have resulted in 
regional markets rather than a fungible, global market like oil. However, while the 
rising global trade in liquefied natural gas could facilitate gas cartel formation, not 
only is this market still being developed but LNG also competes with pipeline gas. 
Unlike oil, natural gas reserves are currently much more widely distributed in the 
world – ‘largely as a result of natural gas not having been a priority for 
                                                
327 Algeria, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar Russia, Trinidad & 
Tobago, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela, and Norway as an observer rather than a member. 
328 Jaffe, Hayes & Victor, Op cit., pp. 477-478. 
106 
 
development’.329 Owing to the large and growing number of natural gas suppliers, 
GECF or other attempts at gas cartelisation are faced with too many potential 
members and too many diverging interests among them to act effectively with unity 
of purpose, not to mention fierce competition from those countries that do not join the 
cartel as well as competition from other energy sources, as Mills points out: ‘Gas, 
primarily used for power, is much more easily substitutable than oil, having strong 
competitors in nuclear, coal, and renewables and being available as LNG from a wide 
and growing variety of suppliers.’330 Moreover, the natural gas industry, particularly 
LNG, is extremely capital-intensive to develop, but is much cheaper to operate once 
production has started, putting a ‘premium on full operation once the equipment is in 
service’331 rather than limiting production to achieve political ends. Lastly, with the 
exception of Russia, which is both the largest reserve holder and biggest exporter of 
natural gas, there is much less of a correlation between gas reserves and export market 
share than there is with oil – e.g. Canada is the world’s second-largest gas exporter 
despite only having the nineteenth-largest reserves, whereas Iran holds the world’s 
second-largest reserves and is not a significant gas exporter and is not even among the 
world’s top twenty gas exporters332 – meaning it is critical for gas exporters to 
maintain good relations with their costumers in order to attract further investments for 
this highly capital-intensive industry and to protect their revenues, market share and 
reputation as reliable suppliers.333 Thus, for Amy Jaffe, Mark Hayes and David 
Victor, ‘the countries most likely to become [natural gas] exporters are those that are 
able to combine prodigious gas resources with a business environment that favors 
private investment; those same conditions would impede the successful 
implementation of an effective cartel’, making the latter ‘still a theoretical prospect 
rather than a real present danger.’334 
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OPEC’s lack of cohesion as a cartel 
OPEC’s drawbacks in effectively controlling the global oil market are not limited to 
its collective actions, but they also include internal power struggles. OPEC members 
often fail to abide by their official production quotas, especially when oil prices are 
high – their degree of compliance tends to be greater when prices are low. This form 
of ‘cheating’ is a result of the heterogeneous nature of OPEC’s membership, which 
sparks a conflict of interest between its larger and smaller members: ‘those with low 
oil reserves always seek higher prices so as to maximize their oil revenues by 
increasing the per barrel income; also, because their production capacity is so limited, 
they do not even care about the market share or the long-term effects of high prices on 
demand and supply. Conversely, member countries with large reserves (e.g., Saudi 
Arabia) in principle have regard for their market share to maximize income from their 
larger volume and, thus, higher market share. OPEC has in the past tried to formulate 
a long-term strategy but has never succeeded due to these conflicts of interest within 
the organization.’335 There are two main examples of how diverging interests among 
OPEC members have backfired, both of which resulted in an oil price collapse, in 
1986 and in 1998. 
 The Iranian Revolution of 1979, followed by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War 
in 1980, caused severe supply disruptions which more than tripled the price of oil to 
over $40 a barrel, which in turn ‘encouraged fuel switching, the development of more 
efficient technologies, and a strong increase in non-OPEC oil production, which, 
along with decreasing demand due to recession, reduced OPEC’s market share from 
more than 30 million barrels/day (mbd) in the 1970s to as low as 16 mbd by the mid-
1980s’336 – or, in percentage terms, OPEC’s market share fell from 53 per cent during 
the mid-1970s to around 30 per cent in 1985.337 This drastic loss of market share was 
a direct result of Saudi Arabia playing the role of swing producer by cutting its 
production – from 10 mbd in 1981 to 3.5 mbd in 1985 – in a vain attempt to keep 
prices high as increasing amounts of non-OPEC oil flooded the market, while other 
OPEC members took advantage of the situation by cheating on their quotas.338 Both 
concerned about the ongoing loss of its market share and in an attempt to discipline 
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overproducers, Saudi Arabia not only increased its output almost overnight from 2.3 
mbd to over 6 mbd, but it also sold its oil at a discount known as ‘netback pricing’ to 
guarantee a considerably larger market share for itself.339 Saudi production rose 
quickly during the first half of 1986, making prices tumble to less than $8 per barrel 
that summer, showing that ‘opening up the spigots to discipline others could 
backfire.’340 
 During the mid-1990s, OPEC was characterised by overproduction and 
disunity among its members to the point of Venezuela questioning the cartel’s 
viability. In 1991, Venezuela’s state-owned company, PDVSA, completely ignored its 
OPEC quota and embarked on an ambitious campaign to increase its production from 
2.8 mbd to 7 mbd by 2006, by reopening its nationalised petroleum sector to foreign 
investment and participation, in order to overtake Saudi Arabia as the top oil supplier 
to the United States, a position it reached in January 1997. Faced with the potential 
loss of its most important export market, this provided Saudi Arabia with a strong 
disincentive to cut its own production for the sake of defending the price of oil. 
Instead, Saudi Arabia once again decided to wage a price war by opening its taps, 
surpassing its 1996 OPEC quota of 8 mbd by 500,000 barrels a day for all of 1997, to 
punish Venezuela for challenging its share of the vital US market.  
However, this infighting happened against a backdrop of aggressively 
increasing Iraqi exports under the auspices of the UN Oil for Food programme, the 
unexpected Asian financial crisis of 1997, which led to a drastic fall in Asian demand 
for oil – a drop in 1.9 per cent, in contrast to a 4.5 per cent rise in Asian demand the 
previous year – and two consecutive warm winters that stagnated OECD countries’ 
winter demand for oil. The combination of OPEC overproduction and worldwide 
demand slump resulted in yet another price collapse, from $27 a barrel in 1997 to as 
low as $8 the following year.341 
 
This event was a stunting reminder of the special glue that binds OPEC 
countries together—fear that the Saudis will use their own oil weapon for 
punitive purposes and for discipline within the producer group. In game-
theoretic terms, OPEC politics involves a dominant producer—Saudi Arabia—
and the peripheral countries—the other OPEC members. The dominant 
producer’s motive is to assure itself the maximum autonomy while preventing 
the others from “free riding” on its efforts to manage the market. It does so by 
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maintaining its “deterrent,” consisting of its shut-in production capacity, which 
it can use to feed the market and to discipline other producers. The peripheral 
countries, conversely, try to work together to prevent the dominant producer 
from acting on its own to produce flat out but rather offer cooperation as a 
means to ensure a floor under prices.342 
 
As is often the case with countries dependent on oil export revenues, the price 
collapse of 1998 bankrupted Venezuela’s treasury, giving rise to popular discontent, 
which paved the way for regime change through the election of a radical, leftwing 
leader in the form of Hugo Chávez in December that year, who soon cancelled 
PDVSA’s expansion plans, heralding a major shift not only in his country’s oil policy 
but also within OPEC itself. That is why, in Morse and Jaffe’s view, ‘[t]here is no 
doubt that without the Saudi weapon, OPEC cooperation would be far shorter-lived 
than it has been. Other members are mindful of the damage Saudi Arabia can inflict 
over the short run with increased production.’343 
 
The International Energy Agency and strategic petroleum reserves 
With virtually all the world’s spare production capacity resting in the Middle East at 
the time of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, there was no mechanism in place for OECD 
countries to protect themselves from the economic fallout of such a major disruption. 
The oil price spike of 1973 thus revealed the full extent to which oil-import-
dependent countries in the OECD were to supply shocks. In response to these events, 
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger summoned the leaders of OECD countries to 
meet in Washington in February 1974 to establish a framework for international 
energy cooperation. Underlying the reason for the meeting was a recognition that 
‘consuming countries have a clear interest in undertaking policies that will undermine 
OPEC’s short- and long-term ability to act as a cartel to inflate oil prices’ and that 
‘[p]olicies undertaken in conjunction with other consuming nations are likely to be 
more effective than policies undertaken individually by increasing the strength of the 
monopsony wedge’ – i.e. collective buying power of major oil consumers344 – in other 
words, the reverse of monopoly power. After almost a year of intense negotiations, 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) was created on 15 November 1974, through a 
decision of the Council of the OECD – to which the new organisation is formally 
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linked and headquartered in Paris – to serve as the collective mechanism though 
which its oil-consuming members would coordinate their actions in response to future 
energy crises, cooperate to prevent scrambles for oil supplies and deter oil-producing 
countries from using oil as a political weapon to influence the foreign policies of its 
members.345 In the words of a former US representative to the IEA, Edward Morse, 
the founding member states sought to ‘blunt the use of the oil weapon’, which the 
Agency does through its two major functions: ‘sharing oil among member states in 
the case of short-term supply disruptions, and long-term plans to reduce dependence 
on OPEC.’346 
 
The IEA’s members currently agree on the following as their core objectives: 
maintaining and improving systems for coping with oil supply disruptions; 
promoting rational energy policies in a global context through cooperative 
relations with nonmember countries, industry, and international organizations; 
operating a permanent information system on the international oil market; 
improving the world’s energy supply and demand structure by developing 
alternative energy sources and increasing the efficiency of energy use; and 
assisting in integration of environmental and energy policies.347 
 
 The centrepiece of the IEA mechanism during its formative years was an 
emergency oil-sharing system through which its member states would share their 
supplies in case of another embargo or other serious supply disruptions affecting one 
or more of its members. This system would be triggered in the event of either a 7-11 
per cent or a 12 per cent or greater shortfall in daily oil supply in one or more of IEA 
member states, with two different responses depending on the case: for a 7 to 11 per 
cent shortfall, demand restraint and conservation measures would be adopted by 
members, while only a 12 per cent or higher shortfall would require the actual sharing 
of IEA members’ oil supplies.348  
However, the second oil price shock provoked by the Iranian Revolution in 
1979 demonstrated that the oil-sharing plan was inadequate to cope with the new 
crisis. The shortfall in supply caused by the decrease of 4.5 mbd of Iranian 
production, although serious, did not reach the IEA’s minimum, but staggering, 
trigger of 7 per cent. The resulting action by OECD countries was in complete 
opposition to the IEA’s raison d’être, provoking a panicky scramble for supplies, oil 
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stock building and hoarding, putting additional upward pressure on prices and 
worsening the crisis.  
The Iranian Revolution taught the IEA a valuable lesson, however: the 
importance of oil stocks and member state coordination in the event of a disruption.349 
The United States Congress had already enacted legislation in 1975 authorising the 
construction of a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) that would allow the US 
government to purchase and store huge amounts of petroleum to be released 
according to need. After the Iran-Iraq War erupted in September 1980, the IEA 
decided to shift its emergency coordination system away from oil-sharing and demand 
restraint towards a more flexible and rapid response mechanism of releasing oil stocks 
to the market similar to the American SPR, a policy that became formalised in the 
IEA in 1985, requiring its 26 members to hold the equivalent of at least 90 days of oil 
imports in emergency stocks, and endures to this date: 
 
There was a fundamental understanding in 1985 that oil stocks could buy time 
for diplomacy. They had become an essential tool of foreign policy, and there 
was an understanding that the tool must be implemented internationally in a 
coordinated manner. Recognizing this, the United States endorsed the 
development of a more formal system of stock usage and the need for the 
United States and its allies to expand their strategic oil stockpiles. As a result, 
the IEA undertook a major effort to formalize coordinated stock policy and urge 
all member countries to build stocks.350 
 
 Thus, when faced with energy statecraft in the form of a supply disruption, oil-
consuming countries are faced with three choices: suffer high prices, try to convince 
countries with sufficient spare capacity to increase production, or draw down strategic 
oil stocks.351 Strategic reserves represent the demand-side of the international energy 
market’s ‘security margin’, absorbing supply shocks by releasing stored oil to replace 
the amount missing from the market without having to rely on spare capacity from the 
supply-side. 
 
The development of strategic reserves sufficient to cover [ninety] days of 
imports by all IEA members (and more recent accumulation by China) provides 
a valuable buffer in the case of an interruption or embargo. The actual period of 
cover would be longer because not all exports worldwide would be cut off 
simultaneously; at most, one or two countries might be implicated (as with Iraq 
and Kuwait in 1990-1991). This gives consumers “staying power,” ensuring that 
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a boycott by a major exporter would have to be sustained for a long period, 
causing them severe economic hardship.352 
 
As the former executive director of the IEA, Claude Mandil, has noted, 
‘strategic stocks are a very important tool of deterrence for OECD countries’353 
against politically motivated embargoes and OPEC’s monopolistic control of the 
market, ensuring price stability through intermittent checks on high oil prices, thus 
increasing the international influence of countries that have such stocks.354 Moreover, 
the threat to draw down strategic stocks can also encourage OPEC countries to 
increase production from their spare capacity – as was the case shortly before the Gulf 
War in 1991, when the Bush administration in conjunction with the IEA expressed 
their willingness to do so, leading Saudi Arabia to increase production – since such an 
action would deflate prices and revenue from oil exports, if not lead to an outright 
price collapse if the drawdown is sufficiently large. Thus, ‘in theory, [strategic] oil 
reserves are an important tool of both economic and foreign policy.’355 
 
Diversification and conservation of energy resources 
The IEA’s limited success as an international organization with formal mechanisms to 
counter OPEC’s monopoly power notwithstanding, there is one strategy Western, oil-
importing countries have adopted, which, more than any other, has potentially worked 
to cripple OPEC’s long-term hold over the oil market, and, if used again, could repeat 
its feats of the 1970s and 80s: diversification. The principle of diversification is 
almost as old as the international politics of oil, and, like its ultimate goal today, was 
born out of fears of the Middle East and its unreliability as a secure source of oil 
supplies. In 1913, when Great Britain and Imperial Germany found themselves in the 
midst of an arms race for naval superiority preceding the First World War, Winston 
Churchill, then the First Lord of the Admiralty, made the landmark decision to 
substitute coal for petroleum as the main energy source to fuel the Royal Navy’s 
ships. Not only would this change make the ships faster and more manoeuvrable, but 
they would also require fewer men in the engine rooms, shovelling coal into the ships’ 
furnaces, allowing them to be on the deck, fighting. But this shift represented at the 
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same time a geopolitical and strategic gamble in the sense that the Royal Navy would 
no longer rely on abundant and safely available Welsh coal, instead having to rely on 
insecure oil supplies from Persia, thus turning Britain’s energy security into a foreign 
policy matter. ‘In addressing the risks associated with this historic move,’ Daniel 
Yergin recounts, ‘Churchill declared, “Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and 
variety alone.” With that, he was articulating the fundamental principle of energy 
security: diversification of supply.’356 
 Almost a century later, experience has shown that diversification remains the 
‘overarching principle’ of energy security.357 ‘Multiplying one’s supply sources’, 
writes Yergin, ‘reduces the impact of a disruption in supply from one source by 
providing alternatives, serving the interests of both consumers and producers, for 
whom stable markets are a prime concern.’358 Norris notes that, in theoretical terms of 
economic statecraft, this means that ‘over the long term, states may seek to limit their 
exposure to economic statecraft by consciously seeking to alter their elasticity 
exposure or relative magnitude exposure (e.g. changing a state’s economic 
dependence on oil,…diversifying trade partners or sources of investment etc.).’359 But 
the principle of diversification has evolved to take on a wider meaning, not just of 
varied sources of petroleum, but, more crucially, also of different kinds of energy 
sources, old and new – thus remaining ‘the essential starting point for any thinking of 
energy security.’360 Indeed, the ability of IEA members and other energy-importing 
countries to exercise their monopsony power against OPEC and other unreliable 
suppliers ‘depends in large part on the availability of alternative energy supplies.’361 
 The purpose of diversification is to reduce dependence on a few, unreliable 
and/or unstable suppliers of a single energy source. Therefore, the outbreak of the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the ensuing war between that country and Iraq – both 
of which caused the price of oil to skyrocket to significantly higher levels than they 
had been throughout the decade following the 1973 price spike – had unintended 
negative consequences for OPEC countries, which at first were satisfied with their 
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monumental increase in oil rents. The exorbitant price of oil during the first half of the 
1980s not only gave incentive for a strong increase in non-OPEC oil exploration and 
production, but also for fuel switching to alternative energy sources as well as the 
development of more fuel-efficient technologies and energy conservation – all of 
which halved OPEC’s market share and made importing countries more energy-
secure and less dependent on the former during the latter half of the 1980s, and could 
have the power to do so again.362 
 High oil prices after 1979 provided a twofold incentive for non-OPEC 
producers. First, high prices offered such a wide profit margin for oil producers and 
investors that hitherto high-cost oil-rich regions not only became economically viable 
to explore but also very lucrative for continued reinvestment in and of themselves. 
Second, the higher return on dividends from oil sales encouraged investment in 
scientific research and development of new and more cost-effective technologies to 
improve the efficiency of upstream oil operations – exploration, development and 
production of new oil fields – thus reducing the costs of producing oil in these 
otherwise high-cost areas while making them more profitable and attractive for 
reinvestment. One such example was oil production in the North Sea, which leaped 
from 2 million barrels a day (mbd) in 1975 to 3.5 mbd a decade later. And since 
‘OPEC adhered to the system of fixed price and swing production, any additional oil 
coming from outside OPEC would first capture its share in the market before buyers 
resorted to OPEC oil. Also, the greater the supplies of non-OPEC oil, the less OPEC 
oil that was on the market to meet world demand.’363 
 The same strategy of oil diversification could be pursued today, like in the 
early 1980s, using the returns from high oil prices to invest in research and 
development of heavy and/or unconventional oils, which ‘have the potential to alter 
the geopolitics of oil without necessarily reducing oil consumption.’ Venezuela’s 
ultra-heavy oil and Canada’s tar sands (bitumen) together make up c. 600 billion 
barrels, or almost half of the world’s unconventional oils, which are about the same as 
the world’s conventional oil reserves of 1.1 trillion barrels. But producing, 
transporting and refining these unconventional oils on a massive scale requires more 
widespread investment in and use of ‘technologies to reduce viscosity, additives to 
enable transport, and the removal of significant contaminants in the refining process’, 
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all of which are lacking in major oil-importing regions, such as North America. 
Investment in these areas could repeat their success of the early 1980s in countering 
OPEC’s geopolitical influence while ensuring the energy security and national 
interests of energy-importing states.364 As Kenderdine and Moniz remind us, ‘[e]ach 
of these options is expensive and the strategic objective—diminishing OPEC’s market 
power—would be enhanced if technology investments were made in conjunction with 
policies to increase global strategic oil reserves and heavy oil refining capacity.’365 
 But as the North Sea and other non-OPEC oil and gas fields mature, hence 
slowing down their production, the need to find more fields outside OPEC’s reach 
becomes paramount, considering the goal of decreasing OPEC’s monopoly power. 
However, there is another, and even more effective, form of diversification that can 
permanently slash at least part of OPEC’s market share: oil substitution for different 
kinds of energy sources. One fundamental consequence of OPEC’s price spikes for 
the industrial economies of the West was that they sparked a long-term process of 
gradually shifting the bulk of their energy use away from petroleum towards 
alternative energy sources, from 45 per cent of the world’s total energy mix in 1973 to 
around 35 per cent today, a figure that is projected potentially to decline, especially if 
the relative share of natural gas increases.366 This scenario could still repeat itself 
today, as Mills explains: 
 
Even if conventional non-OPEC oil goes into decline, oil prices in the level of 
recent years ($80-120) are not sustainable in the long term, because they create 
strong incentives to the development of new frontiers and unconventional 
production, and efficiency and alternative energy sources. This premature shift 
to unconventional fuels and alternatives would levy a heavy investment burden 
and be economically inefficient on a worldwide scale, but eventually the oil 
exporters would suffer more than the importers, as happened after the past two 
oil crises. OPEC nations are also well aware that they would ultimately pay the 
price for a global recession, reducing demand for their main export. This spectre 
increasingly confronted OPEC during 2008 as the consequences of the credit 
crisis unfolded.367 
 
Past examples from the first oil crisis include the French policy to build 
thirteen 1,000-Megawatt nuclear power stations between 1973 and 1975 under 
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presidents Pompidou and Giscard D’Estaing,368 and Brazil’s 1975 policy to 
manufacture car engines that run on ethanol rather than gasoline; but the leading case 
of diversification in the 1970s was the shift to natural gas, instead of oil, for electric 
power generation in the US, Japan and several European countries. These countries 
sought to replace the unexpectedly expensive and unreliable oil supplies with natural 
gas in order to reduce their dependence on oil imports. But natural gas was also more 
attractive than other fossil fuels, like oil and coal, because of its lower emissions of 
carbon dioxide and other pollutants. These qualities stimulated both a policy and 
industry shift towards natural-gas-fired electric power generation in industrialised 
countries, with developing countries soon following suit: ‘Environmental preferences 
for natural gas were augmented by relatively cheap supplies from the mid-1980s 
through the 1990s, improvements in natural gas turbine technologies, and much 
cheaper construction and maintenance costs for natural-gas-fired power plants.’369 
However, the shift to natural gas motivated mainly by energy security, but also by 
environmental concerns, brought two main challenges: 
 
First, importing governments needed to ensure that they did not replace oil with 
another insecure and volatile import. Second, a shift to gas would require 
building infrastructures (pipelines and LNG systems) that were even more 
costly than their oil equivalents. A long time horizon would be needed to justify 
these investments. The response to these two challenges was found in long-term 
contracts. For governments, these contracts promised to assure energy security; 
for investors in gas projects, such contracts created a context in which capital 
could be risked when returns were distant.370 
 
Today, such challenges are somewhat overshadowed by the relative urgency 
of mitigating climate change, making the shift from fossil fuels (oil and coal in 
particular) to alternative energy a social and political imperative, rather than merely 
relying on economic incentives. ‘Climate change creates added incentives to move 
away from oil, just as clean gas displaced somewhat cheaper but dirty coal,’ writes 
Mills, ‘and therefore oil will increasingly need an additional competitive edge. Given 
the enormous sums of money pouring into the alternative energy complex so far this 
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millennium, $100 billion in renewables alone in 2006, oil exporters are playing a very 
dangerous game by resisting signals to increase output.’371 
But the problem back then is the same as it is today, with natural gas as well as 
other, newer forms of alternative energy: namely whether resource development and 
infrastructure for delivery can keep up with the rising demand for these energy 
resources.372 The current need to develop a new generation of nuclear power, ‘clean 
coal’ technologies, biofuels and other renewables, as well as hydrogen fuel cells in the 
longer term, will inevitably face infrastructural and investment challenges, but they 
are likely to overcome them because of their increased competitiveness with oil as a 
result of the latter’s astronomic price rise in the last few years and the technological 
development of the former fuels. As Chalabi argues, ‘technology favors these shifts 
because it reduces the costs of otherwise expensive alternatives.’373 Indeed, as Jaffe 
points out, amidst current anxiety over terrorist threats in the Middle East and 
elsewhere, which can cause severe oil supply disruptions, the drive for alternatives is 
even stronger: 
 
In the post-September 11 climate, consumer governments are increasingly 
discussing enhancing development of backstop technologies or promoting 
alternative energy sources that can serve to reduce the need for fossil fuel. In 
this practice, backstop technologies create an incentive for oil producers to 
avoid oil price shocks and supply disruptions for fear that the new technologies 
would be released and used, permanently eliminating sales markets. Alternative 
energy supplies provide ready substitutes if an increase in the price of oil is too 
extreme, and they can shield the economy from the negative impact from 
disruption of any one fuel source.374 
 
 No matter what energy security benefits might ensue from diversifying the 
sources of a country’s oil supplies or its overall energy matrix, perhaps the most 
advantageous form of diversification is not the substitution of oil for other energy 
resources, but for nothing at all. Enhanced energy efficiency in the use of energy 
generally, and its conservation in particular, is a paramount source of energy security. 
As Yergin postulates, ‘[c]onservation—energy efficiency—should be thought of as an 
energy source, and one with very large potential.’375 That being the case, energy 
conservation should also be considered as form of diversification. A third unintended 
                                                
371 Mills, Op cit., p. 194. 
372 Juckett & Foss, Op cit., p. 536. 
373 Chalabi, Op cit., p.762. 
374 Jaffe, Op cit., p. 856. 
375 Yergin, ‘Energy Security and Markets’, Op cit., p. 54. 
118 
 
consequence of OPEC’s 1973 price spike – the other two being diversification 
towards non-OPEC oil and the gradual shift to natural gas and other alternative 
energy sources – was its incentive for greater efficiency in fuel use and its 
conservation in the West, which were often adopted as national policies, especially in 
Western Europe. Various measures were taken by these countries’ governments to 
diminish oil consumption, ranging from laws reducing the speed limit for 
automobiles, to public awareness campaigns, to fiscal policies. In France, for 
example, television ads encouraged motorists to drive in high gears (4th or 5th) to 
increase mileage, and housewives were told to do their laundry only if their washing 
machines were fully loaded with clothes.376 With petroleum products extremely 
expensive for end-users, oil consumption growth, which had been a staggering 8 per 
cent a year in Western Europe from the 1960s up to 1973, turned negative thereafter, 
falling from 15.2 mbd in 1973 to 13.5 mbd in 1975, levelling at circa 14 mbd from 
1975 onwards.377 
 
With a lead time, the price shock heralded a process of structural change in the 
world oil industry. Significantly, the emerging energy-saving campaigns led to 
diminishing oil consumption while achieving the same level of economic 
growth. Prior to the price shock, an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) 
had entailed an equal increase in oil consumption, but after the shock, the 
relationship between economic growth and oil consumption changed. A process 
of gradual “decoupling” of oil consumption from economic growth would not 
be attenuated later with the advent of even higher oil prices; that is, less 
consumption per unit of GDP became a permanent feature.378 
 
This sort of ‘decoupling’ also took place in the United States, where the impact of 
energy conservation in the economy has been vast over the past 30 years: between 
1975 and 2005, US GDP grew by 150 per cent, compared to a mere 25 per cent 
increase in energy consumption,379 while producing $1,000 of US GDP required 1.8 
barrels of oil in 1980 compared to only one-third of that in 2004.380 Yergin explains 
this phenomenon by citing the former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Alan 
Greenspan, who attributes much of this ‘decoupling’ to fundamental changes in the 
American economy: ‘many of the gains in energy efficiency have come because the 
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U.S. economy is “lighter”…than it was three decades ago—that is, GDP today is 
composed of less manufacturing and more services (especially information 
technology) than could have been imagined in the 1970s. But the basic point remains: 
conservation has worked.’381 
 Given that most countries’ oil dependence is predominant in the transportation 
sector, it is particularly important to apply energy conservation to automobiles. After 
the 1970s’ oil shocks, this was recognised in the United States and especially in 
Western Europe and Japan – namely that oil dependence can be reduced by improving 
vehicle fuel efficiency.382 Although overall fuel efficiency in the US declined during 
the low oil price scenario of the 1990s, with the rise in sport-utility vehicle (SUV) 
sales, the lesson stuck in Western Europe and Japan, where automobiles are 
significantly more efficient than in the US. Despite their success with fuel efficiency 
since the 1970s and 1980s, the return of exorbitant oil prices today indicates that the 
reduction of oil dependence in the transport sector requires more than just improved 
efficiency of automotive engines that run on petroleum derivates. As Wilfred Kohl 
points out, 
 
[t]he best long-term strategy to reduce the costs and risks of oil dependence lies 
in research and development of affordable alternatives to petroleum, especially 
in the transportation sector, in which there is a need for new technologies and 
fuels. … Such a development could have a major impact on reducing future 
world oil demand, although the transition to a new transportation technology 
will take a considerable amount of time.383 
 
Though such developments offer great promise for the future, these 
technologies will take time to have a real impact on the reduction of oil dependence. 
Yergin explains that the relatively slow capital turnover, especially in terms of 
exchanging current inefficient cars for newer and more efficient and/or 
environmentally friendly ones, will make ‘these new-technology paths to higher fleet-
average fuel efficiency take time to reach their full potential.’384 Nevertheless, as 
Mills points out, the most worrying prospect for oil exporters is ‘if there is a 
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breakthrough such as highly competitive hybrid or electric cars, [or] algal biofuels,’ in 
which case ‘OPEC might condemn itself to early extinction.’385 
 Overall, the demand-side instrument against OPEC’s influence which has had 
the strongest impact – more so than strategic oil stocks – has proved to be consumer 
taxes on energy to reduce demand for oil. The price volatility brought on by market 
deregulation can also be alleviated by imposing hefty taxes on energy use in 
importing countries, which can serve as a buffer against wide price variations. 
According to Jaffe, not only do such taxes discourage wasteful use of energy, but they 
also collect rents that would otherwise go to oil-exporting countries, thus compelling 
OPEC to accept lower oil prices: ‘When OPEC’s monopoly power strengthens due to 
short-term market tightening, the incentive to exploit that power is tempered by the 
fact that increases in monopoly rents will not accrue entirely to producers but rather 
must be shared with consuming countries that have high energy taxes.’386  
This has sparked scathing anti-tax rhetoric by OPEC directed at OECD 
governments that accumulate higher oil rents than OPEC by imposing high energy 
taxes, which is reminiscent of OPEC’s early 1970s rhetoric against IOCs for 
depriving them of a ‘fair share’ of rents accumulated from the sales of their own 
natural resources. ‘The leaders of OPEC countries cannot be seen as delivering 
benefits to Western consumers at the expense of their own citizens’, writes Jaffe, 
since ‘such perceptions would leave regimes more vulnerable to public attack and to 
the efforts of opposition groups.’387 Indeed, the lower oil prices resulting from 
importing countries’ oil and other energy diversification, as well as energy taxes and 
conservation, were perceived by OPEC countries as far more damaging to them, 
whose oil revenues make up the bulk of their national budgets, than the previously 
high prices had been for OECD countries, whose oil import costs are a much smaller 
fraction of their aggregate trade. In other words, OPEC perceives low oil prices as a 
subsidy for growth in importing countries at expense of their own growth, which is 
mainly stimulated by high oil prices.388 
Diversification is not only an important protection from the rent-seeking 
behaviour of energy-exporting countries, but also against that of importing countries 
that use their collective monopsony power. While diversity of supply is stressed ad 
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infinitum as the principal source of energy security, diversification of demand is not 
often emphasised, even though it is a crucial mechanism for ensuring the energy 
security of countries dependent on energy rents to survive: the guarantee that it can 
export its energy resources to other countries in case one or more of its usual 
customers decide, for whatever reason, to cease importing their energy. In the 1980s, 
for instance, Saudi Arabia learned bitterly that if oil prices are too high, importing 
countries will switch to alternative sources of energy, which, as OPEC’s largest oil 
producer with reserves that will last over a century at current production rates, is 
clearly against its long-term interests.389  
But the fundamental way for oil-exporting countries to ensure their overall 
economic security, rather than merely their energy security, is not through 
diversification of different sources of demand for their oil, but by diversifying their 
economies as a whole, so as not to rely solely or mostly on oil rents for their national 
budgets – a strategy that unfortunately is rarely, if ever, taken into consideration. As 
Daoudi and Dajani have advised, ‘oil producers should assign priority to developing 
their industry and diversifying their economies. Meeting domestic economic and 
social demands is essential for diffusing counterleverages. … The oil producers 
should make serious attempts to decrease imports and weaken trade linkages, 
particularly with consumer nations that might become embargo targets. In this 
respect, diversification of import sources is essential.’390 Therefore, diversification is 
not only an economic end for a country, be it a net importer or exporter of energy, but 
also a strategic means.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The countermeasures against energy statecraft notwithstanding, the ‘energy weapon’ 
– be it in the form of oil, natural gas, or other energy resources – still has the potential 
to be effective if applied properly within an auspicious context, given the ubiquitous 
need for energy resources for a modern society to function. In the case of petroleum, 
on which there is a near-universal dependence for the transportation sector, this is 
particularly true, as Daoudi and Dajani point out below, but it could equally apply to 
any other energy resource on which a given target country excessively depends on. 
And, as such, ‘[j]ust as oil power should not be overestimated, it should not be 
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underestimated. Even in times of oil oversupply, the Western nations’ economies 
remain heavily dependent on oil as their primary source of energy, and because other 
sources are failing to compete successfully with oil in terms of safety, practicality, 
and low cost, the use of oil as a political weapon still poses a serious threat to the 
consumer nations.’391 
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CHAPTER 4 
The International Energy Security Context 
 
 
Energy statecraft – the use of energy resources as an instrument of a state’s foreign 
policy – is a source of state power in that it has the potential to influence the 
behaviour of other actors, or getting them to do what they would otherwise not do. 
Being a subset of economic statecraft, energy statecraft might be conflated into some 
of the debates and criticisms traditionally directed at the former, such as whether ‘the 
use of economic instruments of statecraft [is] a sign of weak and pusillanimous 
statesmanship or an indication of firm commitment’. But no general rule can answer 
this question, says David Baldwin, ‘since the situational context is likely to be crucial 
in determining the symbolic importance of any given instance.’ Indeed, for Baldwin, 
the utility of any given instrument of foreign policy is ‘a function of the situation and 
not a quality intrinsic to the particular technique.’392 This is a proposition many agree 
with, such as Hans Morgenthau, whom Ned Lebow alludes to when affirming that 
‘power is not so readily transformed into influence because it is heavily context-
dependent’,393 and Christopher Hill, who states that ‘both the power to act and the 
ability to exert power over another require an understanding of the nature of the wider 
context in which action has to take place.’394 
This makes it essential to understand the context in which energy statecraft 
takes place in order properly to assess its utility as an instrument of foreign policy. 
Moreover, the power of any given foreign policy instrument may also change over 
time, according to Hill: ‘A currency only has value if it is recognized by others, and 
power thus always has a relational element.’395 Applied specifically to energy 
resources as a source of state power, Jonathan Elkind reminds us that 
 
attention to energy security typically reaches fever pitch when global energy 
prices spike or international conflict threaten to disrupt energy trade. … The 
attention paid to the issue by the public and policymakers alike wanes as soon 
as prices subside naturally, which they generally tend to do in a sector that is 
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predisposed to long, recurring business cycles. The lower prices lull the country 
into a false sense of security even as the energy intensity of its economy 
remains substantially undiminished. In a few years, the cycle repeats.396 
 
Since energy statecraft is herein defined as the manipulation of another state’s energy 
security for one’s own political purposes, this chapter will examine the international 
energy security context that has fostered an increasing use of energy statecraft by 
energy-rich states during the long oil price spike of the past decade. 
 This context, which Dieter Helm calls ‘a new energy paradigm,’397 has been 
characterised not only by high prices for oil and other energy resources, but also by a 
myriad of other threats, ‘ranging from rapidly growing competitors for traditional 
hydrocarbon resources, to terrorists whose willingness to wreak human suffering and 
economic chaos is beyond debate, to environmental impacts that threaten the global 
climate system.’398 Especially with regards to the latter, the growing acceptance of 
climate change as a threat not just to energy security but to the world in general has 
‘helped turn energy use policy into a major foreign policy and even national security 
issue.’399 
All of these defining features of the international energy security context have 
helped promote a drive towards the production and consumption of alternative energy 
resources. Energy security concerns surrounding petroleum have been central to this 
drive, although problems raised by other fossil fuels like natural gas and coal have 
also contributed towards a partial shift towards alternative energy. However, since 
this thesis specifically concerns itself with the use of biofuels as an instrument of 
foreign policy, this chapter will focus on the threats posed by oil to energy security 
because it is the main energy source that biofuels compete with. While natural gas, for 
instance, is a cleaner fossil fuel with the potential to substitute ‘dirtier’ energy 
resources in a multitude of sectors – such as electricity generation, heating and a 
variety of industrial and agricultural purposes – it is rarely used as a source of energy 
for transportation.400 Petroleum, on the other hand, is used for everything, as 
Leonardo Maugeri reminds us: ‘from transportation to heating, to electricity 
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generation, and to plastics and synthetics.’ But the transportation sector is ‘the only 
area where [oil] is truly irreplaceable.’ Interestingly, it is precisely by complementing 
(though not replacing) petroleum in the transportation sector that biofuels have made 
their foremost contribution to energy security – in addition to being increasingly able 
to substitute oil-derived products in all other fields as technology advances, including 
electricity and plastics. Nevertheless, Maugeri insists that ‘petroleum will continue to 
be central to any energy scenario. Furthermore, its cycles will influence the fate of all 
other sources of energy. Therefore, we cannot ignore oil while thinking about a new 
energy paradigm.’401 Hence the focus on the energy security risks of petroleum at the 
expense of lengthy analysis of other energy resources. 
 As explained in the preceding chapter, energy security involves four basic 
elements: availability, reliability, affordability and sustainability. The risks that fossil 
fuels in general, and oil in particular, pose to all four of these elements have created a 
context in which traditional energy resources have gained value as an instrument of 
state power in international relations. On the other hand, because this situation has 
also allowed renewable energy to compete with fossil fuels in general – and biofuels 
to compete with petroleum in particular – the international energy security context has 
also paved the way for the possibility of using biofuels as a tool of energy statecraft – 
the subject of this thesis. The present chapter will therefore assess the concerns that 
oil raises to each of these elements – availability, reliability, affordability and 
sustainability, respectively – in the current international energy security context, with 
secondary consideration paid to other energy sources. 
 
Availability 
Given the finite nature of petroleum and other non-renewable energy resources, there 
has for a long time been a popular belief that the world is running out of oil. However, 
such warnings and predictions of global peak production, or ‘Peak Oil’ – when half 
the world’s petroleum has been depleted – are almost as old as the oil industry itself. 
For example: in 1885 the US Geological Survey (USGS) expected there was ‘little or 
no chance of [finding] oil in California’, which is now responsible for over one-tenth 
of oil production in the United States; in 1914 the US Bureau of Mines estimated 
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there were only ten years left of national oil supply, only to be proven wrong with an 
enormous oil glut in 1930 after the stock-market crash of 1929; this fear was also 
prevalent during World War II, a crucial reason behind Japan’s and Hitler’s invasions 
of the southeast Pacific and the Soviet Union, respectively, but gave way to 
overproduction after the war until the end of the 1960s; and, most notoriously, the two 
oil price shocks of the 1970s also resurrected these fears, until the price of oil 
collapsed in 1986. In 1972, for instance, the Club of Rome think tank published a 
controversial report entitled Limits to Growth, admonishing that only 550 billion 
barrels of oil were left on earth, which would run out by 1990. But the 1986 oil price 
collapse took much credibility out of this neo-Malthusian view, especially considering 
that the world had consumed 600 billion barrels of oil between the publication of 
Limits to Growth and its doomsday year of 1990 and still had almost twice that 
recoverable amount left,402 while world oil production has increased by 60 per cent 
since the 1970s.403 It is easy enough to conclude, writes Michael Klare, that ‘the 
“peak oil” theorists are but so many boys once again crying wolf—that the current 
upsurge of concern over energy scarcity is destined to prove a passing phenomenon, 
either because colossal new reservoirs will be discovered or alternative fuel sources 
will come on line.’404 
Peak oil theorists build on the assumptions of the model first proposed by 
Marion King Hubbert in 1956, which accurately predicted the date for the peak of oil 
production in the United States sometime between 1965 and 1970 depending on 
worst- or best-case scenarios,405 which eventually happened in 1970. Hubbert and his 
followers have since then applied his model to the rest of the world in order to try to 
predict global peak oil production. Peak Oil theorists therefore assume that the entire 
world’s subsoil has been exhaustively explored and therefore its geology is well 
known, as is the case in the United States, meaning that undiscovered oil deposits are 
unlikely still to exist – in other words, almost all of the world’s oil has already been 
found and it is being depleted faster than it can be replaced by modest new 
discoveries – a questionable idea, given the erratic distribution of oilfields in the 
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world and continuing discoveries of new ones, some of them gargantuan, such as 
recent the discoveries made during the past decade in Kazakhstan and Brazil. 
 However, when it comes to hydrocarbons, the rest of the world has not been 
explored for those natural resources to anywhere near the same extent as they have in 
the US. As Maugeri reminds us, the US is ‘by far the oldest and most intensively 
known, explored, and aggressively exploited area in the world. The knowledge of its 
subsurface outpaces that of any other region of the world except Western Europe by a 
factor of 100.’ Hydrocarbons can be found in sedimentary basins, 30 per cent of 
which have yet to be explored worldwide.406 But the most important example of 
under-exploration, ironically, is the Middle East, despite its long and notorious history 
with oil: between 1980 and 2006, around 70 per cent of hydrocarbons exploration has 
taken place in the US and Canada, which together hold close to 3 per cent of the 
world’s proven reserves, in contrast to Persian Gulf countries, which hold over 65 per 
cent of the world’s proven reserves, but together have barely been responsible for 1 
per cent of exploration worldwide.407 Furthermore, Maugeri points out that almost one 
million wells have been drilled in Texas compared to 2,300 in Iraq, while there are 
currently over 560,000 active wells in the US compared to around 1,500 in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 But as oil prices started climbing relentlessly after 2002 – pressured by 
skyrocketing global demand that not even the members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were able to meet, eventually reaching its 
highest level ever on 11 July 2008 at $147.27 a barrel – the peak oil theory has 
regained popularity and doomsday predictions have become more widely publicised 
in the media. In addition to the unprecedented heights of consumption and demand for 
oil and other energy resources, Klare lists a faster-than-expected decline in output 
from existing oilfields, fewer discoveries of new fields and the running out of ‘cheap 
oil’ as factors behind the return to thinking on peak oil.408 According to Klare, 
 
nonrenewable fossil fuels—oil, coal, and natural gas—are still projected to 
jointly satisfy a whopping 87 percent of world energy requirements, about the 
same proportion as today. But because worldwide energy demand in 2030 will 
be so much greater, the supply of all three will have to be correspondingly 
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larger to retain this combined share: Oil production will have to rise by an 
estimated 42 percent, natural gas by 65 percent, and coal by 74 percent. And 
this is where the problem lies: In the view of many energy analysts, increases of 
this magnitude are almost inconceivable in a world where a peak in oil and gas 
production may be in the cards, possibly followed by a contraction in the overall 
global supply; even coal, the most abundant of the three, may not satisfy future 
expectations.409 
 
 A problem that compounds the fast rise in global demand for energy resources 
– and, indeed, is a symptom of peak oil – is the prospect of accelerating rates of 
decline in production in older oilfields. This matters greatly, writes Klare, because 
‘every lost barrel from an existing reservoir must be replaced by an added barrel from 
some new deposit just to stabilize world production at existing levels; if the net rate of 
decline exceeds the rate of increase in newer fields, there can be no hope of meeting 
higher levels of demand.’410 But even if global demand for oil remains static until 
2030, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the equivalent of four 
times the current capacity of Saudi Arabia’s oil production will need to be brought on 
line only to compensate for the rate of decline in production in existing oilfields.411 
Thus, in order to avoid a peak, followed by gradual decline, in oil production, the 
newer fields now coming on line, as well as those yet to be discovered, must be 
‘ample enough to both supplant those now being exhausted and provide the added oil 
needed to satisfy rising international demand. But that is not happening’, according to 
Klare.412 
 The relatively disappointing record of new oil discoveries since the 1980s 
supports this proposition: whereas the petroleum reserves discovered between 1960 
and 1989 were over twice the amount produced during that period, new discoveries 
between 1990 and 2006 amounted to half of the cumulative oil production over the 
same time. If no sufficiently large new discoveries are made, the IEA’s chief 
economist, Fatih Birol, believes that ‘the output of conventional oil will peak in 2020 
if oil demand grows on a business-as-usual basis.’ The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 
released in November 2009 states that conventional oil production ‘is projected to 
reach a plateau sometime before’ 2030, although that does not include hard-to-extract 
and unconventional forms of petroleum like Canada’s tar sands. Meanwhile, optimists 
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such as those at Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) believe that 
advances in technology incited by high oil prices ‘will allow demand to be met for at 
least a couple of decades. After that, CERA reckons, “supply may well struggle to 
meet demand, but an undulating plateau rather than a dramatic peak will likely 
unfold”.’413 Thus, insofar as ‘peak oil’ refers to ‘the traditional sort [of petroleum] 
that comes cheaply out of holes in the ground, [it] probably will arrive soon. There is 
oil aplenty of other sorts (tar sands, liquefied coal and so on), so the stuff is unlikely 
to run out for a long time yet. But it will get more expensive to produce, putting a 
floor on the price that is way above today’s.’414  
The IEA anticipates that such unconventional forms of petroleum will make 
up for its projected decline in future production of conventional, ‘easy’ oil, since 
increasingly high oil prices will make them economically viable.415 Therefore, argues 
Maugeri, ‘the availability of oil will not be a problem if advanced technologies for 
exploration and production are applied on a vast scale to old and new areas of the 
planet. Critics may argue that while there may actually be plenty of oil left 
underground, the “easy” and cheap oil is gone forever. This view is partially true, but 
it is also true that today’s difficult oil will become tomorrow’s easy oil, thanks to the 
economies of applying currently expensive technologies on a large scale.’416  
 According to ‘the most credible studies’, the world’s ultimately recoverable 
reserves are estimated at over 2.6 trillion barrels of conventional oil, including those 
yet to be discovered, of which 1.2 trillion are currently ‘proven’ while the remaining 
1.4 trillion are ‘recoverable’ but may soon be classified as proven reserves when 
technology and prices allow. Today’s proven reserves are ‘enough to satisfy current 
consumption needs for thirty-nine years’ (as of 2010), although including 
‘recoverable reserves extends the limit to eighty-six years. The figures on recoverable 
reserves exclude crude oil that costs more than $18 per barrel to extract’ writes 
Maugeri, which ‘dramatically underestimates the real total.’417 This brings us to the 
concept of ‘recoverability’: ‘proven’ reserves are those that can be extracted 
profitably with currently available technology, and are but a fraction of the total oil in 
place in any given oilfield; that fraction is the recovery rate, or recoverability. 
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This has several implications.418 First, in percentage terms, the difference 
between the recovery rate and 100 is the percentage of the original amount of oil in 
place still in the ground after a field has been exhausted under current price and 
technological conditions, which today is an average of 65 per cent worldwide, 
meaning that almost two-thirds of all the oil found to date is still beneath the ground. 
Second, technological improvements and higher prices can, and often will, increase 
the recoverability of a field, because ‘[t]echnical evolution also makes recoverable 
what was not recoverable before, which increases the reserves without the discovery 
of new deposits.’419 Third, even fields that have been ‘exhausted’ in the past can start 
producing again under improved technological and price conditions. In other words, 
proven reserves figures can be revised upwards even without new discoveries. A 
notable example that illustrates this is the Kern River oilfield, discovered in 1899 in 
California: 
 
Initially, it was thought that only 10 percent of its heavy, viscous crude oil could 
be recovered. In 1942, after a cumulative production of 254 million barrels of 
oil, it was estimated that the field still contained 54 million barrels of 
recoverable petroleum. As Morris Adelman pointed out in 1995, “In the next 
forty-four years, it produced not 54 million barrels but 736 million barrels and it 
had another 970 million barrels remaining in 1986.” Yet even data reported by 
Adelman were underestimated. In November 2007, Chevron announced that 
cumulative production had reached 2 billion barrels. The Kern River is still 
producing more than 80,000 barrels per day, and in 2009, the state of California 
estimated its remaining reserves to be about 627 million barrels. The 
explanation of this apparent miracle is the injection of steam into the subsoil, a 
technology that Chevron began using in the early 1960s.420  
 
Moreover, while the world’s average recovery rate is 35, it is considerably higher in 
countries that allow free access to private oil companies, which normally hold the 
most advanced technologies – such as the US, Canada and the North Sea area – where 
recoverability surpasses 50 per cent, whereas many of the world’s most oil-rich 
countries – like Russia and most Arab states – have recovery rates lower than 25 per 
cent.421 Given current production levels, writes Maugeri, ‘an increase of a single 
percentage point in the [average worldwide] recoverability factor can result in 
additional reserves of between 25 and 55 billion barrels, equivalent to one or two 
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years of global consumption.’422 And better technology also tends to cut production 
costs, making it possible to produce oil from fields that in the past were considered 
too expensive to develop at all. 
 All these factors are particularly pertinent when it comes to unconventional 
oils, which are specifically excluded from proven and sometimes even from 
recoverable reserves. Precisely because they are heavy and highly viscous, requiring a 
mixture of light oil, water and/or detergent to make them flow smoothly through 
pipelines, they have traditionally been considered too expensive to produce in general 
and too costly to refine in particular due to their high concentration of sulphur and 
other pollutants, and were therefore not worth considering as part of official reserve 
figures. But with light crude prices above $50 per barrel, unconventional oils become 
competitive and attract investment.423  
This is especially significant because their quantities are truly massive: the 
USGS estimates unconventional oils – like the bitumen-like ultra-heavy oil in 
Venezuela’s Orinoco belt, Canada’s tar sands, the Rocky Mountains’ shale oil, and 
others – to amount to 8 trillion barrels, 1.3 trillion of which are considered to be 
recoverable with current technologies. These quantities indicate an important fact, 
says Maugeri: ‘Worldwide petroleum resources are enormous, and proven reserves 
are only a small fraction of the overall total.’424 The problem, however, is not 
geological (how many resources are under the ground); it is whether technological, 
economic and political conditions will allow the development of these resources – a 
problem well illustrated in Venezuela: 
 
Venezuela’s Orinoco tar sands are estimated to be the largest deposits of their 
kind in the world, potentially rivaling conventional world oil reserves. Their 
strategic importance for global energy is enhanced by improvements in 
extraction technology and by potential future recovery rates with the turn to 
unconventional oil. When oil prices recover from the financial downturn, of the 
unconventional sources for oil—including Canadian tar sands—the Orinoco tar 
sands are the most economical. A poor investment climate combined with 
aggressive political rhetoric, unsound economic policy, and the current 
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economic crisis poses a risk for development of these reserves, which could 
enhance global oil supply.425 
 
 However, most of the new discoveries being made are almost invariably of 
this ‘tough oil’ variety, according to Klare, which poses problems of their own: 
 
When a major resource is first exploited for human use, developers naturally go 
after the easy-to-excavate deposits: those that lie close to the surface, are 
concentrated in large and rich deposits, are located close at hand, or are found in 
welcoming countries. … Typically, most of these “easy” deposits are exhausted 
by the time a resource approaches its peak moment, as now appears to be the 
case for [conventional] oil… This means we are largely left with “tough oil”: 
deposits buried deep underground or far offshore, scattered in small, hard-to-
reach pockets that often contain significant impurities, or located in unfriendly, 
corrupt countries or hazardous locations. Even if the resources exist, investors 
may be disinclined to risk the vast sums that will be needed to develop these 
unappetizing deposits, or extraction and transportation difficulties of all kinds 
will cut into future supplies.426 
 
Indeed, Klare states that this is possibly the most formidable impediment to increased 
oil output in the future: ‘the reluctance of major investors to risk their capital in the 
development of “tough oil” reserves in remote, hazardous, and unfriendly 
environments.’427 
 And herein lies a further problem. The consensus in the oil industry on what is 
needed to avoid a peak oil scenario is ‘lavish investment in the development of new 
fields and in exploration. Yet the reverse is happening. The oil industry is cutting its 
spending, bringing fewer new fields into production and exploring less.’428 Even 
though there is physically enough oil under the ground to satisfy growing 
consumption and demand, Birol explains that the global financial crisis of 2008-
onwards has diminished the incentive to make the investments required to bring these 
resources into production: ‘A lack of investment where it is needed, particularly in the 
short to medium term, has become a key risk to supply. … There is a danger that 
investment in the coming months and years will be reduced too much, pushing up 
decline rates and leading to a shortage of capacity when the economy begins to 
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recover.’429 Meanwhile, the ‘above ground’ problems that led to the 2008 oil price 
spike, such as rising costs and limited access to exploration, have not gone away with 
the financial crisis. Jeff Currie of Goldman Sachs, an investment bank, argues that 
these problems ‘will continue to limit the growth of the world’s oil supply. He points 
out that even when prices were high, these constraints limited the volume of new 
projects approved by oil firms. Falling investment will simply compound the shortfall. 
So when demand begins to revive, a sharp rise in prices is inevitable. … The speed 
with which it arrives will depend on the strength of the global recovery.’430 
 
Reliability 
If oil and other energy prices have been higher than ever during this century’s first 
decade, it is in part because supply has been too unreliable, as well as insufficient, to 
meet demand, thus sending prices on an upward spiral. Several supply-side factors, 
ranging from economic to political ones, have converged to beget unreliable and 
inadequate oil supplies, most of them springing from one common view of the oil 
market preceding the ‘demand shock’ of the 2000s: no one foresaw the demand boom. 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis provoked a severe drop in oil demand, which, 
combined with subsequent OPEC overproduction, led to an oil price collapse in 1998. 
Very few expected Asian economies and their demand for oil to rebound from that 
crisis as fast as they did. In fact, as late as 2000, a common view was that the danger 
to the oil market in the first decade of the new millennium was not scarcity but an oil 
glut: ‘contrary to much received wisdom, the energy problem looming in the early 21st 
century is neither skyrocketing prices nor shortages that herald the beginning of the 
end of oil age. Instead, the danger is precisely the opposite; long-term trends point to 
a prolonged oil surplus and low oil prices over the next two decades.’431 With such 
mainstream forecasts, the vast majority of oil producers – both inside and outside of 
OPEC – had made long-term preparations for the opposite reality of what emerged in 
the years following. Thus Maugeri points out that the ‘high cost that the world paid 
for oil until 2008 was the consequence of low prices, which for almost twenty years 
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had discouraged the exploration and development of new deposits in the richest areas 
of crude oil on the planet.’432 
 OPEC countries, which are collectively responsible for almost two-fifths of 
the world’s oil production and four-fifths of its proved reserves, were unable to meet 
the world’s aggregate demand during the past decade’s commodities boom not 
because they lack oil, but because they have been running behind on investment for 
new production for several years. The lesson that history has taught them is that 
having excess production capacity almost inevitably leads to oil price collapses with 
subsequent gluts. Having followed this logic since the 1986 price collapse, OPEC 
countries have ‘aimed at mere reserve replacement, limiting exploration and the 
development of new oilfields. Moreover, U.S. economic sanctions against oil 
countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya during the 1980s and 1990s further frustrated 
their ability to adequately replace their production capacity, or to increase it.’433 Even 
with record revenues following the demand boom starting in 2003, most OPEC 
countries have not increased their investments in their energy sectors significantly and 
have continued to keep low commercial inventories.434 
 Politically, the financial crisis that ensued in OPEC countries after the 1998 oil 
price collapse has led to a rapprochement inside the organisation with a new, more 
unified dynamic. Moreover, a recent ‘rise in democratization, freedom of the press 
and political debate, and a growing tide of anti-Americanism are bringing a greater 
concern for popular opinion inside OPEC countries,’ which in some cases has led to 
the election of radical leaders like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran and ‘is restricting 
the options of regional leaders to accommodate Western interests’,435 while the 1998 
price collapse itself was a crucial factor behind the election of Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela. Coinciding changes at the highest levels of government in other OPEC 
members, such as Kuwait and an ‘increasingly hawkish’ Saudi Arabia, have ‘given 
OPEC the solidarity needed to turn idle rhetoric into political action’ and ‘moved the 
agenda of the organization away from the moderate policies of the 1990s toward a 
more radical, confrontational developing-world approach that favors revenues over 
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other issues, including market share.’436 Indeed, OPEC’s new interest is to maximise 
Western, particularly US, dependence on its oil437 – a premise Crown Prince (now 
King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has been increasingly willing to test even before 11 
September 2001. As Edward Morse and Amy Jaffe point out: ‘Critical to the newer 
OPEC consensus is the view that OPEC is in a position to stand up to the West and 
that it should feel justified in doing so, because the West stood by and did nothing to 
help ease the debilitating suffering and destabilizing consequences of the 1998 price 
collapse.’438 
 The resulting economic stagnation in OPEC happened against a backdrop of 
growing populations in those countries, which put pressure on government revenues 
not only to assure their macroeconomic stability but also to increase spending on 
social programmes to appease their embittered and increasingly poor populations, 
making higher oil prices a budgetary necessity for OPEC countries. ‘Owing to 
increased government spending and domestic consumption, as well as inflation and 
the erosion of the dollar,’ writes Sheila McNulty, ‘the threshold oil price has risen for 
every Opec member with the exception of Qatar since 2000.’ While no OPEC country 
can currently afford the price of the barrel to drop below $50, their required minimum 
price varies according to the member state, with Venezuela being the most dependent 
on high and rising prices, needing the barrel to cost at least $94 in 2008 and $97 in 
2009.439 As a result, the more radical members of OPEC – Algeria, Iran and 
Venezuela – consistently argue against boosting OPEC production as a whole, and 
often push for production cuts to raise the price even further, a position that can be 
considered ‘more aggressive than defensive.’440 This is also the case even during 
booming times, when ‘the rise in oil demand strengthens oil producers, which reap 
massive profits by intentionally underinvesting in oil-production capacity. … As oil 
producing countries amass substantial financial reserves, they tend to allocate 
investment and expenditure disproportionately less to oil-production capacity and 
more toward areas that benefit the ruling elites.’441 
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 With Saudi Arabia being one of the few members worried about their long-
term interest of preventing a fall in aggregate demand because of what eventually 
came to be a high-oil-price-induced global recession, and the only one with sufficient 
spare capacity to lower prices through an increase in production, OPEC summits in 
2007 and 2008 usually ended in deadlock and their oil production remained 
unchanged until the financial crisis despite prices mushrooming beyond the landmark 
figure of $100 after January 2008. But even if out-of-control prices have recently 
raised concerns in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom is partly to blame for the price run-up. 
As the organisation’s swing producer, Saudi Arabia has been the driving force behind 
successive OPEC reductions in oil output since 1999 in response to the 1998 price 
collapse, with the Kingdom solely responsible for over one million barrels a day 
(mbd) in production cuts in 1999 alone.442 
More recently, during the past decade’s price hike – with oil prices hovering 
above $60 per barrel after March 2006, but eventually starting to retreat from $80 (the 
record price by then) in the fall of that year – Saudi Arabia began to decrease its 
production steadily from 9.56 mbd in March 2006 to 8.53 mbd in April 2007, in order 
to stop the decline in prices. This led to ‘six consecutive quarters of inventory 
reduction and a 2007 drop in global inventories of about 930,000’ barrels a day.443 As 
a result, the price of crude oil tripled between January 2007 and July 2008, from $50 
to $147 a barrel. Naturally, following this exorbitant price rally, OPEC members 
(mostly Saudi Arabia) increased production. However, given the significant time lag 
to bring oil production on line, demand tumbled under pressure from record prices 
and the financial crisis that hit simultaneously, leading to new production cuts by 
OPEC, in order to maintain a suitably high oil price for its members’ needs: 
 
Just as the increased production found its way to inventories, in the summer of 
2008, the global credit crisis broke. Global oil demand, especially in the United 
States and other OECD countries, fell off a cliff. Caught between rising 
production and falling consumption, prices fell from $147 per barrel in the 
summer to $34 by late December. 
 OPEC reacted swiftly. Racing to catch up with falling demand, it announced 
production cuts totaling 4.2 million barrels a day. Although implementation was 
solid, it lagged behind events and could not prevent prices from temporarily 
taking a nosedive. It took until the first quarter of 2009 for OPEC’s cuts to 
match the decline in demand. Still, from OPEC’s point of view, its supply 
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management was a success. Oil prices stabilized soon after the Christmas 
holidays of 2008, on the expectation that the cartel members would follow cartel 
discipline, and then started to rise…444 
 
As The Economist pointed out after oil prices picked up again, ‘most oil-rich states, 
naturally enough, are happy to see the price rise. Many have become used to bumper 
revenues in recent years and have struggled to balance their budgets since the price 
slumped’ in 2008.445 
During the price rally in 2008, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia said: ‘I keep no 
secret from you that when there were some new finds, I told them: “No, leave it in the 
ground, with grace from God. Our children need it.”’446 That statement reflects a 
lesson learned from the 1986 oil glut and price collapse, and reinforced after their 
repetition in 1998, which has led OPEC countries to minimise their spare production 
capacity in order to avoid similar crises in the future. From 1986 onwards, ‘the de 
facto guiding principle of several OPEC countries was to exploit only those fields that 
were already in production and to develop no new fields beyond those necessary to 
maintain steady production levels.’447 OPEC’s lack of investment in developing new 
oil production and infrastructure over the last two decades – instead spending their 
revenues on social programmes for their growing populations – has gradually eroded 
the organisation’s ability to cushion the oil market from sudden disruptions in supply 
through excess production capacity, thus making it ‘much easier for cartel members to 
agree to restrain output’ than to decide to increase it.448 
 The resulting drastic reduction in spare production capacity exacerbated an 
already tight global oil market under pressure from growing demand: ‘The tightness 
in supplies exposed the complacency or, rather, the failure of Saudi Arabia and other 
producers to adequately invest in exploration and the production of crude. … The 
disappearance of spare Saudi production capacity was the most critical element in 
driving up prices from 2003 to 2008’, according to Edward Morse.449 Christoph Rühl 
provides a helpful explanation for why spare capacity is such an important factor 
influencing the price of oil: 
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Like any complex system, the global oil market needs a degree of redundancy to 
operate smoothly. In the short term, inventories can provide this safety cushion; 
in the longer term, it is provided by spare production capacity. Following strong 
demand growth in 2003 and 2004, spare capacity in the global oil market was 
hovering around record lows, at little more than two percent of global 
production (that is, less  than two million barrels per day, almost all of it in 
Saudi Arabia). In other words, even after the OPEC cuts of 2006 and 2007, the 
global oil market was running at above 97 percent of capacity—an 
exceptionally high rate and one much too high to guarantee any meaningful 
stability in prices. 
 When set against the backdrop of high global economic growth, this 
fundamental market tightness meant that as soon as the production cuts had 
translated into tighter inventories, prices accelerated their journey upward.450 
 
This formula is not new to the oil market and it has always been the case that low 
spare capacity drives up prices and makes them volatile. Thus, as Maugeri writes, 
‘minimal spare capacity made the price of oil dangerously vulnerable to almost any 
event: regional conflicts, hurricanes, pseudoscientific theories about the end of oil, 
market rumors, or financial speculation.’451 
 With spare production capacity at its lowest level since 1973 – a low point of 
little over a million barrels a day in 2008, compared to around 3 mbd throughout the 
1990s and a peak of 12 mbd in 1985452 – the global oil market was more vulnerable 
than ever to any disruption in supply during the past decade’s supply crunch. In David 
Howell’s words: ‘The big spare tap that used to be so easy to turn on to raise 
production significantly at short notice is shut off, or if it is turned on only a trickle 
comes out. Any further surge in oil demand, or any sudden cut in supplies anywhere 
in the world in the present supply system, is immediately reflected in a shortage 
warning and a price blip as traders mark up their stocks.’453 According to Henry 
Groppe,454 a Texas-based oil and gas consultant, every 100,000 barrels per day of 
production that is added or subtracted from the market represents a $1 decrease or 
increase in the price of oil, respectively. During the past decade several disruptions in 
oil supply worldwide – whose production difficultly recover to their full pre-
disruption levels – have contributed to the steady oil price rise over the same period. 
In Saudi Arabia’s Prince Turki al-Faisal’s words, ‘the sad fact is that four oil-
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producing countries failed to live up to production expectations. In 1998, Iran, Iraq, 
Nigeria, and Venezuela were producing 12.7 million barrels per day. 
Everyone…expected them to be producing 18.4 million barrels per day in 2008. 
Instead, due to civil strife, failed investments, or in the case of Iraq, a U.S. invasion, 
they were producing only 10.2 million barrels per day.’455 
The first and most important disruption, which launched the steep upward shift 
in prices, was a December 2002 strike by the employees of Venezuela’s national oil 
company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), in a failed attempt to depose 
President Hugo Chávez in response to his drive to consolidate his control over his 
country’s political system, PDVSA and its oil revenues.456 The strike completely shut 
down Venezuela’s production of almost 3 mbd, which accounted for more than 4 per 
cent of the world’s production at the time.457 The loss of Venezuelan oil from the 
market was greater than the cessation of Iraqi production during the 2003 Iraq war 
that started a couple of months after the end of the PDVSA strike, whose output has 
never fully recovered and has since been producing around 500,000 barrels a day less 
than its pre-strike level.458 The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, for its part, not only 
led to a shutdown of production during the war, but during its aftermath looting and 
sabotage impeded the country’s oil sector from recovering to its pre-war 2 mbd export 
levels, with the country exporting merely 500,000 barrels a day by the end of 2003.459 
Similarly, acts of sabotage made on Nigerian oil infrastructure by militants of the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) were responsible for 
disrupting a further million barrels a day in 2003,460 and their periodic attacks have 
continued to this day. And supply disruptions need not be man-made, as evidenced by 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which raged through the Gulf of Mexico in late August 
2005, destroying numerous offshore oil platforms and refineries on the Louisiana 
coast, causing a disruption which sent the region’s fuel prices to their highest ever. 
                                                
455 Al-Faisal, T., ‘Don’t be Crude’, Foreign Policy, September/October 2009, p. 103. 
456 Yergin, Op cit., p. 73. 
457 Kuenzler, L.T., ‘Latin America’, in Kalicki, J.H. & Goldwyn, D.L. (eds.), Energy and Security: 
Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 
383-384. 
458 Yergin, Op cit., p. 73. 
459 Jaffe, Op cit., p. 852. 
460 Goldwyn, D.L & Billig, M., ‘Building Strategic Reserves’, in Kalicki, J.H. & Goldwyn, D.L. (eds.), 
Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), p. 515. 
140 
 
 But perhaps the most definitive new feature of supply disruptions this decade 
has been the emergence of Islamic terrorism as a threat to energy security following 
the attacks of 11 September 2001. Indeed, the renewed focus on energy security in 
International Relations is driven in large part by the threat of terrorism. In contrast to 
the period following the 1970s price spikes, when energy security concerns focused 
mainly on ‘the reliability of the flow of oil…and the response to and management of 
any disruptions’, energy security in the twenty-first century has widened its focus to 
include ‘the entire infrastructure of energy supply that supports…the global 
economy—offshore platforms and pipelines and tankers as well as refineries, storage, 
generating facilities, transmission lines, and distribution systems. This vast network 
was not designed with terrorism in mind. But its operations now have to be managed 
with that continuing danger in view’.461 
Al Qaeda has repeatedly menaced to launch terrorist attacks against energy 
infrastructure, or what Osama bin Laden called the ‘hinges’ of the world economy.462 
Bin Laden himself had also specifically urged Muslims to stop the flow of oil to the 
West by sabotaging Saudi Arabian oilfields and infrastructure.463 Terrorists almost 
succeeded in doing so on 24 February 2006, when they targeted the world’s largest 
refinery in Abqaiq, where nearly two-thirds of Saudi oil production is processed 
before export.464 Such threats have highlighted Saudi Arabia’s importance to the oil 
market, given that around 80 per cent of the world’s spare capacity465 and well over 
10 per cent of production rests in that country, ‘in turn creating unique political 
pressures and augmenting a so-called terror premium onto world oil prices due to 
worries about the Kingdom’s internal stability.’466 
Since the Second Gulf Crisis in 2003, Maugeri assesses that ‘“black gold” 
prices incorporated a fear factor difficult to quantify. Saudi oil minister Ali Naimi 
estimated it at 10-15 dollars per barrel in November 2004, when oil prices were 
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around 45 dollars per barrel.’467 And given that bin Laden’s aforementioned appeal 
for Muslims to sabotage Saudi infrastructure was posted on the internet in December 
2004,468 the ‘terror premium’ on oil the price may well have exceeded $25 per barrel 
since then.469 Moreover, since Islamic terrorism is most active in the oil-rich Middle 
East, operating in those countries has become more dangerous and thus more 
expensive, propping up oil prices even further. As Howell and Nakhle explain, 
‘[d]anger spells risk and risk has to be paid for when investors put up their money. 
More capital up front, more spending on security, higher wages to persuade staff to 
work in personal danger – it all adds up to a bigger spend to get a barrel of oil out of 
the ground and moved to market, wherever the location. All this implies that oil prices 
could stay high at least for the next few years – probably for the next decade.’470 
 As mentioned above, however, the 2008 financial crisis led to a fall in demand 
which made oil prices plummet, followed by three separate rounds of production cuts 
by OPEC since September of that year. These production cuts have effectively 
brought OPEC members’ spare capacity back to as much as 6 million barrels a day,471 
the highest it has been since the 1980s, most of it in Saudi Arabia. According to 
Morse, the re-emergence of Saudi Arabia’s spare production capacity should be ‘the 
most critical element’ to maintain lower oil prices through the end of 2012 – ‘or more, 
if global demand fails to rebound enough’ – which the Kingdom is likely to use in 
order to ‘keep prices moderate in order to spur global economic growth, maintain 
long-term demand for oil, and deter investments in alternative sources of energy.’472 
On the other hand, the global financial crisis hit the richer, more developed countries 
of the West significantly harder than some of the emerging markets that have been the 
main drivers of oil demand growth in the past decade, such as China. The return of 
emerging market growth after the crisis could well translate into rising oil demand 
again. As the McKinsey Global Institute admonished in 2009, 
 
If oil demand grows as quickly as expected when the world economy recovers, 
OPEC’s spare capacity could be gone within five years. And since the world 
relies increasingly on unconventional sources of oil (think tar sands), it will take 
time and money to bring more supplies online. Until then, the world will be left 
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only with demand-side measures—such as boosting energy efficiency and 
cutting back on use—to control prices.473 
 
This ultimately raises the question of whether petroleum will be a reliable energy 
resource in the future, and whether OPEC and other major oil-producing countries can 
be reliable suppliers – a concern that is encouraging switching to alternative fuels 
such as ethanol. 
 
Affordability 
The fundamental difference between the oil price spikes of the 1970s and the most 
recent one during the past decade is that, unlike the former, which were immediate 
and deliberately politically motivated, the 2003-2008 price spike was slow in coming 
and predominantly driven by demand. In The Economist’s words: ‘If the Arab oil-
weapon felt like a hammer-blow, this time stagnant oil output and growing emerging-
market demand have squeezed the oil market like a vice.’474 Throughout this past 
decade there has been an unexpected explosion in demand coming, for the most part, 
from emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere, which have not been outweighed by 
slower consumption in the West.475 Almost 85 per cent of the world’s demand growth 
for crude oil between 2000 and 2007 – a rise in 9.4 million barrels a day – was in 
emerging markets in Asia (especially China and India), the Middle East and Latin 
America.476 
The specific impact of Asia, particularly China, began to be felt from 2003 
onwards, when global oil consumption growth led by China doubled compared to 
average annual rates during the 1990s, creating a ‘demand shock’477 rather than a 
supply shock typical of the past. Global oil consumption grew by 1.8 mbd in 2003 and 
3 mbd in 2004, compared to 600,000 to 700,000 barrels a day during the preceding 
years in the decade. China alone was responsible for almost a third of the 2004 global 
demand growth, with its own demand leaping by 17 per cent that year, an increase of 
over 900,000 barrels a day, thereby becoming the world’s second-largest oil consumer 
after the United States. Bearing in mind that China still consumes only 2 barrels of oil 
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a year per capita, compared to 13 in Western Europe and 26 in the US, China’s drive 
towards becoming a developed country indicates that its demand for energy is likely 
to continue to increase inexorably until it has overcome the most energy-intensive 
phase of its development, giving credence to Napoleon Bonaparte’s prophetic words 
two centuries ago: ‘Let China sleep, for when she awakes she will shake the world.’478 
Even though record oil prices have reduced demand in the developed world, in 
emerging countries it is still rising. In the United States – ‘where low tax rates on fuel, 
consumer disregard for efficiency, and demographic growth have increased oil 
consumption’ and ‘more than half of the 17 million cars sold…each year between 
2000 and 2004 were gas-guzzling sport-utility vehicles’,479 representing an important 
portion of this decade’s increase in demand for oil and its price – demand has fallen 
under pressure from exorbitant prices, but consumption in developing countries has 
not dropped to the same extent. This is because fuel prices in emerging markets 
representing half of the world’s population480 – especially in Asia, Latin America and 
the Middle East – are shielded by heavy subsidies and other kinds of market 
regulations by their governments. These subsidies, in turn, continue to boost demand 
distortedly since roughly a quarter of the world’s petrol is sold below the real market 
price, keeping oil prices at artificially high levels. This is particularly the case in 
Middle Eastern countries, which, according to Michael Levi, ‘will gobble up nearly 
50 percent more oil than India in 2030, despite being home to just a fifth as many 
people. The reason? Massive oil subsidies that put China and India to shame. … That 
probably means less oil left for the rest of the world—and higher prices to boot.’481 In 
theory, The Economist points out, ‘rising crude-oil prices should reduce global 
demand. But if domestic prices are capped, then emerging economies will continue to 
guzzle oil, pushing world prices still higher.’482 But even more importantly, in terms 
of how this continues to affect the price of oil, Carola Hoyos calls attention to the fact 
that ‘the countries that subsidise their fuel account for [more than] 100 per cent of 
current demand growth, because demand in developed regions such as the US, Europe 
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and Japan is either flat or contracting, as drivers have been feeling the full effect of 
higher, unsubsidised fuel costs.’483 
Being unprepared for such an unexpected rise in demand from emerging 
markets, the oil industry’s risk-aversion in its investments since the 1990s has also 
contributed to higher prices in the past decade. The oil industry faced low prices and 
sluggish growth in consumption throughout the 1990s, thus assuming that the industry 
had fully matured, and therefore did not embark on new investments in exploration 
because they would not be profitable under such conditions.484 As stated in The 
Economist, ‘ExxonMobil [the world’s largest oil company] claims that it still assesses 
the profitability of potential investments using the same assumptions about the long-
term oil price as it did at the beginning of the [last] decade, for fear that prices might 
tumble again.’485 This is also true more generally for the industry as a whole, as 
explained by Howell and Nakhle: 
 
Years of weak oil prices may have been a joy for the consumer and for the oil-
drinking advanced world. But the inevitable price paid on the supply side has 
been weak investment in the entire supply chain, from exploration and 
development through to production and refinery processing, and through to 
every kind of equipment supply in the chain in between. These were years in 
which no one wanted to spend too much on new rigs, new platforms, new 
drilling equipment or new tankers.486 
 
The international oil companies’ (IOCs) financial prudence by not launching high-
capital investment ventures in new exploration has therefore ‘partially eroded their 
capacity to replace reserves—i.e., to find new oil to replace their daily production.’487 
The last two decades of underinvestment have also inhibited the updating of 
refining capacity to match the changing quantities of different kinds of oil being 
produced. As Maugeri puts it, ‘Refining has been the weakest link in the petroleum 
production chain for the last 20 years.’488 Before the two oil crises in the 1970s, 
petroleum consumption was expected to grow at 5 per cent a year at least until the end 
of the century, incentivising investments not only in exploration and production of 
crude oil but also in refining capacity and infrastructure. But the crises of 1973 and 
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1979 disrupted the flow of enormous amounts of oil while refining capacity grew 
significantly. Demand for oil rose by less than 2 per cent a year from 1980 to 2000, a 
period characterised by excess refining capacity and no investments made in new 
refining infrastructure – e.g. no refineries have been built in the US since 1976 – or 
updating current refining capacity to refine heavier oils than the light variety 
predominant in the 1970s.489 Today, the ‘world can be swimming in oil,’ says 
Maugeri, ‘but the refineries may not be able to find the type of crude oil that they 
need.’490 While lighter crudes generate more petrol and diesel, heavier crudes produce 
more fuel oil for heating. In mid-2008, The Economist wrote that ‘diesel is in short 
supply and there is a glut of fuel oil. That makes processing heavy oil unprofitable for 
some refineries, since the gains from diesel are outweighed by losses on fuel oil. As 
refineries turn instead to lighter grades, it pushes their prices yet higher.’491 
Skyrocketing demand for crude oil after 2000 has therefore put additional pressure on 
light oil prices, since there is limited refining capacity for heavier oils, for which there 
is lower demand and are thus cheaper than light oils. Meanwhile, fears that oil prices 
would drop again have also been a deterrent to investments in more efficient and 
advanced refining technologies, putting further pressure on prices due to the relative 
lack of alternatives to light oil. 
 But as record oil prices kept getting higher and showed no signs of abating, it 
became clear to oil companies that new exploration and production was not only 
profitable but necessary to meet spiralling demand, encouraging a rush to invest in 
new capacity. Ironically, this has increased exploration, production and development 
costs by 110 per cent, according to Cambridge Energy Research Associates,492 putting 
a higher price floor on the cost of the marginal barrel. This is because the oil 
platforms, ‘engineers, survey ships and seismic rigs that oil firms need to find and 
produce new deposits are expensive right now. The costs of finding oil have, 
temporarily, doubled precisely because everybody wants to give them work.’493 All of 
these increased development costs, in turn, are reflected in higher oil prices. 
 Moreover, the unexplored reserves that can be accessed by IOCs, despite their 
generally superior technological and managerial expertise, tend to have higher 
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development costs than the ones under national oil company (NOC) control. When oil 
prices are low, it is usually the case that ‘oil-rich countries welcome the low-cost, 
high-tech and well-capitalised oil firms’,494 while high-price scenarios incite resource 
nationalism and politicisation, often leading to the expulsion of IOCs from such 
countries. The recent price spike is no exception, a period during which oil-producing 
countries’ government intake (i.e., taxes and royalties) has escalated, raising the 
overall cost of delivering oil to the market,495 with Venezuela and Russia as 
prominent examples of countries where the state has politicised hydrocarbon 
resources by taking over their control. ‘The danger from both an economic and energy 
security standpoint’, warn Jan Kalicki and David Goldwyn, ‘is that state control will 
have an adverse impact on investment and production, with collateral damage to both 
economic growth and global energy supplies—a danger reflected in oil price jumps in 
response to strikes against Petróleos de Venezuela’.496 Although global oil reserves 
are vast, IOCs have access to a very small portion thereof, since the vast majority is 
under NOC control, including the fields that are cheapest and easiest to develop. The 
plain truth, says Maugeri, is that ‘from the 1980s…the world’s private oil 
companies…controlled no more than 8 percent of the world’s oil reserves. At the 
same time, any new frontier of petroleum exploration and development [will be] 
technically and environmentally challenging, and above all costly’,497 such as the 
ultra-deep waters in the Arctic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of Brazil, 
where new operations ‘will be more expensive than $75 per barrel. Revitalizing 
production in the older and bigger petroleum basins of the world will cost more, too.’ 
Profitable production of such reserves may require high long-term prices due to their 
more prolonged and more expensive development, which is why Maugeri reckons 
‘easy and cheap oil seems bound to disappear.’498 
 But considering the limited amount of petroleum supplies given runaway 
demand, inevitably leading to higher prices, standard economic theory has it that 
demand should fall when oil prices become too high. For years, consumption and 
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demand for oil was widely believed to be inelastic and uninfluenced by price rises, ‘a 
result of the transportation sector’s high level of reliance on gasoline and other 
petroleum-based motor fuels.’499 But as the drive for energy efficiency and 
conservation, along with the investment spree in diversification towards alternative 
energy sources, of the 1980s following the 1970s price spikes have proven, oil 
consumption does, in fact, respond to higher prices, meaning that demand for oil is 
inelastic only in the short term. As Maugeri points out, ‘price always affects demand, 
even if the connection takes time to manifest itself, as consumers try to maintain the 
lifestyle they are used to for as long as possible. Consumer inertia makes it difficult to 
establish quick and direct correlations between the demand for oil, the price of oil, 
and economic or demographic growth but these links do exist.’500 In that sense, the 
sustained rise in oil prices of the past decade was a key contributing factor to the 
recession that ensued after the 2008 financial crisis, which led global demand for oil 
to tumble and, with it, the price of the barrel. The record price of $147 in July 2008 
collapsed by almost 80 per cent by the end of the year due to decreased demand 
inflicted by the recession – the first time global oil consumption had fallen since 
1993.501 
 This sharp fall in prices has halted the investment rush that resulted from the 
preceding boom, making energy suppliers worldwide question whether future demand 
will be certain and high enough to justify the substantial investments necessary to 
develop new production capacity – a worry that is particularly pronounced since 
increasingly accepted environmental concerns are casting doubt on the future of fossil 
fuels.502 For example, close to $90 billion worth of new projects have been deferred in 
Canada’s tar sands alone.503 
 
Falling prices have begun to curtail long-run investment in exploration and 
production (E&P) as more expensive projects are put on hold; that, in turn, will 
feed back into the long-run outlook. E&P planned under high oil prices to bring 
online more oil and gas to alleviate the tight supply market will not have taken 
place on the size and scale needed. While some international oil companies 
claim that they will stick to their investment plans, OPEC indicates that about 
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thirty-five new projects could be on hold, cutting by about half the increases 
projected in global production capacity expected by 2014.504 
 
The irony is that, by diminishing investments into new production capacity to meet 
demand growth after the world economy recovers from recession, these long-term 
structural factors are likely to lead to an eventual reversal to higher oil prices. As the 
business cycle turns, El-Gamal and Jaffe explain, ‘the euphoria begins to wane. … 
Then, reduced liquidity and credit prevent oil exporters from investing sufficiently in 
productive capacity during the recession, and our story eventually repeats, each time 
more dramatically than before.’505 
 Indeed, oil prices have made a remarkable recovery since their trough of $34 
per barrel in December 2008, reaching levels consistently over $70 during the second 
half of 2009. With global demand for oil showing signs of recovery by the end of 
2009, prices once again surpassed the $100 mark in 2010, reaching close to $120 a 
barrel upon civil war breaking out in Libya in February 2011, before stabilising again 
below $100 per barrel after Saudi Arabia used its spare capacity to make up for its 
fellow OPEC-member’s supply disruption. All of this points to the fact that all the 
factors are in place for a likely new oil price spike similar to the previous one, subject 
to how soon the world economy really recovers from recession.506 
 
As soon as the world economy starts growing again, the theory runs, demand for 
oil will once again outstrip the industry’s ability to supply it. The seemingly 
ample cushion of inventories and spare capacity will quickly be exhausted, 
sending prices soaring. In other words, the global recession has only interrupted 
the “supercycle” of which many analysts used to speak, during which the normal 
boom-and-bust cycle of oil and other commodities would give way to a 
protracted period of high prices, as ever-growing demand from emerging markets 
swallowed everything the extractive industries could produce. “The commodity 
supercylce is not over, just resting…”507 
 
With a likely return to exorbitant oil prices, based on the long-term structural factors 
mentioned above putting the future affordability of petroleum in question, the drive 
towards alternative energy sources becomes increasingly imperative, particularly for 
those that can substitute the transportation sector’s inelastic dependence on oil, such 
as ethanol and other biofuels. 
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Sustainability 
As humanity enters the twenty-first century, a new era of energy security is emerging, 
where the need to curb fossil fuel consumption is paramount. What characterises this 
new energy era, above all, is the environmental threat posed by these polluting energy 
sources, manifested in the form of global warming and climate change. According to 
some, climate change is ‘arguably the greatest challenge facing the human race.’508 
Whether or not such statements are scientifically unequivocal is immaterial; what 
matters is that it is by now increasingly accepted as such, not only by the scientific 
community – where a steadily growing consensus on the matter has emerged over the 
past twenty years, while climate-change sceptics now find themselves in a minority509 
– but also by politicians and decision makers worldwide, who ‘are now well aware of 
the hazards posed by climate change and the need to respond to them.’510 
The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that the 
rise in our planet’s average temperature is caused by increases in greenhouse gas 
(GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere – instigated mostly by the burning of fossil 
fuels since the Industrial Revolution – and asserts with ‘very high confidence 
[emphasis in original] that the global averaged net effect of human activities since 
1750 has been one of warming.’511 The precise implications of climate change are 
moot and still the subject of ongoing research, but ‘there is a consensus that 
greenhouse-gas-induced climate change will entail not only higher average and 
extreme temperatures but also an increasing disruption of weather patterns, increases 
in both floods and droughts, rising sea level, and more, with adverse effects on 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, patterns of disease, the livability of cities in summer, 
and many other aspects of human well-being.’512 This, in turn, aggravates energy 
security by creating a vicious cycle in which the violent weather conditions brought 
on by climate change, ‘generating out-of-season typhoons and exceptionally powerful 
hurricanes, such as Katrina and Rita, in the oil-producing Gulf of Mexico, are helping 
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to intensify the short-term [energy security] crisis by tipping platforms over and 
rupturing pipelines.’513 Climate change is therefore referred to as a ‘threat multiplier’: 
‘a destructive force that will exacerbate existing social, environmental, economic, and 
humanitarian stresses. ... Such impacts may spark conflict in weak states, lead to the 
displacement of millions of people, create environmental refugees, and intensify 
competition over increasingly scarce resources.’514 
 Unlike most environmental problems, climate change is a long-term global 
challenge with profound implications for energy security; it is primarily a problem 
caused by human use of energy resources, and it ‘has a greater impact on the 
environment that any other human activity.’ According to Kevin Baumert, around 75 
per cent of all GHG emissions derive from energy use, with fossil fuel combustion 
constituting the largest part at 70 per cent of all emissions. Almost two-thirds of fossil 
fuel emissions come from electricity and heat generation (42 per cent) and 
transportation (23 per cent), while most of the remainder is emitted by industries and 
residences (20 and 9 per cent, respectively).515 Because of the causal link between 
fossil fuel use and global warming, it is impossible to mitigate climate change without 
transforming the way energy is produced and consumed worldwide. Therefore, 
responding to climate change, writes Anthony Giddens, ‘has to be closely integrated 
with questions of energy security.’516 
 But how does the world at once meet both the challenge of climate change and 
the challenge of economic growth by ensuring energy security, asks Daniel Yergin. 
The answer, for him, lies in ‘an emphasis on technology to a degree never before 
seen.’517 The technological developments required to meet these challenges are 
multiple, and should be focused not only on developing renewable energy resources, 
but also in making better use of existing ones, as well as investing in home-grown 
energy in order to avoid dependence on volatile and often uncertain energy imports. 
Investing vast amounts into developing these varied technologies, particularly in 
renewable energies, is essential to counter climate change, but as Giddens recalls, 
‘those resources won’t develop in some sort of automatic way, nor will they be 
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stimulated by the operation of market forces alone. The state has to subsidize them, in 
order for them to be competitive against fossil fuels and to protect investment in the 
face of fluctuations to which the prices of oil and natural gas are subject.’518 
Otherwise, these investments need to be buttressed by a prolonged period of steep 
market prices for fossil fuels, in order to succeed without government subsidies.519 In 
that sense, the exorbitant rise in oil prices of the past decade was in part a blessing for 
the cause of climate change because it encouraged a reduction in oil consumption and 
spurred investments into renewable energies and other technologies that make better 
or more efficient use of existing resources. 
But even though such technological advances will in the future allow the 
refining and use of heavy and unconventional oils, these forms of petroleum are less 
attractive environmentally because they are much more polluting and emit more 
GHGs than lighter oils. Meanwhile, switching from conventional combustion engines 
to hybrid battery-powered vehicles offers little relief to the environment, ‘since the 
electricity for those is commonly produced by burning fossil fuels at another location. 
Although local air quality is improved, total carbon dioxide emissions are not 
curtailed; they are merely exported.’520 Moreover, the different kinds of alternative, 
cleaner energy sources are not without their limitations. Nuclear energy, with which 
several countries have extensive experience, is attractive both for energy security and 
environmental reasons: it does not require vast quantities of uranium (compared to the 
volumes of oil, natural gas and other fuels to generate the same amount of energy) and 
its GHG emissions are minimal. But to play this role successfully, as Amy Jaffe 
reminds us, ‘nuclear power will have to overcome serious economic and political 
challenges, including concerns over nuclear waste, safety, and non-proliferation.’521 
And even ‘non-threatening’ renewable energy sources – such as biofuels, geothermal, 
wind and solar power – face the financial and logistic obstacle of high fuel-switching 
costs given their still limited market penetration. 
All of these examples point to an underlying incongruity between the goals of 
ensuring energy security on the one hand, and mitigating climate change on the other: 
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‘Because climate change and energy security concern different fuels to different 
degrees, efforts to make progress on one may come at the expense of the other.’522 
The most affordable and widely available energy resources tend to be more polluting, 
while those that are least offensive to the environment tend to be more expensive. In 
Maugeri’s words: 
 
The uncomfortable truth that we must all accept is that cheap energy is not 
good for the health of our planet, and it is not compatible with the fight against 
climate change. People’s quest for cheap energy has made fossil fuels the over-
dominant actors of the contemporary world, it has made energy efficiency a 
subject of minor relevance, and it has depressed investment in new technologies 
to develop affordable primary sources of energy other than fossil fuels.523 
 
The high cost of ensuring both energy and environmental security simultaneously 
suggests that these two goals are mutually exclusive in the short term, with energy 
security apparently ranking higher as a short-term priority. ‘Too much focus on 
policies intended to make energy cheaper’, write David Pilling and Chris Giles for 
The Financial Times, ‘threatens to conflict with efforts to reduce consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions.’524 The problem is not that energy and environmental 
security are mutually exclusive overall, but that achieving each goal individually is, in 
and of itself, very expensive, and even more so if both are to be achieved 
simultaneously. ‘Establishing a more reliable and secure energy supply system and 
reducing carbon emissions lie in part on the same road, which is a happy 
coincidence,’ according to Howell and Nakhle. ‘But long before we get any results 
from cutting carbon emissions the world will probably be shaken by problems of 
security and supply disruption that could blow the highest hopes off course.’525 Thus, 
in the long-term, the way to rectify both problems is essentially the same: namely 
through energy conservation and diversification to more environmentally friendly 
energy sources. 
However, both of these problems – energy security and climate change – are 
exacerbated by ongoing increases in energy demand of dramatic proportions, which 
could lead to equivalent increases in greenhouse gas emissions, making possible 
solutions to these problems particularly elusive. While most of the GHGs that are 
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currently contributing to global warming have been created by the energy needs of 
industrial countries over the past couple of centuries, it is now the rapidly growing 
developing countries’ steep rise in fossil fuel consumption that is the main contributor 
to GHG emissions. To illustrate this, Rühl calls attention to the fact that ‘the entire net 
increase in global oil consumption since 1999 has come from outside the OECD 
countries’, leading to a noticeable acceleration in GHG emissions ‘after the turn of the 
century, driven by growing demand in the developing world.’526 Because of their 
rapid and highly energy-intensive growth over the past decade, developing countries 
‘already account for just over half of total carbon emissions… The lifetime emissions 
from these countries’ planned power stations would match the world’s entire 
industrial pollution since 1850.’527 A further aggravating concern is that despite 
technological improvements to engine efficiency and environmental friendliness, 
‘vehicle miles traveled continually increases as more cars are purchased,’528 a 
problem that is becoming particularly acute as automobile sales grow in developing 
countries, which are nowhere near as ‘motorised’ as Western countries. As stated in 
The Economist: 
 
The number of cars in the rich world will grow only slowly in the years ahead, 
but car ownership elsewhere is about to go into overdrive. Over the next 40 
years the global fleet of passenger cars is expected to quadruple to nearly 3 
billion. China, which will soon overtake America as the world’s biggest car 
market, could have as many cars on its roads in 2050 as are on the planet today; 
India’s fleet may have multiplied 50-fold. Forecasts of this kind led Carlos 
Ghosn, boss of the Renault-Nissan alliance, to declare [in March 2008] that if 
the industry did not get on with producing cars with very low or zero emissions, 
the world would “explode”. 
 Cars already contribute around 10% of the man-made greenhouse gases that 
are responsible for climate change.529 
 
If these trends continue – with ‘developing countries responsible for almost all growth 
in energy demand, whose energy consumption is expected to exceed that of the 
industrial world in about two decades and to climb even more rapidly thereafter’530 – 
developing countries’ GHG emissions will soon dwarf those of developed countries. 
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 As the worldwide debate on climate change unfolds, a political cleavage is 
being created between rich and developing countries: ‘The currently wealthy want 
measures that will put [GHG emission] limits on everyone, at least eventually, while 
the rapidly developing argue that they should not be penalised for coming late to the 
party. They should be allowed a phase of energy-intensive growth like the one the 
rich countries went through.’531 To deny developing countries the right to grow 
economically, and thereby also increase their GHG emissions significantly, their 
argument goes, is to resign them to eternal poverty. For without energy, writes 
Maugeri, ‘there is no economic development and no freedom from poverty. This need 
for energy tends to put environmental and climate concerns on the back burner. For 
the vast majority of [poor or developing] countries, access to low-cost energy will 
remain a top priority.’532 Though it seems fair that developing countries should not be 
denied a chance to catch up with rich ones, the problem with this approach is that 
these countries normally seek ‘the easiest and most direct way to obtain the necessary 
energy resources for development,’533 which is found in the increased use of fossil 
fuels. As Paul Roberts puts it, 
 
In today’s economy, clean, sustainable energy is a luxury reserved for the 
richest nations. In countries staggering under high population growth, the drive 
for energy security rarely means “leapfrogging” to a sophisticated, clean 
technology. Instead, these nations tend to take the easiest, fastest, and cheapest 
path possible – which usually means technologies that are obsolete, low-quality, 
and highly polluting.534 
 
As the prices of oil and natural gas increase, poorer consumers desperately turn to the 
worst possible way to solve their energy security in environmental terms, namely 
coal, which is the most carbon-intensive fossil fuel and makes up over a quarter of the 
world’s energy matrix,535 thus putting energy security considerations above 
environmental concerns for many states, including even some countries in Europe 
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where utilities calculate that burning coal is cheaper than burning cleaner natural 
gas.536 
Coal reserves worldwide are much more abundant and more widely dispersed 
than other fossil fuels and their production costs are also much lower. ‘Faced with the 
insecure nature of imported oil supply and potentially rising prices,’ writes Amy Jaffe, 
‘even countries seeking environmental improvement may find themselves unable to 
move away from heavy reliance on coal in power and industrial sectors.’537 In order 
not to aggravate the environmental threat brought on by the expanding use of coal, 
new technologies for carbon dioxide capture and sequestration are necessary. Unlike 
other technological advances in energy use, which are motivated mostly by energy 
security and financial concerns, carbon sequestration ‘is motivated uniquely by global 
climate change concerns, because it is always less expensive to vent carbon dioxide 
directly to the atmosphere.’538 Nevertheless, if strong GHG-emission reduction 
policies are implemented worldwide, coal consumption is more likely to fall than 
other energy sources not only because coal is the most polluting, and therefore more 
expensively charged under potential carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems, but also 
because ‘there are more low-cost alternatives to coal used in the electricity sector than 
there are to oil used in the transportation and manufacturing sectors.’539 
 Meanwhile, in the highest GHG-emitting sector – power generation for heat 
and electricity – the fuel that offers the best alternative to carbon-intensive energy 
sources like oil and coal, is actually another fossil fuel, natural gas, since it produces 
more energy per unit burned while emitting far fewer GHGs than either of the 
former.540 
 
Because of its relative abundance, versatility, and environmental benefits 
compared with other fossil fuels, natural gas is widely viewed as the “bridge 
fuel” to the next energy future (whatever that may be). Whether the global 
demand for natural gas will grow during the next two decades and whether 
natural gas will graduate to the full status of a global energy source like oil will 
hinge on how these four challenges—supply development, frameworks for 
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delivery and use, the expansion of international trade through LNG or other 
options, and balancing supply availability and use—are met.541 
 
But in order for natural gas to have a significant positive impact on the environment, 
its use must become much more widespread, which in turn requires an ‘aggressive 
program to develop stranded and unconventional gas reserves’542 in order to create a 
global market for it, as currently exists for oil – a proposition which also holds true 
for ethanol and other biofuels. Moreover, if coal use is substituted by natural gas 
worldwide, GHG emissions would be cut by approximately 50 per cent,543 which, as 
promising as it sounds, may not turn into reality given the vastly cheaper cost of coal 
compared to natural gas. But even if natural gas is plentiful and cheap enough to 
replace carbon-rich coal, asserts The Economist, ‘it will also be in a position to 
replace carbon-free nuclear and renewables, and in doing so more carbon dioxide will 
be emitted than would otherwise be the case.’ In that sense, prioritising natural gas 
over other energy sources would be a ‘mixed blessing’ for climate change mitigation, 
since ‘the overall increase in energy use and the reduced use of nuclear and 
renewables in a gas-happy world would almost perfectly balance out the gains made 
by burning gas instead of coal’, according to a hypothetical scenario projected by 
International Energy Agency for the year 2035.544 
 As for the second-highest GHG-contributing sector, transportation, a partial 
shift to ethanol fuel made from biomass ‘stands out as an excellent way to introduce 
an environmentally friendly energy technology’. A fundamental advantage of ethanol 
is that it is not mutually exclusive with current and more advanced, forthcoming 
engine technologies, like cars powered by petroleum-derived fuels, hybrid engines or 
fuel cells, respectively. Moreover, the environmental advantages of its consumption – 
as opposed to its production – might be even greater than its practicality. There is a 
virtual consensus among scientists, write Richard Lugar and James Woolsey, that 
‘when considered as part of a complete cycle of growth, fermentation, and 
combustion, the use of cellulosic ethanol as fuel, once optimized, will contribute 
essentially no net carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.’545 However, in terms of ethanol 
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production, as environmentalists often point out, the cultivation of some (but not all) 
biofuel-yielding crops can lead to rainforest destruction in developing countries, 
exacerbating environmental problems, and displacement of other food crops in 
developed countries, raising food prices. As the former UK Secretary of State for 
Energy, David Howell, questions: ‘If that is the price of independence from fossil 
fuels, is it worth it?’546 
 Although the drive for energy diversification towards conservation and 
‘greener’ alternative fuels to diminish dependence on fossil fuels is worthy for reasons 
of energy security, it is a necessity for environmental reasons, in order to mitigate 
climate change. But even if this drive offers much future potential and gives reason 
for optimism, the shift to alternative energy sources faces major obstacles. Normally 
such obstacles include high technical costs, creating new infrastructure for 
distributing alternative energies, long lead-times for new investments and entrenched 
interests in power generation, transportation, industry and agriculture sectors – all of 
which put renewable energies at a crucial disadvantage against fossil fuels, due to the 
latter’s dominance in most markets, existing knowhow and infrastructure for fossil 
fuels and the perceived high costs of adjusting to new, low-carbon policy 
frameworks.547 For these reasons, the exorbitant oil-price scenario of the past decade 
was in fact a blessing for investment in alternative energies – because it is 
inconceivable for most consumers to shift to renewable energies merely out of 
environmental concerns, unless there is also a strong financial incentive to do so. 
 However, the collapse of global oil prices induced by the 2008 financial crisis 
has held back an otherwise necessary investment drive towards a ‘greener’ future, as 
has often been the case in the past: ‘History has shown that low prices for petroleum 
or excessive uncertainty about future price movements are the worst enemies of 
research and development into alternative energy sources.’548 If fossil fuels remain too 
cheap for renewables to compete with them, Maugeri suggests that we can expect ‘a 
continued drop in investment in new forms of energy. … As a case in point, the 
greatest wave of investment in renewable sources took place during the oil shocks of 
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the 1970s. However, when prices dropped, spending on alternatives to oil, gas, and 
coal evaporated.’549 
There is, conversely, a fundamental and crucial difference between the 1986 
price collapse following the two oil crises of the 1970s and the most recent one after 
the 2008 financial crisis. Unlike in the 1970s and 80s, the concern about the 
environmental impact of energy use and its overwhelming contribution to climate 
change caused by GHG emissions has come into the political limelight. It is now 
almost ubiquitously recognised as ‘a challenge of the highest order’, requiring 
technological, institutional and behavioural change.550 According to Edward Morse, 
the opportunities presented by relatively lower oil prices after the 2008 financial crisis 
should not, therefore, ‘detract from the important goals of reducing global greenhouse 
emissions…and building a new generation of energy-efficient nonhydrocarbon fuel 
sources.’551 Indeed, it could well be, as Maugeri believes, that the ‘environmental 
conscience now shown by many governments could help sustain interest and 
investment in alternative energy when fossil fuels are cheap.’552 We can consequently 
expect to see a surge of technological innovation in renewable energy resources in the 
future in order simultaneously to tackle energy security and climate change, Giddens 
affirms: ‘Without such innovation, it is impossible to see how we can break our 
dependency upon oil, gas and coal, the major sources of environmental pollution. A 
turn to renewable sources of energy is essential, and it has to be on a very large 
scale.’553 
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Concluding Remarks 
The assessment of energy statecraft as an effective instrument of foreign policy 
cannot be made without a proper understanding of the context in which it takes place. 
Being defined as the manipulation of another state’s energy security for one’s own 
political purposes, energy statecraft is useful only under an auspicious international 
context for that end. Such a situation exists if one or more of the four elements of 
energy security – namely, availability, reliability, affordability and sustainability – 
raise cause for concern. The ‘new energy paradigm’ that has emerged since the turn of 
the new millennium – simultaneously characterised by worries over the future 
adequacy of global oil reserves and other finite energy resources; the questionable 
ability and willingness of energy producers to supply them in a reliable fashion; 
skyrocketing demand for energy sources across the board by rapidly growing 
developing countries, coupled with extremely volatile oil prices that jeopardises 
investments in new supply capacity, both of which aggravate the affordability of 
hydrocarbons; and the threat posed by climate change caused by burning fossil fuels – 
has raised the value of energy resources as an instrument of state power to those that 
possess them, and thus influence over those that are in want of them. But this so-
called new energy paradigm has also created a context in which the drive towards 
switching to use of alternative energy has blossomed as a necessary response to the 
aforementioned threats to energy security.  
 The last time such a massive switch to renewable energy sources was widely 
discussed was after the Arab oil crisis of 1973. As The Economist points out: 
 
Then, too, a spike in the price of oil coincided with a fear that natural limits to 
supply were close. … Of course, there was no geological shortage of oil, just a 
politically manipulated one. Nor is there a geological shortage this time round. 
But that does not matter, for there are two differences between then and now. 
The first is that the price rise is driven by demand. More energy is needed all 
round. That gives alternatives a real opening. The second is that 35 years have 
winnowed the technological wheat from the chaff.554 
 
As mentioned above, one particular energy resource that stands out as ‘an excellent 
way to introduce an environmentally friendly energy technology’ is ethanol and other 
biofuels, especially considering their applicability in transportation, the only sector 
where alternatives have not been able to replace petroleum. Given the need to curb 
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GHG emissions from burning fossil fuels and the huge projected rise in car ownership 
in the developing world, combined with the concern that future oil supplies may not 
be able to meet such a steep surge in demand, biofuels seem like an increasingly 
attractive alternative and renewable energy source. 
 With such an appeal, in view of the international energy security context 
described above, biofuels have the potential to join the ranks of the few energy 
resources that can be used as an instrument of foreign policy. There are but a few 
major producers of biofuels in the world, but only one country currently employs 
biofuels in its energy statecraft, namely Brazil. The subsequent chapter will therefore 
evaluate the effectiveness of Brazil’s energy statecraft focused on biofuels. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Energy Statecraft of Brazil 
 
 
Energy statecraft has been an established instrument of foreign policy among energy-
rich countries at least since the first international oil crisis of 1973, but its 
employment has thus far been restricted to petroleum and natural gas, more often than 
not in a negative way by restricting or disrupting target states’ access to these energy 
resources. What is new in this century, however, is the use of biofuels as an 
instrument of energy statecraft. So far, only Brazil presents a case study of a country 
using biofuels as an instrument to achieve its foreign policy goals. This chapter seeks 
to assess the efficacy of using biofuels as a form of energy statecraft by testing the 
conditional variables identified in the economic statecraft literature, which have been 
examined in pervious chapters. 
 The chapter begins with a historical outline of Brazil’s National Alcohol 
Programme – a series of public policies implemented by the Brazilian military regime 
in response to the oil crises of the 1970s – through its various phases, from a strictly 
domestic energy security policy to its launch as a foreign policy initiative during the 
administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010). The four 
conditional variables identified in the literature that, in theory, determine the potential 
for success of energy statecraft are then assessed individually against the foreign 
policy strategy employed by the Brazilian government during the Lula administration. 
The first of these variables analyses whether the instrument employed by the state – in 
this case, the promotion of biofuel use to third countries – is commensurable with the 
foreign policy goals that it seeks to achieve. In Brazil’s case, energy statecraft is 
carried out with the aim of attaining two main objectives: first, is the so-called 
commoditization of ethanol, that is the creation of an international market where 
ethanol is traded freely without barriers; second, is the increase in Brazilian ethanol 
exports within this market. In order to create this market, however, more countries 
need to produce ethanol or other biofuels, since Brazil is unable to supply global 
demand for biofuels while potential importers are unwilling to substitute their 
dependence on unreliable petroleum supply for dependence on a single (or few) 
suppliers of biofuels. Thus, the main strategy pursued by Brazil to accomplish its goal 
of commoditising ethanol is to encourage and assist other countries to use and 
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produce their own biofuels by promoting its use to third countries and transferring the 
technology to do so. 
 The second conditional variable is the market share of a given product, in this 
case biofuels. Here Brazil holds a relatively comfortable position as the world’s 
second-largest producer of ethanol and its main exporter. But as other countries, 
particularly the United States and the European Union, spend exorbitant amounts of 
money into developing their own biofuel programmes, Brazil risks falling behind the 
race for prominence in the still fledgling international biofuels market. Unlike the US 
and the EU, however, Brazil has much land available in which further to expand its 
biofuel production. In order to maintain its leading position in the international 
biofuels market, Brazil therefore needs to invest significantly in expanding its 
production capacity – both to meet rising internal demand, as well as to supply 
growing global demand for biofuels.  
 The elasticity of demand for a given good is the third conditional variable: in 
order for a resource to be used effectively as a form of energy statecraft, it should 
have a low degree of elasticity. This is where biofuels differ most significantly from 
other, more traditional resources used in energy statecraft, such as oil and natural gas: 
demand for biofuels is extremely elastic. Thus, while this makes biofuels a poor 
instrument of energy statecraft in principle, it is their capacity to complement, if not 
substitute, traditional fossil-based fuels that give strength to energy statecraft using 
biofuels. To be sure, the inelastic demand for biofuels generated through the 
increasing number of countries enforcing compulsory biofuel blend mandates in 
gasoline adds to the potential for successful energy statecraft through biofuels. 
However, the ultimate strength of biofuels as a form of energy statecraft lies in its 
competition with petroleum and the increased elasticity of the latter as a result of 
introducing the former – a competition which only matures after introducing flexible-
fuel (‘flex-fuel’) technology in the transportation sector, the sector which is most 
dependent on inelastic demand for oil. 
 Fourth and last among the conditional variables tested is the degree of control 
a government has over the private commercial actors that carry out the specific 
measures of a country’s energy statecraft. National oil companies are usually the 
avenue through which most energy-rich states pursue their energy statecraft. In Brazil, 
however, unlike the oil and gas sectors which are more firmly under government 
control through the national energy company, Petrobras, the country’s biofuel 
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industry is entirely private. This means that a large degree of cooperation between the 
government and the private biofuel industry is required in order to implement an 
energy statecraft strategy employing biofuels. As such, the fact that the objectives of 
the Brazilian government and its biofuel industry are largely the same – namely to 
create an international market for ethanol, in which Brazil plans to be a major 
exporter thereof – is a favourable condition when testing this variable. Moreover, the 
Brazilian government’s recent decision to intervene in the country’s biofuel sector – 
by classifying ethanol as a strategic fuel rather than as an agricultural product, and 
regulating it under the auspices of the National Petroleum Agency, using the same 
market rules for oil and gasoline – is also a favourable factor in terms of improving 
the prospects of significantly increasing ethanol exports abroad. 
 The chapter then concludes by discussing a common theme that runs through 
each of these conditional variables: the fact that the international market for biofuels 
is still in its fledgling stage. In principle, the lack of such a market should hinder the 
use of biofuels as a form of energy statecraft. However, as debated throughout these 
sections, energy statecraft using biofuels does not operate in a manner similar to 
energy statecraft using oil or gas. The very fact that there is no full-fledged 
international biofuel market indicates that energy statecraft using biofuels cannot be 
employed in a negative manner, only positive – through carrots rather than sticks. 
However, countries that adopt biofuels as part of their national energy mixes enhance 
their own energy security by doing do. Since energy statecraft is herein defined as the 
manipulation of another country’s energy security to attain one’s own political goals, 
biofuels can still be used as a form of energy statecraft by enhancing the energy 
security of target states. 
 
Brazil’s National Alcohol Programme (ProÁlcool) 
Often being touted as the most successful producer of biofuels in the world, Brazil has 
a long history of biofuel production, particularly with ethanol made from sugarcane. 
Though sugarcane is one of the country’s oldest crops, exporting sugar since 1532, it 
was not until the 1920s that the crop was grown to produce biofuels. Starting with a 
1931 government mandate to blend a modest 5 per cent of ethanol to all gasoline 
imports, national consumption slowly grew to 7 per cent in 1937 and 9.4 per cent at 
the outbreak of the Second World War. During the war, however, the government’s 
mandatory blend of ethanol to gasoline reached as high as 50 per cent in 1943, due to 
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the threat posed by German submarine attacks to the supply of oil. But cheap and 
plentiful oil after the war led only to periodic mandates for ethanol blends in gasoline 
until the first global oil crisis of 1973.555 
 The gasoline shortages provoked by OPEC’s 1973 oil embargo led 
policymakers in Brazil and elsewhere to realise the danger to energy security caused 
by dependence on a few unreliable suppliers of petroleum and their ability to raise oil 
prices dramatically. This situation alarmed the government of General Ernesto Geisel, 
which anticipated that such a crisis could happen again in the future, and therefore set 
out to implement a series of policies drastically to reduce Brazil’s dependence on 
foreign energy sources. At the time of the embargo, Brazil imported 80 per cent of its 
oil needs, representing roughly half of its total import bill, meaning that the 
subsequent increase in petroleum prices placed a substantial burden on the country’s 
balance of payments.556 In reaction the Brazilian government launched the National 
Alcohol Programme (ProÁlcool) in 1975, which coincided not only with a sharp rise 
in global oil prices but also with a fall in world sugar prices, thus providing a new 
market for an otherwise struggling domestic sugarcane industry,557 while at the same 
time taking advantage of Brazil’s vast tracts of fallow land and its long history of 
growing sugarcane. In terms of ensuring the country’s energy security, the ProÁlcool 
programme was driven mainly by concerns over the affordability of oil as well as the 
reliability of its delivery, whilst also considering the lack of availability of known 
domestic petroleum reserves versus the vast availability of land to grow sugarcane in 
Brazil. Another goal of the Brazilian government in implementing ProÁlcool was to 
help lessen the economic disparity between the more developed south and the 
underdeveloped northeast regions by stimulating the latter’s agricultural industry. 
Even though it is well known today that ethanol made from sugarcane has a positive 
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impact on the GHG emissions, environmental sustainability was not one of the 
original driving forces behind ProÁlcool’s creation.558 
 Since its relatively modest beginning in 1975 (compared to its scale and reach 
today), Brazil’s National Alcohol Programme evolved through the following decades 
in four distinct phases, according to the first head of the recently-created Department 
of Energy at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Antônio José Ferreira 
Simões.559 The first phase, from 1975 to 1979, saw the Brazilian government 
implementing the multi-pronged ProÁlcool programme by taking measures to 
stimulate both the supply and demand for ethanol fuel, initially as an additive to be 
blended with gasoline. At the outset of the programme, when the production costs of 
ethanol were still relatively high, ProÁlcool was heavily dependent on government 
incentives. The government required a mandatory blend of ethanol in gasoline, 
fluctuating between 10 per cent (E-10) and 22 per cent (E-22) until the end of the 
decade, thereby guaranteeing the purchase of set amounts of ethanol fuel by 
Petrobras, the state oil company, at a guaranteed fixed price considered adequate to 
generate a reasonable profit to producers.560 
 The second phase of ProÁlcool was a reaction to the second oil price spike in 
the 1970s, sparked by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, when global petroleum prices 
quadrupled. Lasting until 1989, this phase is considered the heyday of Brazil’s 
National Alcohol Programme, characterised by a series of new policies and 
government incentives to expand the use of ethanol.561 On the supply side, in addition 
to giving tax rebates on ethanol production, the government offered preferential low-
interest loans and credit guarantees for the construction of new ethanol distilleries. 
More important, however, was the government’s decision to allow the sale of pure 
ethanol (E-100) in petrol stations, rather than merely blend it with gasoline, thus 
ordering Petrobras to create a distribution infrastructure by installing E-100 pumps in 
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most of the country’s petrol stations.562 On the demand side, the government 
generously fixed the price of neat ethanol at the pump at 59 per cent of gasoline, 
largely subsidised by substantial taxes on gasoline, thereby guaranteeing competitive 
prices for consumers. These measures solved the ‘chicken-and-egg’ concern raised by 
the big automobile manufacturers operating in Brazil, who were reluctant to produce 
vehicles with engines that ran only on E-100 until they could be certain of a 
guaranteed demand for these new cars, as well as by the sugarcane producers, who 
worried about not being able to sell all the additional ethanol the government was 
incentivising them to produce.563 Thus the government signed an agreement with 
automobile manufacturers requiring them to build pure ethanol-run cars on a large 
scale. Consumer demand for these vehicles was further stimulated by sales tax 
incentives throughout the 1980s, peaking at roughly 90 per cent of all cars sold 
annually in Brazil in 1986.564 
Although ProÁlcool was very successful in its first and halfway through its 
second phase – during which time ethanol production skyrocketed in Brazil, 
quadrupling during the programme’s second phase – a series of concomitant 
exogenous factors led its discredit. The Latin American debt crisis of 1982 had 
already severely restricted the Brazilian government ability to continue subsidising its 
National Alcohol Programme, when the oil price collapse of 1986 made ethanol 
uncompetitive with gasoline, even with subsidies, thus forcing the government to 
phase out its financial support for ethanol, although the minimum blend to gasoline 
was kept. To make matters worse, when global sugar prices rose sharply at the end of 
1988, Brazilian sugarcane growers shifted their crops to sugar production for export, 
provoking a severe ethanol shortage in the second quarter of 1989. As a result, 
ethanol-run car drivers were left stranded, which seriously undermined consumer 
confidence in the availability and reliability of ethanol fuel, and sales of E-100 fuelled 
cars rapidly declined afterwards. ProÁlcool was further discredited when the 
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Brazilian government had to authorise ethanol imports, turning Brazil from the 
world’s largest producer of ethanol to its largest importer.565 Larry Rother reminds us 
that ethanol was questioned as a fuel in Brazil for purely economic, rather than 
technical, reasons: ‘It continued to be an efficient fuel source, but if reliable supply 
could not be guaranteed, consumers preferred to protect themselves by returning to 
gasoline, supplies of which were never interrupted’ – a situation that persisted 
throughout the 1990s. ‘Even after sugar prices returned to their historically low levels, 
motorists were wary of being tricked again, and the sales of ethanol-fueled cars 
continued to lag.’566 
 During ProÁlcool’s third phase, throughout the 1990s, the Brazilian 
government focused its efforts on reducing runaway inflation and cutting its 
expenditures, thus characterising this phase by deregulation in the country’s fuel 
sector and phasing out of all ethanol-related subsidies, leaving all decisions 
concerning the ethanol sector in the hands of private industry. While the ethanol blend 
in gasoline was maintained – and indeed made mandatory by law in 1993 (varying 
between 20 and 25 per cent), thus creating a smaller but permanent market for ethanol 
– E-100 sales at the pump dropped significantly throughout the decade, putting an end 
to imports from 1996 onwards. The same decline occurred in the sales of pure 
ethanol-fuelled vehicles, which were discontinued after 1998 when its sales amounted 
to less than one per cent of total annual auto sales in Brazil. This put pressure on the 
sugarcane industry to lower production costs, increase efficiency and improve 
management practices. By the late-1990s, when the price of ethanol was fully 
liberalised, the retail price dropped, making it competitive with gasoline again. 
Renewed interest in E-100 as a fuel by both consumers and car manufacturers then led 
to an increase in demand and supply for ethanol in Brazil.567 
 The fourth and current phase of ProÁlcool, from 2000 onwards, has seen the 
revitalisation of ethanol fuel in Brazil and elsewhere. Daniel Yergin lists three factors 
that ‘brought “alcohol” back in Brazil’: the steadily rising price of oil of the 2000s; 
the accumulated thirty-year experience in research and development of ethanol fuel 
and learning curve which led to dramatically reduced production costs; and, most 
                                                
565 Spencer, Op cit., pp. 6-7. IEA, Op cit., p. 11. International Atomic Energy Agency, Op cit., p. 185. 
Bundy, Op cit., p. 5. 
566 Rother, Op cit., pp. 184-185. 
567 International Atomic Energy Agency, Op cit., p. 185. Simões, Op cit. IEA, Op cit., p. 11. Cortez & 
Leal with Sinkala, Op cit., pp. 72-73. 
168 
 
importantly, Volkswagen’s introduction of flexible-fuel technology (‘flex-fuel’) in 
automobiles in 2003, which are given tax breaks in Brazil. Flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) 
work with any combination of ethanol and gasoline, including 100 per cent of either, 
due to electronic sensors that automatically detect whether the fuel in the tank is 
gasoline, ethanol or a mixture of both, and then properly adjust the engine combustion 
parameters accordingly, giving the driver the choice of the cheapest fuel available at 
the pump. ‘This was the impressive breakthrough that would put confidence back into 
the minds of motorists’, he writes.568 Flex-fuel cars protect consumers both from 
sharp increases in the price of gasoline provoked by high international oil prices and 
potential shortages in ethanol supply. As a result, FFVs have become immensely 
popular in Brazil, and all automobile manufacturers in the country followed 
Volkswagen’s suit in producing them: by 2006, 75 per cent of cars sold in Brazil had 
flex-fuel engines, and today virtually all of the cars sold annually in Brazil (over 3 
million) are equipped with this technology. Consequently, domestic demand for 
ethanol rose dramatically during this phase, eventually surpassing gasoline.569 Today, 
the Brazilian ethanol sector is driven predominantly by market forces, including 
demand from abroad, rather than by government incentives. The sugarcane industry 
has made significant investments in technological improvements to increase 
production, and now produces ethanol efficiently and at competitive prices.570 
 Despite its ups and downs along the years, the Brazilian National Alcohol 
Programme has developed into a definite success story overall, catching the attention 
of other countries, particularly in the past decade, when concerns over energy security 
have been paramount. In this context, the Brazilian government has identified an 
opportunity to promote the use of ethanol abroad based on its own positive experience 
with it. Though the first attempts to promote Brazilian biofuels abroad were 
undertaken by the state government of São Paulo under governor Mário Covas in 
1988 and 1989 in places like Sweden, Canada and Iowa in the United States, in order 
to make up for the gradual loss of domestic demand for the fuel at the time,571 it was 
not until the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administration, from 2003 to 2010, that 
promoting biofuels in third countries became a part of the federal government’s 
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foreign policy. Indeed, ‘Lula is the “father of ethanol”, in terms of promoting the 
image of ethanol and incentivising its use abroad’, according to a representative of 
Brazil’s Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA).572 The following sections will 
describe this particular foreign policy strategy and analyse it in terms of the criteria 
for effective energy statecraft discussed in previous chapters, testing the hypothesis 
that if each of these conditional factors is favourable, energy statecraft should be more 
likely to be successful in its implementation. 
 
1. Goal Formulation 
Effective energy statecraft – herein defined as the manipulation of the energy security 
of one or more target states by a sender state to advance the political goals of the 
sender state – depends, according to the theoretical framework used in previous 
chapters, on the fulfilment of four conditional criteria: 1) the formulation of foreign 
policy goals being commensurable with the instruments used in their pursuit; 2) the 
sender state should have a high market share in the commercialisation of the energy 
resource in question; 3) low elasticity of demand for the energy resource in question 
on the part of the target states; and 4) a high level of government control over the 
commercial actor(s) that sell the energy resource in question. However, what is 
unique and completely novel in the study of biofuels as an instrument of energy 
statecraft, as opposed to existing forms of energy statecraft (oil and natural gas), is 
that there is not yet an international market for it. Thus, theoretically speaking, one 
cannot pursue negative energy statecraft using biofuels for the very simple reason that 
there is not a market for it in most countries, whereby a sender state can implement 
negative biofuel energy statecraft by denying a target state that energy resource, since 
there are no sender states dependent on biofuels in the same way they are dependent 
on oil and gas. Since biofuels cannot be used as a negative form of energy statecraft, it 
can only be employed in a positive manner, through incentives and carrots: by 
positively manipulating the energy security of a country by enhancing their energy 
security with biofuels – i.e. ‘exporting energy security’ by exporting biofuels. 
Therefore, the ability to use bioenergy as a form of energy statecraft depends on the 
creation of an international market for it – in other words to transform ethanol and 
                                                
572 Interview with UNICA representative, São Paulo, Brazil, 14 June 2011. My translation. 
170 
 
other biofuels into a globally traded commodity – whereby producing states can 
manipulate the energy security of consumer states, positively or negatively. 
 As mentioned above, the promotion of biofuel use abroad, particularly of 
ethanol, has been undertaken by Brazilian sub-state actors since the late 1980s. From 
the Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010) onwards, however, promoting the use of 
biofuels to third countries has become an instrument of the Brazilian government’s 
foreign policy. According to President Lula, the idea to promote increased biofuel 
consumption not only domestically but also abroad, was inspired by his first Minister 
of Agriculture, Roberto Rodrigues, who in 2003 walked into Lula’s office saying, ‘Mr 
President, the country has an extraordinary opportunity’ to spread the use of biofuels, 
and ‘you could go down in history as the “biofuel president”.’573 The ‘opportunity’ for 
Brazil and Lula, in this case, was an international energy context plagued by steadily 
rising oil prices in the face of growing populations in developing countries, concerns 
over the future availability of fossil fuels and their effect on the environment, as well 
as the reliability of having a large portion of the world’s energy needs provided by a 
limited number of countries. In other words, the world was faced once again, like in 
the 1970s, with threats to energy security – threats which Brazil overcame with its 
National Alcohol Programme, and whose experience could benefit other countries 
faced with similar energy security challenges today. It is within this context that 
Brazil’s foreign policy strategy to disseminate the production and consumption of 
biofuels is situated, according to Lula’s Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim: ‘President 
Lula has determined biofuels as one of the priorities of his administration. He has 
committed himself personally to defend the economic, environmental and social 
benefits of these energy resources.’574 Since then, there has hardly been a presidential 
trip abroad or visit by a foreign dignitary to Brazil in which Lula had not mentioned 
Brazil’s successful experience with ethanol production, if not staunchly advocated its 
use, often admitting to being ‘in love with biodiesel’:575 ‘I have been, as everyone 
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knows – almost in an obsessive manner – an advocate of renewable sources of 
fuel.’576 
The speeches delivered by President Lula from 2004 onwards in his trips 
abroad, as well as at home, may have varied in the attention given to biofuels, 
depending on the occasion, but the basic message remained the same. Lula repeatedly 
recalled the need to tackle the energy security challenge the world faces, listing the 
advantages of adopting biofuels in his speeches, such as those summarised in an 
article he published in the Miami Herald: 
 
• First, these products constitute renewable energy alternatives, which allow us 
to diversify the world’s energy supply while lessening the undesirable 
dependency on a limited number of sources and suppliers. 
• Second, these products protect the environment, both by emitting fewer of 
the gases responsible for the greenhouse effect and by using agricultural wastes 
and depleted lands. 
• Third, these biomass products are development tools with a strong positive 
impact on society. Given the abundance and variety of their feedstocks and the 
versatility of the technology employed, these products facilitate job creation on 
small and family farms, as well as in related industries. Moreover, they generate 
export revenue for countries that in many cases depend on a single export 
commodity and which now lack energy resources. 
Using the full potential of biofuels, however, depends on creating new models 
of energy cooperation. We need to join efforts to create and disseminate these 
technologies and open up world markets for new fuels. … 
Given that each country can produce and consume different kinds of biofuels, 
it’s no longer a question of dividing up the world between producers and 
importers nor of creating new dependency relationships. Our aim is to maximize 
the advantages that these new sources of energy can produce, in terms of 
agricultural diversification, job creation and environmental conservation.577 
 
Spreading this message wherever Lula went in the world, and to all those who visited 
him in Brazil, followed by other instruments and subsequent strategies, has been the 
core of what some have called Brazil’s ‘biofuels diplomacy’578 or ‘ethanol diplomacy’ 
– which the present work defines as ‘energy statecraft’ or, in this case, 
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biofuels/ethanol statecraft – and was, ‘without doubt, one of the hallmarks of [Lula’s] 
administration’, according to Ambassador Simões.579   
Brazil has many overlapping objectives in its energy statecraft – including 
creating new export markets for Brazilian biofuel-related products, enhancing energy 
security in terms of reducing dependence on expensive imported oil, limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions, improving the environment by substituting lead additives 
in gasoline, creating jobs in rural communities and developing poorer countries – but 
the overarching declaratory goal is to transform ethanol into a globally traded 
commodity.580 Thus, the aspirations of Brazil’s energy statecraft are twofold: ‘to 
increase demand for Brazilian biofuels around the world, and to help guarantee 
reliability of supply in the global marketplace, enhancing private-sector development. 
For instance, if a drought resulted in lower production levels in Brazil, other countries 
such as South Africa and India could still supply the market, and vice versa.’581 
Despite being the world’s most efficient ethanol producer and having the most 
potential for its expansion, it is not in Brazil’s interest to be the world’s only biofuels 
exporter. As a former director of UNICA, Eduardo Carvalho, explains, Brazil is ‘not 
interested in becoming the Saudi Arabia of ethanol… It’s not our strategy because it 
doesn’t produce results. As a large producer and user, I need to have other big buyers 
and sellers in the international market if ethanol is to become a global commodity, 
which is our real goal.’582 
In order for biofuels to be traded as commodities in a global market, a number 
of conditions – or complementary goals – must also be met. First and foremost is the 
need to promote both the production and the consumption of ethanol fuel in third 
countries. There are currently a limited number of producers, and even fewer 
exporters, of ethanol, while overall demand for it is low in the world. Nicole Spencer 
expects that more countries will adopt biofuels in their national energy mix once they 
have access to a larger biofuel market globally, which will likely increase and become 
more competitive as more countries produce biofuels.583 But more importantly, the 
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need to commoditise ethanol by spreading its use and production to third countries is 
inherently linked to the energy security component of biofuel use. One of the main 
advantages of biofuels is how they reduce dependence on oil imports from a few 
unreliable producers, and energy consumers and importing countries are not interested 
in substituting one energy dependence for another, which is why it is crucial to have 
as many biofuel suppliers as possible in the world. Potential ethanol-importing 
countries are wary of using a product from a single supplier, in case there is a bad 
harvest or other disruption in supply from Brazil. Therefore, expanding production to 
other countries is paramount to the strategy of turning ethanol into a commodity 
because the more countries that produce biofuels, the more importing countries’ 
energy security is enhanced by consuming them.584 As Lula’s Foreign Minister, Celso 
Amorim, has clarified, ‘when we are talking about ethanol, we are not thinking about 
an “ethanol OPEC”, we want the opposite, seeking something that involves other 
countries in a solidary manner. We will win and others will win too.’585 
Second, common technical standards for ethanol and other biofuels must be 
adopted internationally. Similar to the need to increase the number of ethanol 
producers, adopting universal standards for biofuels would ensure that a disruption of 
supply from one country would be met by another supplier using the same or similar 
technical standards, ensuring similar end-products. Third, biofuels need to be traded 
in relevant commodity exchanges, creating a futures market for them and the option 
of long-term contracts, much like the current international petroleum market.586 
Finally, in order for a global biofuels market to function smoothly and without 
distortions, all barriers to its trade, including tariffs and subsidies, must be removed. 
 There are many motivations behind these goals, some idealistic and others 
more narrowly self-interested. An obvious interest behind Brazil’s objective to create 
an international market for biofuels is economic. By creating a world market for 
ethanol and other biofuels, it follows that more export opportunities arise for Brazilian 
biofuel producers, with benefits to Brazil’s trade balance. But equally important is the 
potential for export of Brazilian energy production technologies along the entire 
sugarcane-ethanol industry, including flex-fuel vehicles. Many of the countries that 
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have the appropriate climactic conditions to grow biofuels lack the technical expertise 
to make them, so every biofuel cooperation agreement that Brazil signs with such 
countries is integrated with the promotion of technologies along the entire ethanol 
production chain, providing opportunities for Brazilian companies in many sectors to 
benefit.587 In this regard, write Freemantle and Stevens, ‘it is in the interest of Brazil’s 
large state-owned and private sugarcane growers and biofuels machinery 
manufacturers to see ethanol develop as a global commodity’, and foreign policy is 
merely serving Brazilian economic interests in the pursuit of this objective by 
providing its companies with ‘a formidable competitive advantage in expanding their 
global reach and establishing market participants on both the demand and supply 
sides’ in growing markets with large agricultural potential and technological 
deficit.588 Another, less obvious, interest behind Brazil’s ‘teach a man to fish’ strategy 
of investment and technology transfer in biofuels to developing countries is political. 
Lavishing such investments and technical assistance on these countries helps Brazil 
compete with India and China for soft power influence among developing countries 
and alleviates whatever mistrust they may have over Brazil’s dominant role in world 
trade. It also promotes the country’s international image as a relatively moderate and 
apolitical energy supplier, while garnering support for Brazil’s ‘lonely quest for a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Since rising powers like Brazil will one 
day run the world, argues Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães Neto, the [former] foreign 
ministry’s secretary-general, they can save trouble later by reducing poverty in 
developing countries now.’589 
 But there are also more long-term and idealistic motivations behind the goal of 
commoditising ethanol. According to Brazil’s current Foreign Minister, Antonio de 
Aguiar Patriota, Brazil wants to project internationally an agenda of peace and 
development. From a more idealistic perspective, Brazil is motivated by the idea that 
it has something to contribute to a peaceful and developed world. In that light, the 
Brazilian government sees agriculture as an instrument of peace, as are sustainable 
and economic development, since social tensions can arise in places without energy 
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and food security. Accordingly, Brazil’s international projection, particularly its 
promotion of biofuels abroad, is not directed at any specific objective, but towards the 
idea of creating an international order where there is more room for sustainable 
development and poverty reduction.590 President Lula himself had also endorsed this 
view when stating that ‘Brazil is actively preparing itself for a new development 
paradigm that will meet the environmental and social challenges of the coming 
decades. Ethanol and biodiesel are the key components of our approach, and we are 
determined to “plant the oil of the future”.’591 In poor countries, he writes, ‘production 
of ethanol and biodiesel can have an extremely positive impact. It assists in dealing 
with the energy deficit, influencing internal consumption and exports. It can also 
generate a vast number of jobs, redistributing the population more harmoniously 
between urban and rural areas.’592 
 The Brazilian government employs different strategies to pursue its goal of 
commoditising ethanol, depending on the target state in question, mainly whether the 
target states are potentially great consumers and/or producers of biofuels, since both 
demand for and the supply of biofuels need to be increased to become a commodity. 
Part of the strategy behind commoditizing ethanol is to increase and diversify the 
consumer base for the product, particularly for Brazil’s own exports. The United 
States is currently Brazil’s largest single export market for ethanol, making Brazil 
highly dependent on the ups and downs of the American market. In order to diversify 
its own ethanol exports, as well as to bolster the fuel’s commoditization, Brazil has 
identified the Europe and Asia as potential key demand centres, in addition to the 
US,593 given these regions’ high energy consumption. However, many of these 
countries, particularly the US and EU countries, have highly protected agricultural 
markets with barriers to biofuel imports from Brazil and elsewhere. Thus, in terms of 
encouraging potential large ethanol demand centres to increase their biofuel 
consumption, one of the Brazilian government’s strategies has been to put pressure on 
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these countries to reduce, if not eliminate, their trade barriers to ethanol imports. 
Another tactic employed is to encourage the introduction of compulsory ethanol blend 
mandates into gasoline in these countries, where there are few or none, although both 
the US and the EU have already set very ambitious targets. 
 While Brazilian talks with potential large biofuel demand centres, especially 
the US and the EU, have been limited in their success in terms of opening markets, 
their importance has been much more pronounced in cooperation agreements to 
disseminate the use of biofuels to third countries. The most significant of such 
agreements is the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and 
Brazil to Advance Cooperation on Biofuels, signed in São Paulo on 9 March 2007. 
According to President Lula, the idea behind the agreement originated over lunch 
with President George W. Bush, during the latter’s visit to Brasília in 2005, where 
Lula (‘obsessed with biofuels’) told Bush about Brazil’s success story with ethanol so 
eagerly that Bush ‘almost couldn’t have lunch because [Lula] wouldn’t stop talking 
about biofuel.’594 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two 
countries is based on three pillars: bilateral, third countries and global. On the 
bilateral front, the two countries agreed to share technologies and cooperate in the 
research and development of the next generation of biofuels, such as those made from 
lingo-cellulosic material. Second, Brazil and the US have agreed to spread the 
benefits of biofuels to third countries by conducting feasibility studies and providing 
technical assistance aimed at stimulating private sector investment in domestic biofuel 
production for local consumption in these countries. Initially, this pillar of the MOU 
targeted the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti and Saint Kitts and Nevis, but 
was later expanded to include Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jamaica and 
Senegal. Globally, the two countries have been working multilaterally to establish 
common standards and codification for biofuels in order to advance commoditization. 
Involved in these efforts are the Brazilian National Institute for Metrology, 
Normalization and Industrial Quality (INMETRO) and the US National Institute of 
Norms and Technology (NIST), as well as the International Biofuels Forum (IBF), 
whose members include the EU, China, India and South Africa, in addition to Brazil 
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and the US.595 In addition to accelerating the process of biofuel commoditisation, the 
MOU brings political benefits to both countries: ‘For the United States, biofuels serve 
as a bridge to a closer relationship with Brazil, a leader in Latin America and a 
growing world power. Likewise, collaborating with the United States and other 
countries on biofuels shines a spotlight on Brazil’s achievements in this area and 
further enhances its profile as an international leader.’596 Concurrently, the MOU also 
helps improve the US’s image in Latin America while countering the influence of 
Venezuela’s petroleum-based version of energy statecraft. Indeed, ‘“Ethanol 
diplomacy” appears to be helping Brazil reassert regional leadership relative to oil-
rich Venezuela under Hugo Chávez.’597 
 Brazil has also signed similar ‘triangular cooperation’ agreements on biofuels 
with the European Union, although the target states of EU-Brazil agreements are all in 
Africa, rather than predominantly in Central America and the Caribbean, as is the case 
with the MOU with the US. But even though Brazil’s agreements with the US and the 
EU, as well as Brazil’s exclusively bilateral agreements on biofuel cooperation 
(mostly with South American countries), differ on their target states, these countries 
nevertheless share some basic similarities, which make them ideal countries for 
biofuel production. President Lula explained in several speeches that Brazilian 
ethanol is competitive because Brazil has the right technology, fertile soils, abundant 
sunshine and water available for the best ethanol-yielding crop: sugarcane. But he 
stresses that these conditions are not exclusive to Brazil, and similar climactic 
conditions are found in large parts of other tropical and subtropical countries in 
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as parts of Asia, where enough land 
is available to expand biofuel production, especially in those countries that already 
cultivate sugarcane. With energy cooperation agreements and technology transfer, 
based on over thirty years’ experience in Brazil, Lula believed that Brazil can incite a 
‘green revolution’ in developing countries with the right combination of available 
land and appropriate climactic conditions, generating jobs, wealth and 
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development.598 ‘The good thing is that a poor country can reduce what it pays for 
imported oil and earn money exporting this,’ explains Ambassador Simões. ‘That way 
they will have more money to invest in social programs, and the production of energy 
will be democratized in the world, with a hundred countries producing energy instead 
of just fifteen or twenty.’599 
 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, roughly one tenth of the 
world’s 200 million hectares of land that is both available and suitable for sugarcane 
cultivation is currently being used, not counting forests and protected areas, spanning 
more than one hundred countries.600 Among such target states, the Brazilian 
government’s effort to spread the production of biofuels has paid particular attention 
to Africa. The reasons behind Brazil’s focus on African countries are not restricted to 
the fact that the continent has, after Brazil itself, the largest area of available land for 
potential expansion of biofuel production, nor that African savannahs are 
geographically very similar to the Brazilian Cerrado, where sugarcane is highly 
productive. During the Lula administration, the Brazilian government acted in Africa 
with a modern-day sense of mission civilisatrice, in which helping Africa to fulfil its 
entire potential for development is officially a part of Brazil’s foreign policy,601 as 
part of its wider ‘South-South diplomacy’. A junior Brazilian Foreign Ministry 
official602 has explained that the Brazilian government is convinced that it is 
contributing to the development of African states by sharing its experience with 
biofuels. Brazil’s experience demonstrates that biofuel programmes are an important 
instrument of sustainable development, if implemented in a responsible manner, in 
five different ways. First, by incorporating new agricultural technologies, the entire 
agricultural sector’s productivity is increased, including food production. Second, 
native biofuel industries reduce dependence on imported petroleum for net oil-
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importing countries, while increasing the amount available for export in oil-producing 
nations. Third, biofuel programmes have an important industrial side, unlike most 
traditional agricultural products, which attracts and stimulates investment in industry. 
Fourth, biofuels diversify not only sources of liquid fuels for transport but also 
sources of electricity, since biofuels can co-generate electricity during their 
production cycle when using advanced technologies. And, fifth, biofuels can generate 
significant export revenues for countries that have a small domestic consumer market 
and/or that can produce biofuels beyond their internal needs. In sum, Brazil’s 
assistance in generating deeper socioeconomic stability in Africa by actively 
positioning itself to be the main partner in several African countries’ pursuit of energy 
and food security ‘fits Brazil’s desire to see, and actively participate in, the ongoing 
shift in the global economy towards the developing markets of the South.’603 
 In order to propagate biofuel production in Africa and other developing 
countries, the Brazilian government has employed a series of tactics. First and 
foremost has been the use of presidential diplomacy. President Lula was a ‘marketing 
man’,604 who travelled the world preaching the virtues of biofuels wherever he went 
and inviting other world leaders, such as President George W. Bush, to come see the 
success of Brazilian ethanol for themselves. The fact that roughly two-thirds of 
Brazilian biofuel cooperation agreements made by 2008 were signed abroad605 
confirms the importance of Lula’s foreign visits to this strategy. However, from 2006 
onwards Brazil’s strategy to spread biofuel production abroad became more unified. 
Foreign Minister Patriota recalls that ‘during inter-ministerial meetings – involving 
the President’s Chief of Staff, the Ministries of Energy and Agriculture, among others 
– what bewildered [the Foreign Ministry] at the time was that many ministries 
[involved in matters pertaining to biofuels] were in contact with their counterparts in 
other countries, without having a unified vision behind [these contacts].’606 This led to 
the creation of the Energy Department within Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations 
in April 2006, whose role is systematically to coordinate the multiple fronts on which 
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the Brazilian government and private sector engage with the outside world in matters 
related to biofuels.607 Since then, Brazil’s promotion of biofuels to third countries has 
followed a largely uniform model of knowledge and technology transfer through 
exchanging visits by officials and technicians. 
 Delegations from countries interested in starting up their own biofuels 
programme are invited to come to Brazil and attend seminars at the Foreign Ministry 
in Brasília, where they learn about the Brazilian ethanol programme, the different 
phases of biofuel production, including distribution and the manufacture of flex-fuel 
vehicles, as well as the socioeconomic impact of ethanol production, its role in the 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and the current state of biofuels research. 
Foreign delegations are also invited to go to Rio de Janeiro and/or São Paulo to visit 
Petrobras, regulatory agencies such as the National Petroleum Agency, the National 
Development Bank (BNDES), INMETRO, as well as sugar mills, ethanol plants and 
the automobile industry.608 Equally, Brazil sometimes sends its own officials and 
specialists abroad to conduct seminars and courses on the aspects of biofuels listed 
above. 
 Once a target state decides to adopt a biofuel programme of its own – be it 
through a bilateral or trilateral agreement (with the US or EU) – a standard three-
phase model is followed.609 During the first phase, Brazil sends a team of researchers 
from the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, an academic institution, to conduct feasibility 
studies (using the same methodology in all target states) analysing the country’s 
potential to develop a biofuels in a sustainable fashion. These feasibility studies make 
comprehensive analyses of the social, economic and environmental aspects related to 
the sustainable production and use of biofuels and bioelectricity, taking into account 
local stakeholders’ views and assessing the potential to meet domestic and foreign 
demand in order to determine the most appropriate sites, technologies and feedstocks 
for the implementation of bioenergy projects.610 The feasibility study’s final report is 
then presented to local authorities, identifying sustainable bioenergy projects with 
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high potential for implementation. The second phase consists of the host government 
selecting or prioritising one or more among the potential projects presented by the 
feasibility study, and finding investors, funding from governmental sources and/or 
potential partners to participate in those bioenergy projects.611 Brazilian companies 
and the BNDES are involved in funding some of these projects, whose third phase is 
their actual implementation, often through joint ventures with Brazilian firms.612 
 As a sign of the priority given to African countries in Brazil’s quest to 
disseminate biofuel production worldwide, in 2007 the Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation (Embrapa), linked to the Ministry of Agriculture, opened an 
African branch office in Accra, Ghana. When visiting Accra in April 2008, President 
Lula referred to Embrapa’s African branch as ‘the cornerstone of a new Brazilian 
foreign policy strategy, and the spearhead of [Brazil’s] commitment to extend to 
developing countries, particularly African, the benefits that Embrapa has and 
continues to bring to Brazil’613 in areas of tropical agriculture, including food and 
bioenergy production. During its first year, Embrapa’s office in Accra sent 
representatives to seventeen African countries while providing long-distance 
assistance to thirteen others.  Thus Embrapa’s office in Ghana serves as bridge of 
technology transfer and cooperation between Brazilian and African institutions, and is 
an integral part of the Brazilian government’s policy of deepening ties with African 
countries. 
 
2. Market Share 
According to theory, economic statecraft is more effective when a sender state has a 
large market share for a given good or product. This is particularly true when 
employing negative economic statecraft, where a sender state with a large market 
share of a good can disrupt the flow of its trade to target states in order to achieve the 
former’s political goals. Insofar as energy statecraft is concerned specifically, rather 
than general economic statecraft, Adam Stulberg considers a sender state to wield 
significant market power in the energy sector if it controls roughly 30 per cent of 
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supply and exports to foreign markets.614 However, the international market for 
biofuels – including ethanol and biodiesel – is a relatively recent phenomenon and so 
far remains small and volatile, with only about 10 per cent of the world’s ethanol 
production traded internationally, and even less for biodiesel, most of it being 
exported from Brazil to the United States and the European Union,615 since most 
biofuel production worldwide is made primarily for domestic consumption.616 Given 
the current small size of its international market, biofuels make for a poor instrument 
of foreign policy, which is why building such a market is of paramount importance if 
it is ever to be fully employed as a tool of energy statecraft. But as more countries 
implement policies that mandate the use of biofuel blends into gasoline and diesel, the 
international trade in biofuels in general and ethanol in particular is steadily growing. 
 Global ethanol production has more than doubled in the period between 2000 
and 2005, and its annual production has grown on average by 12.2 per cent between 
2000 and 2007, from 17.25 billion to over 46 billion litres of ethanol produced per 
year, with the US responsible for 43 per cent of that growth, followed by Brazil with 
32 per cent and the EU with 15 per cent. Brazil was the world’s leading producer of 
ethanol up to 2005, before being overtaken by the US in 2006. With the collective 
European Union ranking a distant but significant third place in ethanol production – 
followed by China, Canada, Thailand, Colombia, India and Australia – Brazil and the 
US dominate the world’s ethanol production, together making up around 70 per cent 
of the ethanol production for all uses and nearly 90 per cent of ethanol fuel.617 
However, since the vast majority of US ethanol production is consumed domestically, 
Brazil is the world’s leading exporter of ethanol by an extremely wide margin, 
                                                
614 Stulberg, A.N., Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s Energy Statecraft in 
Eurasia, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 56. 
615 Zarrilli, S., ‘Development of the Emerging Biofuels Market’, in Andreas Goldthau & Jan Martin 
Witte (eds.), Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institute Press, 2010), p. 77. See also: Johnson, F.X. & Virgin, I., ‘Future Trends in Biomass Resources 
for Food and Fuel’, in Rosillo-Calle, F. & Johnson, F.X. (eds.), Food versus Fuel: An Informed 
Introduction to Biofuels, (London: Zed Books, 2010), p. 186; and Carvalhal, C.M., Ethanol and the 
Latin American Great Game, Cambridge Energy Research Associates Decision Brief, April 2007, p. 2. 
616 Sullivan, M.P., C.R. Seelke & R.G. Rush, ‘Latin America: Energy Supply, Political Developments 
and U.S. Policy Approaches’, in Joanna E. Carlson (ed.), Latin America: Energy and Politics, (New 
York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), p. 6. 
617 Ravindranath, N.H., Manuvie, R. & Lakshmi, C.S., ‘Biofuels and Climate Change’, in Rosillo-
Calle, F. & Johnson, F.X. (eds.), Food versus Fuel: An Informed Introduction to Biofuels, (London: 
Zed Books, 2010), p. 142. Zarrilli, Op cit., p. 76. Roett, Op cit, p. 120. Spencer, Op cit., p. 8. 
Freemantle & Stevens, Op cit., p. 4.  
183 
 
consistently responsible for more than half of global ethanol exports to 63 different 
countries.618 
 Brazilian ethanol exports have grown relatively steadily since the start of the 
current century, and sugarcane producers as well as the government want this upward 
trend to continue. Petrobras estimates that world demand for biofuels in 2012 is 
around 5-6 per cent of all liquid fuels for transportation,619 but Brazil alone could 
potentially produce enough ethanol to substitute 10 per cent of world gasoline 
consumption by cultivating an additional 25 million hectares of sugarcane, mainly 
from low-productivity, degraded and pasture lands.620 However, Brazil needs 
substantial investments in order to expand both its production and export of ethanol 
significantly. Around 2006 and 2007, the Brazilian government and sugarcane 
industry had ambitious expansion plans for the production of ethanol, particularly 
exports. In September 2006, Silas Rondeau, Brazil’s Minister of Mines and Energy at 
the time, announced that the country expected to double its annual exports of ethanol 
to 4 billion litres by 2010.621 Half a year later, Luis Carlos Guedes Pinto, then the 
Agriculture Minister, said in an interview with Bloomberg that Brazil planned to 
double its ethanol production to roughly 34 billion litres while tripling its exports to 
around 10 billion litres by 2014, requiring US$13.4 billion in new investments to 
achieve that target.622 Meanwhile, the construction of 77 new ethanol plants were 
being planned up to 2012, while some of the 335 existing plants at the time were 
scheduled for upgrades or expansions.623 With such expectations of growth in the 
Brazilian ethanol sector, Petrobras announced its plan to build 1150km-long ethanol 
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pipeline from Brazil’s sugarcane producing regions to export terminals on the coast, 
with the capacity to increase ethanol exports significantly.624 
 Despite the Brazilian government’s rhetoric about vast ethanol production and 
export growth, the fact is that Brazilian ethanol exports stagnated in 2007, growing 
only 3 per cent from 2006. Though ethanol exports made an impressive 45 per cent 
leap in 2008 to 5.1 billion litres,625 the global financial crisis led to a cutback in 
production expansion plans while domestic demand kept rising, thus lowering 
expectations for future ethanol exports to increasingly modest levels. In September 
2008, the Energy Research Company (EPE), a research institution linked to the 
Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy, lowered the Ministry’s 2006 projection by 
half to 4.1 billion litres of ethanol exports in 2010, estimating that Brazil will only 
surpass the original 2006 projection of 8 billion litres in 2017, taking into account the 
priority given to domestic demand over export markets: 
 
In order to meet Brazilian ethanol consumption, EPE estimates that it will be 
necessary to build 246 new mills by 2017, adding an average of around 4.5 
billion liters to the market a year. This amount of projects represents a boost of 
60% over the 400 ethanol mills in operation registered by the Agriculture, 
Livestock and Supply Ministry (Mapa) in 2008. This prospect, however, is 
affected by the lack of credit in the market as a result of the economic slump in 
the US which has driven many projects around the world to a halt. … According 
to trade experts, the companies will be put on hold in 2009 and this should delay 
the forecasts for production expansion by at least five years.626 
 
But even with lowered expectations, Brazilian ethanol exports in 2009 fell below their 
2006 level and dropped even further to around 1.9 billion litres in the following two 
years.627 Making matters worse was a period of low ethanol inventories during the 
‘inter-harvest’ period – between late November 2010 and early April 2011 – as a 
result of poor management and planning, which not only crippled Brazil’s market 
share of global ethanol exports, but also forced Brazil to import ethanol from the 
United States for a brief period during the first semester of 2011, generating price 
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hikes and pessimistic views about the future of ethanol.628 So even if there were an 
open international market for ethanol unhindered by trade barriers, Brazil would not 
have produced enough ethanol for significant exports in 2011, a situation which could 
persist up to 2015, according to two experts.629 
 Meanwhile, US ethanol production has soared beyond domestic demand to 
exportable quantities. It was reported on 11 May 2011 that, in addition to meeting 
internal demand, the US exported 760 million litres of ethanol during the first quarter 
of 2011 alone, roughly the same figure as its total ethanol exports in 2010 and almost 
double its 2009 exports. According to the Renewable Fuel Association’s vice 
president of research and analysis, Geoff Cooper, ‘[a]rtificially constrained markets in 
the US and fears of instability in the policies that impact domestic ethanol production 
and use are forcing ethanol producers to seek other markets…until we eliminate 
artificial barriers to greater ethanol use domestically, export markets present real 
demand opportunities that our industry will continue to explore.’630 However, the US 
consumer market, the largest in the world, is likely to become a net importer when it 
exhausts its domestic capacity to produce ethanol made from corn, possibly around 
2015. ‘The great breakthrough [for Brazil] will come in 2015,’ says Plínio Nastari, a 
Brazilian agribusiness consultant, ‘when the United States could become ethanol 
purchasers.’631 Thus, its recent slump in ethanol exports notwithstanding, the long-
term perspectives for Brazil’s market share of the emerging international ethanol 
market are ‘excellent,’632 with optimistic projections by Ernst & Young, an 
accounting firm, that Brazilian exports could reach 17.4 billion litres in 2030,633 
provided the necessary investments are made in the sector. 
 Where biodiesel – as opposed to ethanol – is concerned, there is still very little 
being traded internationally. ‘Because of restrictive specifications and national 
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policies for biofuels around the world,’ write Kaltner et al, ‘the market for biodiesel 
exports remains rather dispersed, varied and impaired by various trade barriers.’634 
Within the embryonic biodiesel market, the European Union is the undisputed leader, 
collectively responsible for 56 per cent of the world’s production in 2009 (10 billion 
litres produced in the EU, out of 17.9 billion litres worldwide, with Germany alone 
responsible for 28 per cent of the EU’s total production, while the US produced 1.9 
billion litres and Brazil is estimated to have produced 1.6 billion litres in 2009).635  
Though this is still a modest amount – especially when compared to global 
consumption of so-called ‘middle distillates’ (which include jet and heating kerosene, 
as well as conventional diesel oil) of 1.75 trillion litres in 2009636 – Zarrilli reminds us 
that ‘the development of the [biodiesel] industry in several regions and ambitious 
government targets in several countries are expected to lead to more international 
[biodiesel] trade in the future…. Moreover, the need for a number of non-self-
sufficient countries to meet biofuels utilization mandates will also likely contribute to 
the expansion of international trade’, with annual global production of biodiesel 
potentially reaching 44 billion litres by 2018.637 Given the limited available land to 
expand biofuel production significantly in Europe, however, ‘Brazil faces an 
unprecedented opportunity to build market share on the European continent’,638 and is 
expected to surpass both US and EU biodiesel production by 2015.639 
 In sum, Brazil clearly has the potential to be among the world leaders of 
biofuels – both ethanol and biodiesel – in terms of market share. This is especially 
true for biofuel exports, or what is traded internationally between countries, as 
opposed to aggregate worldwide biofuel production, most of which is grown for 
domestic use. Theory suggests that a significant market share of biofuel exports – 
above 30 per cent according to Stulberg – will better enable Brazil’s energy statecraft 
to be effective. Achieving and maintaining such a leading global position in that 
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market, however, will require significant and sustained investments in the expansion 
of Brazil’s biofuel production capacity. 
 
3. Elasticity of Demand 
Theory dictates that economic – or more specifically in this case, energy – statecraft is 
more likely to succeed if it is implemented with a good that has low elasticity of 
demand. This is, in principle, true both in negative and positive statecraft: a target 
state is more likely to acquiesce to demands made in the face of threats to cut off 
supply of an inelastic good, as well as to bribes made with such a good. What is 
interesting about employing biofuels in energy statecraft, on the other hand, is that 
they are extremely elastic in their demand, so far. Petroleum is not, however, and the 
crucial advantage of biofuels in this respect is not their own elasticity, but their 
capacity to substitute – or at the very least complement – oil use, thereby diminishing 
the inelasticity of oil demand, and therefore increasing its force as a tool of energy 
statecraft. Hence, biofuels serve as an instrument of energy statecraft by manipulating 
the energy security of a target state in terms of enhancing that state’s energy security 
through the diversification of energy sources as an alternative to petroleum-derived 
fuels. 
 While there are many alternatives to petroleum in every sector except 
transportation – such as electricity generation, heating and manufacturing – 
approximately 95 per cent of the world’s transport fuels are derived from crude oil,640 
indicating highly inelastic demand for petroleum in the transportation sector. The only 
renewable energy source that can replace oil directly in the transportation sector in a 
sufficiently large scale are biofuels.641 But in order to substitute gasoline for biofuels, 
a fundamental ‘chicken and egg’ problem must first be overcome: ‘Consumers are 
afraid to buy cars that use a new fuel that may be difficult to find. Service station 
owners are not interested in investing in a parallel fuel distribution system since the 
number of potential users is usually very small.’642 This dilemma was experienced in 
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Brazil in the late 1980s and most of the 1990s, when ethanol supply could not meet 
demand and pure ethanol-driven car sales plummeted from more than 90 per cent in 
1989 to less than 1 per cent in 1996. This is a challenge faced by all countries 
considering a shift away from oil use, particularly in the transport sector. For, as 
Richard Lugar and James Woolsey remind us, ‘[t]he massive infrastructure developed 
to support gasoline-powered cars is particularly resistant to modifications. It precludes 
rapid change to alternative transportation systems.’643 
 Contrary to other potential alternatives to petroleum, however, biofuels have 
the advantage of being easily integrated within the vast distribution and storage 
infrastructure already in place for oil-derived fuels,644 including automotive engines, 
where concentrations of up to 10 per cent ethanol or 20 per cent biodiesel in gasoline 
and diesel motors, respectively, are imperceptible and do not require engine 
modifications.645 As the International Energy Agency has observed, biofuels ‘have the 
potential to leapfrog traditional barriers to entry because they are liquid fuels largely 
compatible with current vehicles and blendable with current fuels. In fact, low-
percentage ethanol blends, such as E10 (10% ethanol by volume), are already 
dispensed in many service stations worldwide, with almost no incompatibility with 
materials and equipment. Thus, biofuels could be used in today’s vehicles to reduce 
global petroleum consumption by 10% or more.’646 Brazil’s case clearly illustrates the 
possibility of reducing dependence on oil for transport: during the first thirty years of 
ProÁlcool, over one billion barrels of oil equivalent were saved by partially 
substituting gasoline with ethanol.647 
According to Antônio Carlos Mendes Thame, a Brazilian Congressman 
representing the sugarcane-growing region of São Paulo state, there are two basic 
ways to establish a biofuel market, both of which were initially implemented as part 
of the ProÁlcool programme: incentives and mandates. Incentives aim to manipulate 
the economic rewards of producing a certain good – including fiscal incentives, 
subsidies and higher taxation of competing goods – but are ultimately voluntary; no 
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one is forced to produce the goods in question. Mandates, on the other hand, are 
compulsory; if a predetermined amount of a good is not produced, the producer is 
fined. Though both measures were implemented at the outset of ProÁlcool, incentives 
were completely gone after thirteen years, but the compulsory mandate to blend up to 
25 per cent ethanol into gasoline has remained. Mendes Thame therefore attributes the 
establishment of a permanent and competitive ethanol market in Brazil, free of 
subsidies and other incentives, to these mandates.648 The same is true for the creation 
of biofuel programmes in other countries, where the implementation of compulsory 
biofuel blend mandates automatically generate a market for biofuels, writes Zarrilli: 
‘The mandatory use of certain amounts or percentages of biofuels in transportation 
fuels not only creates a market of a certain size but also ensures stability and 
predictability for new investments. It also helps ensure the growth of the biofuels 
sector, sets demand ahead of supply, and induces investments to close the gap.’649 
Thus, in realising the potential advantages of biofuels – be they economic, 
environmental, social or even political – several countries are seeking to develop 
significant domestic markets for biofuels through blending mandates, effectively 
guaranteeing a considerable amount of future demand.650 According to one analyst, 
the world witnessed a proliferation of biofuel production targets around 2006, and at 
least 64 countries had adopted national biofuel mandates or targets by 2007.651 
 The bulk of biofuel mandates comes from the European Union, where the 
goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on imported petroleum 
have led to the Biofuel Directive (2003/30/EC), mandating that all transport fuels 
should include a minimum biofuel blend of 2 per cent by the end of 2005 and 5.75 per 
cent by the end of 2010 in all 27 EU member states.652 The 5.75 per cent blend 
mandate alone represents an impressive demand of 14 billion litres of biofuels a 
year.653 But in 2009 the EU went even further, repealing the previous directive with a 
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new Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC), mandating that 20 per cent of all 
energy consumed in the EU should derive from renewable sources, including a 
minimum of 10 per cent of transportation fuels,654 targets which are well beyond the 
European agricultural sector’s capacity.655 In addition to the EU, the most important 
countries whose blend mandates will drive global demand for biofuels are the United 
States, China with 10 per cent by 2020, Brazil, which has a varying blend mandate 
between 18 and 25 per cent for ethanol in gasoline and 5 per cent biodiesel in regular 
diesel oil, and India, which mandates a 20 per cent ethanol blend by 2017.656  
 In the United States, the first major boost in domestic ethanol production came 
with the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which not only bans the use of methyl tertiary-
butyl ether (MTBE), thus forcing ethanol’s major competitor as an additive to 
gasoline off the market, but also mandates a Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) of 7.5 
billion gallons (29 billion litres) of ethanol to be blended in gasoline by 2012.657 Six 
billion gallons (22.7 billion litres) of ethanol are required each year merely to replace 
MTBE as an additive to gasoline, which is being phased out because of its polluting 
effects on ground water.658 However, the US government set much more ambitious 
targets two years later in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which 
raised the RFS to 9 billion gallons (34 billion litres) in 2008 (up from 4.7 billion 
gallons, or 17.8 billion litres, in 2007), with a phased increase to 36 billion gallons 
(136 billion litres) of ethanol blended into gasoline by 2022, of which 21 billion 
gallons (79.5 billion litres) must be ‘advanced biofuels’ derived from feedstocks other 
than corn starch, such as sugar or cellulose.659 According to Daniel Yergin, the 2022 
target is equivalent to around 20 per cent of all motor fuel in the United States, or the 
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annual oil production of Venezuela or Nigeria.660 The difficulty with this target is that 
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) only allows blends of up to 10 per 
cent ethanol, because more might corrode the internal surface of engines’ fuel rails. 
But as the American ethanol industry is nearing the ‘blend wall’, when its production 
meets the demand for the maximum 10 per cent ethanol blend in gasoline, thus 
generating surplus for export, the industry is lobbying the EPA to raise the cap to 15 
per cent, even though only 3 per cent of American automobiles are designed to run on 
fuels containing more than 10 per cent of ethanol.661 The most obvious way to remedy 
this situation, according to a study by the Worldwatch Institute, is to introduce flex-
fuel vehicles to the market on a large scale: 
 
Ethanol use can increase to 10 per cent of non-diesel fuel, possibly more, with 
minimal changes to current car fleet or infrastructure; biodiesel blends can be 
higher. To go beyond this, however, governments need to address the ‘chicken 
or the egg’ dilemma: vehicles are needed that can run on high blends of 
biofuels; but consumers will not buy them without a distribution system that 
ensures access to these fuels. Such a distribution system is not likely to develop 
without the vehicles to demand/use it. This dilemma can be resolved with 
technologies such as flexible-fuel vehicles (FFVs).662 
 
Therefore, in order for the US to consume the 36 billion gallons of ethanol mandated 
by the Energy Independence and Security Act, ‘massive investment in flex fuel 
technologies and infrastructure to increase the capability of cars to run on higher 
ethanol percentages and expand the supplemental distribution of ethanol’ are 
necessary663 – a proposition that holds true for all countries with ambitious biofuel 
mandates. 
The technology known as ‘flex-fuel’ (flexible fuel) arose from research 
developed in the US, Europe and Japan during the end of the 1980s, in search of a 
solution to the problems generated by the uncertainty of international oil prices, 
whose volatility and periodic spikes are economically detrimental to all oil-importing 
nations.664 Its introduction in the Brazilian automotive market in 2003 was a 
promising development in the country’s ethanol market, which had been debilitated 
by the gradual phase-out of pure ethanol-run cars. Engines powered only by ethanol 
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depended on the permanent availability of ethanol at the pump and at prices 
competitive with gasoline, which, given the fluctuations in the prices of oil and sugar, 
could not be guaranteed. By introducing FFVs, the choice of fuel was transferred 
from the automobile industry to the consumer, thus revolutionising fuel use in Brazil 
by ‘democratising’ the choice of fuel in favour of the consumer, forever ‘banishing 
the ghost of ethanol scarcity’ and potentially even gasoline shortages, should they 
happen.665  
Advocates of flex-fuel technology list several advantages of its adoption. They 
argue that for consumers, the security of fuel supply engendered by the possibility of 
fuel choice at the pump is highly attractive, despite Brazil already having a wide 
ethanol distribution infrastructure in place. It is also attractive for ethanol producers, 
who are afforded greater flexibility in determining whether their sugarcane crops are 
turned into ethanol fuel or refined sugar, depending on harvest yields and 
international sugar prices. Car manufacturers also benefit, saving money by not 
having to build duplicate models running on either gasoline or pure ethanol.666 
Beyond Brazil, where biofuel markets are not as well-established, they argue that 
introducing FFVs, in addition to mandatory blends, will stimulate the expansion of 
ethanol production while bridging the gap between today’s biofuels grown from 
agricultural feedstocks to the advanced biofuels of the future, such as cellulosic (or 
‘second-generation’) ethanol.667 Moreover, FFVs allow countries that adopt them to 
use whatever fuel is available domestically, be it gasoline or ethanol, until a national 
biofuel market is properly consolidated.668 
Early surveys conducted with new FFV owners indicate that their choice of 
fuel at the pump is defined primarily by the relative price of the fuel, although some 
consumers deliberately choose ethanol over gasoline due to environmental 
concerns.669 The liberty of fuel choice notwithstanding, flex-fuel engines seem to 
offer no disadvantage in performance vis-à-vis regular ones: 
 
The surveys carried out with Brazilian owners of flex fuel vehicles show that 
they are satisfied with the performance, power and automatic regulation of 
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engines. Most of them have stated that “in the beginning, many different 
mixtures of alcohol and gasoline are tested, however, it makes almost no 
difference for the power of the engine, which is easily adapted to the fuel used. 
Therefore, the best alternative is the chance to fill the tank with the cheapest 
fuel per kilometre driven.” All of the users interviewed stated that they would 
buy a flex fuel vehicle again.670 
 
And since no other alternative energy technology is available on a viably large 
commercial scale in the automotive industry – such as hydrogen fuel cells or electric 
cars that perform as well as those with combustion engines – it is safe to assume that 
FFVs are the most practical option to reduce oil dependence in the transportation 
sector in the short- to medium-term.671 
To quote Daniel Yergin, ‘[t]o say that flex-fuel vehicles “caught on” [in 
Brazil] would be an understatement.’ In 2003, when they were first launched, only 
40,000 FFVs were sold in Brazil,672 comprising merely 4 per cent of new car sales 
that year. In 2004, this share skyrocketed to 22 per cent, 50 per cent in 2005, 78 per 
cent in 2006, over 2 million new FFVs sold in 2007 representing 86 per cent of all 
new car sales, 87 per cent in 2008 with over 2.3 million units sold,673 94 per cent by 
August 2009 and a total of more than ten million FFVs on the road by March 2010674 
(roughly one third of the entire national car fleet), while the Brazilian Sugarcane 
Industry Association estimates that FFVs will make up as much as 50 per cent of 
Brazil’s automotive vehicle fleet in 2012 and 65 per cent by 2015.675 ‘The rate at 
which this technology has been adopted is remarkable,’ said Barry Eagle, president of 
Ford do Brasil in 2006, ‘the fastest I have ever seen in the motor sector, faster even 
than the airbag, automatic transmission, or electric windows’.676 In the words of 
another observer, ‘no one, not even the most ardent advocates of ethanol and biofuel-
run engines, would have dared imagine that flex-fuel vehicles would, over a very 
short period of less than five years, mean the end of the era of cars fuelled only by 
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gasoline [in Brazil].’677 Yet the rest of the world still has a long way to go in terms of 
adopting flex-fuel technology in automobile manufacture. In June 2009, there were 
over 16.4 million FFVs in circulation worldwide: 8 million in the US, 7.5 million in 
Brazil, 600 thousand in Canada, 300 thousand in Sweden and a few thousand spread 
over other countries like France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Thailand.678 
 The fact that Brazil is at the vanguard of flex-fuel technology represents, in 
principle, an additional motivation behind the country’s goal of commoditising 
ethanol, in hopes of gaining new export markets for FFVs. Indeed, the increasing use 
of biofuels in other countries provides an opportunity for Brazilian automobile 
manufacturers to expand their FFV production beyond domestic demand. However, 
Brazilian FFV exports have been limited due to a lack of ethanol fuel and distribution 
infrastructure in potential export markets. In an attempt to remedy this situation, in 
2008 the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP) joined up with the 
Brazilian Automotive Industry Association (ANFAVEA) and Brazil’s Sugarcane 
Industry Association (UNICA) in a campaign to promote FFV exports, even to 
countries where they would only run on gasoline for lack of a local ethanol market. 
This partnership’s goal, writes Maffeis Neto, was to popularise FFVs with the view 
that ‘demand always precedes supply’ – in other words, the existence of an FFV fleet 
could subsequently lead to ethanol production, or at least to ethanol imports when oil 
prices rise excessively. However, even though Brazil’s Foreign Ministry set up its 
own Energy Department, provisions to incentivise FFV sales are not included in trade 
agreements for the adoption of compensation mechanisms in automotive trade with 
other countries – an oversight that FIESP considers a ‘failure,’679 since increased FFV 
and ethanol use abroad would not only further stimulate demand for Brazilian ethanol, 
which the country has the long-term capacity to meet, but would also go a long way 
towards commoditising ethanol globally. 
 Nevertheless, the commoditisation of ethanol depends less on the adoption of 
FFVs than on the implementation of biofuel blend mandates worldwide. While flex-
fuel technology increases the elasticity of demand for both ethanol and oil, 
compulsory blend mandates make the demand for ethanol decidedly inelastic by 
generating a fixed and mandatory demand for it. Given the considerably limited 
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market share of ethanol compared to petroleum, however, biofuels are extremely 
unlikely ever fully to substitute oil and the relatively inelastic demand for it. But 
ethanol and other biofuels can, in fact, become a permanent complement to the energy 
supply in the transportation sector by substituting harmful additives to gasoline such 
as MTBE. Once ethanol becomes an established additive to gasoline through 
compulsory blend mandates in most countries, it will effectively turn into a global 
commodity680 with entrenched (and less elastic) demand for it. But ultimately, 
biofuels’ advantage as an instrument of energy statecraft lies not in their potential 
inelasticity of demand – even if only as an additive to gasoline – but in its capacity to 
diminish the inelasticity of oil. 
 
4. Government Control of Commercial Actors and Public-Private Partnerships 
As mentioned in previous chapters, William Norris puts forward the notion that 
economic statecraft is unlikely to be very effective unless the sender state’s 
government has a large degree of control or influence over the specific private 
commercial actors that actually implement the measures stipulated by the economic 
statecraft of that sender state. This is particularly the case with energy statecraft, 
where most states able to pursue it as part of their foreign policies tend to have 
national energy companies firmly in the government’s control, such as Russia’s 
Gazprom or the national oil companies of most OPEC member states. However, while 
Brazil does have a national energy giant in Petrobras, its biofuels sector is entirely 
private, and therefore requires a significant level of public-private cooperation 
effectively to implement energy statecraft using ethanol and other biofuels. Since the 
success of biofuels as an instrument of energy statecraft hinges on the creation of an 
international biofuels market – unlike ‘traditional’ energy statecraft, where there are 
established markets and consumer dependence on oil and gas – the private 
commercial actors that carry out the technology transfer that helps build such a 
market become of paramount importance to Brazil’s energy statecraft strategy of 
promoting biofuels abroad.  
 According to an extensive study on biofuels by the Worldwatch Institute, 
bilateral and multilateral governmental agreements play a crucial role in the 
promotion of biofuels through technology transfer. Notwithstanding governments’ 
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vital role in this transfer, the study states that in practice the actual flow of biofuel 
technology is executed by the private sector:681 
 
The process of transferring biofuel technology and expertise can be understood 
as a process of managing technological change. It involves the flows of 
knowledge, experience and equipment among different stakeholders, including 
governments, private-sector entities, financial institutions, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), research and educational institutions and labour unions. 
It encompasses technological cooperation and the diffusion of technologies both 
within countries, as well as between them. And it involves the process of 
learning to understand, utilize and replicate existing biofuel technologies – 
including the capacity to select and adapt them for local conditions and even to 
sell them back to the original source as improved technologies. … 
Technology flows are also influenced by government policies and by financial 
aid and development programmes. The rate of such flows is affected by the 
motivations of the relevant stakeholders and by the barriers that impede them – 
both of which are influenced by government policies, including environmental 
and climate change policies. 
 Most technology flows occur in, or are driven by, the private sector (between 
commercial parties), although they can also involve the government or 
community.682 
 
 Mendes Thame reminds us that the fact that the Brazilian government detains 
the technology for agricultural production of biofuels while Embrapa holds the 
scientific knowledge behind it, could theoretically allow free technology transfer to 
other countries. However, the industrial sector, which actually operates the production 
of biofuels once the technology and knowledge are in place, does not belong to the 
government; it belongs to private enterprise,683 which encompasses the actors that 
carry out the government’s energy statecraft in practice. In line with this reality, the 
aforementioned Worldwatch Institute study then goes on to suggest that one way that 
‘Brazil (and other biofuel leaders) can stimulate biofuel technology transfer abroad is 
through bilateral technological cooperation, supported by government diplomacy and 
implemented by the private sector.’684 This formula of public-private partnership is at 
the heart of Brazil’s energy statecraft, as vouched for by Lula’s Foreign Minister, 
Celso Amorim, who states that the Brazilian government’s initiatives to promote 
ethanol and biodiesel in third countries are aided by the dynamism and 
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competitiveness of Brazilian entrepreneurs.685 Indeed, it will not be possible to 
maintain Brazil’s international leadership in biofuels unless the interests of the 
Brazilian state are aligned with those of its private agribusiness sector, according to 
Arnaldo Jardim, a Brazilian Congressman.686  
 In a sector as complex as biofuels – which overlaps the energy, agricultural 
and industrial sectors, as well as advanced technologies and scientific research and 
development – it is no surprise that several different commercial actors are involved 
in the Brazilian government’s promotion of biofuels to third countries, including 
several ministries (e.g., Foreign, Energy, Agriculture, Trade) as well as NGOs and the 
private sector. According to a senior Brazilian Foreign Ministry official, the two 
actors that have had the greatest responsibility and influence in the government’s 
overall strategy of ethanol dissemination across the world are the Foreign Ministry 
and UNICA, the Sugarcane Industry Association. UNICA, which represents the 
interests of the major sugarcane producers in Brazil, mostly in the state of São Paulo, 
has offices in Washington, D.C. and Brussels, where, along with Brazil’s Embassies 
there, it is very active in lobbying the US Congress and the European Commission, 
respectively, to drop import tariffs on ethanol and any other form of protectionism 
that serves as an impediment for the creation of an international market for ethanol.687 
UNICA’s representation in Brussels is particularly focused on issues surrounding the 
environmental sustainability of ethanol production, such as participating in 
roundtables and debates on certification and standardisation of ethanol fuel as a 
product, which will be a significant step towards its commercialisation.688 Both of 
these activities are in line with the Brazilian government’s goals and strategies 
pursued in the international promotion of biofuels, as President Lula has advised in a 
speech: ‘we will have to arrive [in other countries] speaking a single discourse on 
ethanol; there is not a discourse by UNICA and one by another group, there is not a 
discourse by the Government and one by UNICA. We will have to arrive there 
speaking a single language, a single discourse’689 – implying the need for Brazilian 
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non-governmental commercial actors, such as UNICA, to align their public views on 
biofuels with the government’s, if Brazil’s energy statecraft is to be effective. Taking 
this into consideration, it is advantageous for Brazil’s energy statecraft that UNICA 
shares the government’s principal goal in that endeavour: 
 
One of the main objectives of UNICA is promoting Brazilian ethanol abroad. 
To this end, UNICA formed a partnership with APEX-Brasil, the Brazilian trade 
and investment promotion agency [in December 2007]. The project started in 
January of 2008 and targets the markets of North America, Europe and the 
South and East of Asia. 
 UNICA formed a partnership with APEX-Brasil to establish ethanol as a 
global energy commodity. The agreement contemplates shared funding of 
around R$16.45 million through the end of 2009 [revised to a total of R$18.75 
million by the end of that period690] to promote Brazilian ethanol as a clean and 
renewable fuel around the world. 
 Among the activities foreseen under this agreement are improving the ethanol 
supply structure, commercial intelligence studies and projects to promote 
ethanol in high-impact events like fairs and seminars, and work to enhance the 
image of ethanol via a public relations effort aimed at key opinion makers 
around the world. 
 In addition to having direct benefits for UNICA members and other areas of 
the sugar-energy sector, this project will benefit the sugarcane ethanol supply 
chain, which includes biotechnology research for new strains of sugarcane, 
suppliers of inputs and equipment, rural producers, trading companies, logistical 
structure and service providers.691 
 
The UNICA partnership with APEX-Brasil has been fundamentally important for 
Brazil’s inclusion in international biofuel debates, and was renewed in 2010 to 
continue the activities listed above to promote the adoption of biofuels worldwide and 
increased exports of Brazilian ethanol,692 aiming to stimulate the demand side of 
ethanol’s commoditisation. 
 In addition, Brazilian government agencies are also involved in incentivising 
the supply side of ethanol commoditisation through public-private partnerships. The 
Brazilian strategy to spread the production of biofuels has given particular attention to 
the African continent, where this endeavour has been spearheaded by Embrapa, the 
government-linked Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, which opened a 
representative office in Accra, Ghana, inaugurated by President Lula himself during 
an official visit in April 2008: ‘In Africa, Embrapa focuses on technology transfer, 
knowledge diffusion, agricultural and socio-economic development, environmental 
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sustainability and food, fibre and energy security. … The office in Ghana coordinates 
the agencies’ efforts on the continent, as well as acting as an agent in facilitating 
linkages between financial organisations and Brazilian companies and African 
governments and continuing to accelerate the shift towards biofuels across the 
continent.’693 As a result, several Brazilian companies are getting financial support 
and other incentives from Brazilian government agencies taking part in promoting 
bilateral and multilateral biofuel cooperation, in order to sell and transfer biofuel 
technologies abroad.694 The synergy between Brazilian government agencies, such as 
BNDES and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC, Brazil’s equivalent of USAID 
in America), and the country’s private sector in promoting the development of biofuel 
technology transfer in Africa has been notable.695  
 The commercial actor over which the Brazilian government holds most 
control, however, is the national oil and gas company, Petrobras, which also plays an 
important role in the government’s energy statecraft. Sérgio Gabrielli, the former 
CEO of Petrobras during most of the Lula administration, has written that in view of 
the prospects of global growth in the biofuel sector, Petrobras seeks to become not 
only an oil and gas company, but an energy company more broadly, by taking on a 
strategic role in developing the necessary infrastructure and logistics for increased 
ethanol exports. Improving the transport infrastructure to deliver ethanol from 
producers to the market is a fundamental step to help create an international ethanol 
market with a large share of Brazilian exports. To that end, Petrobras has formed 
partnerships with private companies to build an ethanol pipeline linking Brazil’s 
ethanol producing regions to export terminals on the coast, with a projected annual 
capacity of 8 billion litres. Gabrielli makes clear, however, that Petrobras does not 
intend to participate in ethanol production for domestic consumption, but invests in 
export capacity in order to contribute to increase the Brazilian private sector’s 
capacity to supply future ethanol demand from around the world, by investing in 
infrastructure while at the same time increasing the national energy company’s 
participation in ethanol exports.696 A study by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency views this strategy as necessary to achieve Brazil’s goal of expanding its 
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market share of ethanol exports worldwide, but also ultimately dependent on the 
private actors in the Brazilian sugarcane sector increasing production: 
 
The application of this export oriented strategy would necessitate expanding 
ethanol production capacity in Brazil…. However, this strategy can only be 
implemented if…additional ethanol supply is reliable and long term contracts 
are negotiated. Given that sugar cane yields, and hence ethanol production, vary 
from year to year, an ethanol storage system would be needed in conjunction 
with ethanol exportation under long term contracts. This is the reason why some 
specialists argue that Petrobras should participate in this programme, both 
through its fuel storage system and through its fuel trade divisions. For instance, 
Petrobras oil pipelines already transport ethanol from the major areas of sugar 
cane production (São Paulo State) to possible locations of ethanol shipping (Rio 
de Janeiro and Santos harbours), and Petrobras exports petroleum or petrol 
products to several markets, including Africa, Southeast Asia and the United 
States of America.697 
 
In an effort to solidify this strategy, the Brazilian government, aware that the 
country’s biofuel sector lacked regulation, decided through a presidential degree by 
Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, to consider ethanol a strategic fuel rather than an 
agricultural product. With this new measure, ethanol is now being regulated by the 
National Petroleum Agency (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, or ANP, the 
government’s regulator of the fuel market). ‘But the government didn’t adopt this 
measure thinking of our international projection,’ says a senior Brazilian Foreign 
Ministry official, ‘but because of our internal needs. But the measure does have an 
influence in our actions abroad’.698 This new measure will regulate the entire 
productive chain of ethanol and other biofuels and will frame the biofuel industry 
within the same legal regime defined by Brazil’s Constitution for the oil industry. The 
National Petroleum Agency is now responsible for the regulation of ethanol 
production, creating stocks and inventories, distribution, as well as determining the 
amounts reserved for exports or imports. According to one source, this governmental 
intervention into the private sector has a clear political objective: to favour Petrobras’ 
plan to become an important global player in the fledgling international ethanol 
market.699 It is interesting to observe that the reach and limits of the government’s 
actions in the expansion of the Brazilian ethanol sector are still being defined in 
practice. Roberto Rodrigues, the former Minister of Agriculture during part of the 
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Lula administration, advocates greater government intervention and even the creation 
of a National Energy Secretariat, with the goal of attributing strategic treatment to the 
sector, which it lacks today, in his opinion.  Without such strategic coordination for 
the sector – which, according to Rodrigues, only the government can offer – it will be 
impossible to turn ethanol into an international commodity. Perhaps the recent 
creation of a specific biofuel company, led by Petrobras, could be a response to this 
sort of preoccupation. It is noteworthy that without an articulated governance 
structure, Brazil’s strategic objectives for its biofuel sector will find themselves under 
threat, according to one observer.700 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The hypothesis raised by this study states that if the four variables identified in the 
conceptual literature, listed above, are favourable, energy statecraft should be more 
likely to succeed. First, the formulation of Brazil’s foreign policy goals in its 
implementation of energy statecraft using biofuels has focused on two key objectives: 
the creation of an international market for biofuels where ethanol is freely traded as a 
commodity, and the significant increase of Brazilian ethanol exports therein. While 
ambitious, this first objective – namely the commoditization of ethanol and possibly 
other biofuels as well – is attainable in the longer term, but is ultimately dependent on 
actions taken by several other actors. This is why the Brazilian initiative during the 
Lula administration to encourage and assist other countries to produce their own 
biofuels – both for their own domestic consumption as well as for export – is such an 
important aspect of the overall strategy pursued to achieve the goals pursued in 
Brazil’s energy statecraft. The second objective in Brazil’s formulation of its foreign 
policy goals sought through energy statecraft is directly linked to the second 
conditional variable identified in the literature, namely increasing Brazil’s market 
share of global biofuel production, particularly where exports are concerned. In this 
respect, Brazil started from a comfortable position of being the world’s top ethanol 
producer, but was quickly overtaken by US production. In what relatively little 
ethanol is traded internationally, however, Brazil does hold a comfortable leading 
position. But as global demand for ethanol and other biofuels keeps growing, Brazil 
will need to invest heavily in expanding its biofuel production capacity – not only to 
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supply its growing domestic demand, but also to produce increasing amounts for 
export – if it is to maintain its position as the world’s foremost exporter of ethanol 
fuel.  
Third, theory suggests that in order to be an effective instrument of energy 
statecraft, the energy resource employed should have low elasticity of demand. 
Biofuels, however, are extremely elastic and countries that use them are not 
dependent on its imports, especially when compared to petroleum use worldwide, 
which is particularly inelastic in the transportation sector. The elasticity of demand for 
biofuels nevertheless decreases as more countries implement policies that mandate a 
compulsory blend of biofuels as an additive to traditional fossil fuels, thus increasing 
their efficacy as an instrument of energy statecraft. Interestingly, though, it is 
precisely the inelasticity of biofuels and their capacity to complement fossil fuels as 
additives, thereby reducing import dependence on the latter, which makes biofuels an 
attractive alternative fuel. Moreover, the introduction of flex-fuel technology in the 
automobile industry addresses the elasticity problem raised by petroleum-based 
gasoline use by allowing consumers freely to choose their fuel at the pump, rather 
than being restricted to a single fuel source for their cars. This increases the elasticity 
of ethanol, too, but in doing so counteracts the inelasticity of oil dependence. In that 
sense, the efficacy of biofuels as an instrument of energy statecraft lies more in its 
ability to enhance a target state’s energy security vis-à-vis petroleum imports in the 
form of positive statecraft, rather than as a potential punitive measure exploiting a 
target state’s import dependence on an inelastic good, as would be the case in 
negative statecraft.  
Lastly, Norris suggests that in addition to the three conditional variables 
delineated above, effective economic statecraft depends also on degree of control or 
influence the sender state has over the private commercial actors that actually 
implement the political measures dictated by the state when formulating its energy 
statecraft. In that regard, while the Brazilian state does control its national oil 
company, Petrobras, it is largely the country’s private sector that is responsible for the 
production and commercialisation of biofuels. Carrying out the Brazilian 
government’s energy statecraft strategy of commoditizing ethanol and increasing 
Brazil’s market share of ethanol exports worldwide therefore requires a large degree 
of cooperation between the government and private companies, as well as establishing 
lasting public-private partnerships. In Brazil’s case, the interests of private ethanol 
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producers have been convergent with the government’s, while both have often acted 
in partnership in promoting increased biofuel use abroad. The Brazilian government’s 
recent intervention in the country’s biofuel sector, reclassifying ethanol as a strategic 
energy source rather than as an agricultural product (as it used to be classified) and 
regulating it with the National Petroleum Agency under the same rules for fossil fuels, 
has also been instrumental to the objective of increasing Brazil’s ethanol exports 
abroad. 
However, a major common theme that runs through these four variables – on 
which, in theory, effective energy statecraft is conditioned – is the still embryonic 
existence of an international market for biofuels, and the goal to create one. Without a 
fully developed and established global biofuel market, energy statecraft using biofuels 
cannot be employed in a similar manner to more ‘traditional’ energy statecraft 
utilizing oil and natural gas – either as a stick (negative) or a carrot (positive). Instead, 
the instrumentality of biofuels as a form of energy statecraft lies not on its inelasticity 
and market share dependence, but precisely in its ability to decrease the energy 
security threats posed by the dependence on other, more traditional energy sources. 
As such, energy statecraft using biofuels still manipulates the energy security of 
another state to achieve the sender state’s political goals – in accordance with the 
definition of ‘energy statecraft’ used herein – but in a more positive manner, 
enhancing the target state’s energy security, rather than increasing its reliance on 
energy import dependence. Thus, the goal of creating a global market where ethanol 
and other biofuels are traded as commodities is a significant step towards enhancing 
the energy security of many countries, which is a crucial objective of Brazil’s energy 
statecraft through the use of biofuels. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
The present study began by acknowledging the relative scarcity of scholarly research 
on economic instruments of foreign policy (i.e., ‘economic statecraft’) in general and 
on positive economic statecraft in particular, and has sought to make a contribution to 
the literature on these general subjects. More specifically, this study focused its 
research on a particular subset of economic statecraft, namely energy statecraft – in 
other words the use of energy resources as a particular and unique type of economic 
foreign policy instrument – the academic scrutiny of which is fairly new to 
International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. What comparatively little has 
been published so far on energy statecraft, like economic statecraft, has tended to 
focus on the negative uses thereof, in detriment of studies on positive energy 
statecraft. Moreover, these studies have almost exclusively examined petroleum and 
natural gas as instruments of foreign policy. Conversely, scholarly inquiry on the use 
of biofuels as instruments of a state’s energy statecraft were completely unheard of at 
the time the research for this thesis began. Thus, the goal of this study has been to 
examine the use of biofuels as an instrument of a state’s foreign policy. 
 To inform this analysis, this study reviewed the literature on economic 
statecraft and adopted a ‘conditionalist’ approach to it. This school of thought 
stipulates that the right question to ask is not if economic statecraft works, but when 
and under what conditions it is likely to be effective. Within the conditionalist 
literature on economic statecraft, four conditional variables that determine the 
efficacy of economic statecraft were identified: 1) the commensurability between the 
means and ends sought in foreign policy; 2) the magnitude of an economic 
interaction; 3) the price elasticity of an economic good; and 4) the degree of control a 
government has over the commercial actors that carry out its economic statecraft in 
practice. These four conditional variables were adapted to the particular 
characteristics of energy resources – i.e., the specific economic goods used in energy 
statecraft – in order to form a theoretical framework in which to test this study’s main 
hypothesis: namely, if all four conditional variables are favourable, energy statecraft 
is more likely to be successful. Moreover, a further subcategory of the conditionalist 
economic statecraft literature – the international conditionalist (as opposed to 
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domestic conditionalist) approach – finds that the international context in which 
economic statecraft takes place also plays a role in determining its efficacy. A chapter 
on the international energy security context of the past decade was therefore included 
to explain how opportunities have surfaced in recent times for energy statecraft in 
general and energy statecraft using biofuels in particular. Since the focus of this study 
was on biofuels, rather than other energy resources (like oil and gas), only one case 
study was available, in terms of a country using its native biofuels as an instrument of 
its foreign policy: Brazil. Thus, this study made use of the Brazilian case to test its 
hypothesis, which sought to answer the question of whether Brazil’s energy statecraft 
using biofuels has been successful. 
 Adopting biofuels as part of a country’s energy mix brings several benefits in 
terms of the four elements of energy security listed in Chapter 3: availability, 
reliability, affordability and sustainability. Biofuels have the potential not only to 
substitute, or at least complement, increasingly unavailable petroleum, but there is 
significant land available around the world on which to grow more crops for biofuel 
production. They also enhance the energy security of countries that consume them by 
decreasing dependence on costly (if not unaffordable) oil imports from few, unreliable 
suppliers. Lastly, biofuels help reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which is needed to 
mitigate the harmful effects of climate change. However, these benefits will only 
reach their full potential if a well-structured international market for biofuels is 
created, writes Antônio Simões, a Brazilian Ambassador. In order to develop such a 
market, it is necessary to increase the number of biofuel-producing countries, 
establish common standards and norms for biofuels, expand the consumption of 
biofuels to as many countries as possible, and trade biofuels through mercantile 
exchanges and futures markets – all of which comprise the Brazilian government’s 
goal of turning ethanol (the world’s most widely used biofuel) into a commodity.701 
To that end, the Brazilian government has developed several strategies in the pursuit 
of its goals, which have been evaluated in this thesis’ case-study chapter. As indicated 
in that chapter, global biofuel production, particularly of ethanol, has indeed 
skyrocketed over the past decade, suggesting, in principle, that the strategies pursued 
under Brazil’s energy statecraft have been successful. 
                                                
701 Simões, A.J.F., ‘Biocombustíveis: A Experiência Brasileira e o Desafio da Consolidação do 
Mercado Internacional’, in Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Biocombustíveis no Brasil: Realidades 
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The empirical work conducted for this study raises an important question for 
further research: namely, whether the increasing use of biofuels (both in terms of 
production and consumption) worldwide is the result of Brazil’s energy statecraft, or 
whether it has been mostly driven by domestic initiatives like compulsory biofuel 
blend mandates. In other words, is it the international energy security context, rather 
than Brazilian pressure and influence, that is driving the commoditization of ethanol 
and other biofuels? Ultimately, this question can only be answered empirically, by 
comparing the international agreements on biofuel production and technology transfer 
et cetera signed by Brazil and its target states with data on biofuel production in these 
countries after these agreements have been signed. And even then, it is difficult to 
determine whether increased biofuel production (if any) in these countries has been 
directly a result of Brazilian influence or whether recent initiatives to adopt biofuel 
programmes in several countries have been domestically driven by the pressures of 
the international energy security context. In other words, did Brazil’s energy statecraft 
really manage to get other countries to do what they would otherwise not have done? 
This is, of course, an empirical problem shared by all academic studies on foreign 
policy initiatives relying on soft power, in which a country gets others to want what it 
wants – as opposed to bribing or coercing them to do so (hard power) – so that target 
states do what the sender state wants through their own initiative. These questions and 
empirical problems need to be addressed in future studies, the groundwork for which 
the present thesis has attempted to provide. 
In the meantime, the international energy security context remains, by itself, 
an important driver of ethanol’s commoditization, a process which Brazil’s former 
President Lula believes is ‘irreversible.’702 The Brazilian Congressman Antônio 
Carlos de Mendes Thame703 lists six positive externalities of biofuel production that 
address some of the threats posed to energy security by the current international 
context. The first is a macroeconomic externality: every barrel of ethanol produced is 
one less barrel of oil that is imported, or an additional barrel that can be profitably 
exported (depending on whether a country is a net oil importer or exporter). The 
second externality affects public health by permanently eliminating any toxic additive 
to gasoline, such as MTBE and ETBE, while also allowing the substitution of diesel 
                                                
702 Lula da Silva, L.I., ‘“Café com o Presidente” – Programa com o Presidente da República, Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, em 12 de março de 2007’, in Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Resenha de 
Política Externa: 1º Semestre de 2007, (Brasília: FUNAG, 2007), p. 565. 
703 Interviewed in Brasília, Brazil, 22 June 2011. 
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fuel use in buses and trucks, which is highly polluting and damaging to public health, 
particularly in metropolitan areas. The third and fourth externalities are 
environmental: biofuels emit less carbon dioxide and also further enhance the 
availability aspect of energy security through the cogeneration of clean energy by 
turning biofuel feedstock residues into electricity or even more biofuels (breaking 
down plants’ lignocellulose, in addition to their starch). The fifth externality is 
geopolitical in that it enhances the reliability aspect of energy security by diminishing 
dependence on oil imports from politically unstable Middle Eastern countries. The 
last externality is job creation in Brazil and all other countries that produce biofuels. 
Given the current global energy security context, these externalities serve as strong 
incentives to spread and increase the production of biofuels worldwide.  
Among the many advantages to energy security brought on by biofuels, one of 
the most publicised is the diversification they bring to liquid fuel supply. It has been 
widely debated whether the goal of liquid fuel diversification is best achieved by 
incentivising biofuel production for export in tropical countries whose climactic 
conditions are most suited for their cultivation, thus replicating the centralised market 
control that oil companies display in the international petroleum market, or by 
producing biofuels domestically exclusively to meet local demand.704 So far, biofuel 
production worldwide has been spurred predominantly by domestic policies that 
support indigenous biofuels at the expense of imports from countries better suited for 
biofuel production, only opening their markets to imports when demand outruns local 
supply. Such domestically-oriented policies, however, severely limit the expansion of 
a truly global market for biofuels, delaying the Brazilian government’s goal of 
commoditising ethanol by years, if not decades.705 This situation is exacerbated by the 
fact that the world’s most important demand centres, the United States and the 
European Union, protect their markets with tariff and non-tariff barriers: 
 
Seeing its ethanol exports blocked by the United States and Europe, Brazil is 
learning that energy security and climate change were only a part of the reason 
countries looked to biofuels. Certainly, these arguments were important, but 
biofuel mandates would not have happened if not for the power of agriculture in 
both the United States and Europe. 
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Brazil’s problem, then, is that it merely solved the problem politicians talked 
about — it has developed a fuel that reduces greenhouse gas emissions and 
comes from a place that is politically stable and friendly to both the European 
Union and United States. In solving the rhetorical problem without offering a 
political fix, it has placed U.S. environmental activists and EU politicians in a 
difficult position, and has not necessarily won markets. The larger problem…is 
that there is little interest in either the United States or Europe in staring down 
the agricultural interests.706  
 
Thus, while the introduction of compulsory biofuel mandates in potential consumer 
states do create inelastic demand for biofuels, this does not necessarily translate into 
demand for imports thereof, nor does it stimulate the development of an international 
market for them. 
Lula assumed that as countries around the world started to blend ethanol into 
gasoline as a measure to curb greenhouse gas emissions, ethanol would become a 
commodity with an internationally determined price. ‘We have to be more 
responsible,’ he said, ‘because we have to…guarantee the supply of the Brazilian 
market and the international market. Therefore, we have to plant more sugarcane and 
boost the cultivation of ethanol in other countries.’707 Lula’s energy statecraft 
discourse, however, was ‘more talk than walk’. The greater part of biofuel agreements 
Brazil signed with other countries during Lula’s administration have not resulted in 
concrete implementation, according to Paulo César Lima, a Legislative Consultant on 
Energy Matters at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, who also states that Brazil is 
having ‘no success’ in reaching its goals promoting ethanol abroad: ‘Ethanol is far 
from being a commodity. Europe and the United States still maintain their barriers [to 
Brazilian ethanol]. The ethanol scarcity in Brazil [in 2011] was very bad not only for 
its own ethanol industry, but had external repercussions, [suggesting] that Brazil does 
not have [the capacity to produce] enough ethanol even for its domestic market.’708 
Mendes Thame largely agrees with the proposition that the Brazilian government 
under Lula did not succeed in opening new markets for Brazilian ethanol exports: 
‘Lula only talked, called [ethanol] mill owners heroes, brought Bush to Brazil, but did 
not open a single market.’ What few markets have been opened to Brazilian ethanol 
exports so far, he says, have been opened by Brazilian private actors, including the 
Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association’s (UNICA) lobbying efforts in Washington 
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and Brussels, rather than by the federal government. On the other hand, he also 
acknowledges that Lula’s incessant promotion of Brazilian ethanol (even if it was 
mostly through discourse) was a positive thing; that the Foreign Ministry was 
competent in defending the interests of Brazil’s ethanol abroad; and that the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation’s (Embrapa) technology transfer efforts have, in 
fact, resulted in the construction of a few Brazilian ethanol plants in Africa – all of 
which are important steps towards Brazil’s goal of commoditizing ethanol.709 
Despite the many advantages conferred by adopting ethanol fuel, and 
President Lula’s ‘tireless insistence’ that ‘the Brazilian experience demonstrates that 
biofuels will play an increasingly important role’ in a ‘clean and cheap’ global energy 
mix,710 most countries have hesitated to follow Brazil’s lead in committing fully to the 
use of biofuels.711 James Smith attributes this to the unique historical, technical, 
political and environmental context that allowed the Brazilian experience with ethanol 
to flourish: ‘It is difficult to see how Brazil’s recipe for success can easily be 
replicated elsewhere. Biofuel production is intimately entwined in local agro-
ecological contexts, and dependent on local capabilities to shape socio-technical 
systems to unlock the potential of bioenergy.’712 For Leonardo Maugeri, ‘Brazil 
remains an exception’ in managing to provide competitive ethanol due to the 
country’s geographical and climactic conditions, which boasts abundant water for 
crop irrigation and vast tracts of arable land, all of which is ideally suited for 
sugarcane cultivation (‘the crop that is the most productive for bioethanol and that 
consumes the least energy to obtain it’), not to mention cheap labour that reduces the 
cost of producing biofuels. For these reasons, he writes, ‘Brazil is to biofuels as 
Denmark is to wind power, Saudi Arabia is to oil, and the United States is to coal. 
Nature has endowed these countries with specific resources and features that cannot 
be replicated.’713 
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 Ideal environmental conditions aside, moreover, the Brazilian government’s 
strategy to increase the use of biofuels worldwide by transferring technology to third 
countries may also be limited by potential target states’ underdevelopment in terms of 
human infrastructure and governance. ‘Because technology is typically more than just 
a piece of hardware or a set of ideas,’ according to a study by the Worldwatch 
Institute, ‘it is not always easy to replicate another country’s experience with 
technological change and transfer. One of the sources of Brazil’s biofuel success…has 
been the country’s strong foundation of research, education and training, a capacity 
platform that required sustained effort over time to establish and maintain. This 
situation may not be easily found in other countries (particularly developing 
countries)’.714 This is especially true of African countries, which are the main target 
states of Brazil’s energy statecraft because of their climactic conditions suitable for 
biofuel production. Antônio Lício, a former official in Brazil’s Ministry of 
Agriculture,715 states that the problem with investing in biofuel production in Africa is 
not one of opportunity costs between agriculture for energy or food production, but 
the continent’s endemic structural problems and lack of proper governance. 
‘Therefore the [Brazilian] strategy is useless’, he says; ‘only after Africa becomes a 
“governable” continent with minimal investment conditions – not only in ethanol, but 
in many other aspects too – will it be worth pursuing this strategy.’  
A further setback in Brazil’s campaign to promote its experience with biofuels 
abroad was the announcement of enormous oil and gas discoveries in November 
2007, whose quantities are continuously revised upwards as more oil is found in the 
so-called ‘pre-salt’ layer several thousand kilometres under the seabed, which the 
government now estimates could be between 70 and 100 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent.716 The excitement generated by these discoveries among policymakers and 
in public debates is one of the major reasons why the ‘euphoria behind [biofuels] and 
the expansion of the foreign market for Brazilian ethanol, which occurred in 2006, 
declined in 2007 and went cold in 2008.’717 Since the mammoth pre-salt discoveries, 
ethanol and biofuels have significantly lost ground to oil in Brazilian public discourse 
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and particularly in political debates, suggesting a shift in priority in Brazil’s energy 
policy, if not in its energy statecraft, as Larry Rother notes: 
 
Brazil’s own priorities…seem to be changing. Before the discovery in the Sub-
Salt basin in 2007, the government clearly regarded the ethanol program as the 
single most important strategic mechanism in its drive to achieve energy self-
sufficiency. But the size of the recent oil bonanza is so large and so dazzling 
that hopes that ethanol will be a magic bullet, admittedly unrealistic, seem to be 
slipping. Brazil continues to invest in and support the program, but some 
enthusiasm has now been lost, and with it some momentum. … Already, 
Brazil’s discourse in international forums has also changed: Once the most 
ardent proponent of renewable green energy, Brazil now has a vested interest in 
prolonging consumption of fossil fuels (at increasingly elevated prices, of 
course) for as long as possible.718 
 
A popular suggestion to consolidate the country’s abundance of biofuels and fossil 
fuels into a single overarching strategy is to focus Brazil’s sugarcane production to 
supply the domestic ethanol market while the oil and gas from the pre-salt fields 
should be explored exclusively for export.719 Nevertheless, the new thrill over Brazil’s 
recent oil discoveries at the expense of the country’s biofuel euphoria has been 
criticised  by many, among them Fábio Feldmann, the former Environment Secretary 
of the state of São Paulo: ‘Brazil is excited about its pre-salt oil finds but I have 
serious doubts about this…. A country that believes fossil fuels is its transport to the 
future is not in step with a world desperately seeking other sources of energy.’720  
This noticeable shift in priority notwithstanding, President Lula insisted in 
several speeches and interviews during his last couple of years in office that ‘Brazil 
will not renounce its environmental agenda to be merely an oil giant. We want to 
consolidate our condition as a world power in green energy.’721 Despite the discovery 
of sizable oil reserves in deep waters, Brazil ‘will continue advocating the creation of 
a global biofuels market with a large number of producers in the developing world.’722 
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The pre-salt discoveries do not change this, Lula wrote: ‘We will not give up our 
achievement in renewable energy, and will continue to expand it, on behalf of our 
own interests and of our global responsibilities towards the environment.’723 
But even with Lula’s reassurances that Brazil has not changed its energy 
policy priority, the shift has been even more pronounced under his successor, 
President Dilma Rousseff, who, having previously acted as Lula’s Energy Minister 
and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Petrobras while serving as Lula’s Chief 
of Staff, seems much more interested in the pre-salt oilfields, which attracts many 
more votes for her politically, says one observer.724 According to another, while 
ethanol has not necessarily ceased to be a priority under Rousseff, she is definitely not 
as incisive as Lula in its promotion abroad. Moreover, Lula was so incisive not only 
because of his passion (if not obsession) with biofuels, but also because of the 
moment in time in which his ethanol promotion abroad took place: in 2007 to 2008, 
Brazil envisaged producing around 50 billion litres of ethanol as soon as 2012 to 
2014, which would leave around 20 to 25 billion litres of surplus export capacity, 
which did not happen. Then came the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, which 
significantly reduced investments in the Brazilian biofuel sector in the short to 
medium term, although the government will continue to promote biofuel production 
abroad, but with less drive than before.725 
To conclude, this study revisits the classical International Relations theory of 
Hans Morgenthau, who ‘acknowledges that the strategies and tactics that leaders used 
to transform the potential attributes of power into influence are just as important as 
the attributes themselves.’726 Given the fact that the Brazilian government has had 
scant success in opening new export markets for its biofuels, and its even more 
ambitious foreign policy goal of creating an international market where ethanol is 
traded freely as a commodity is a long way from coming to fruition, it would seem 
fair to presume that the strategies pursued under Brazil’s energy statecraft have been 
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ineffective. However, the utility of any given instrument of foreign policy, repeating 
David Baldwin’s quote from the onset of this study, is ‘a function of the situation and 
not a quality intrinsic to the particular technique’727 – a proposition also present in 
Morgenthau’s work, who Ned Lebow mentions when stating that ‘power is not so 
readily transformed into influence because it is heavily context-dependent.’728 Thus, 
the lesson that emerges from this study is that the context in which energy statecraft 
takes place is of fundamental importance to the likelihood of its success or failure, 
and every possible outcome in between. Energy statecraft using oil as an instrument, 
for example, tends only to work during periods of tight supply and exorbitant prices in 
the international petroleum market. The same is true for biofuels, the use of which is 
most attractive when they are economically competitive with oil, during times when 
the latter’s price is high. The case of Brazil’s energy statecraft utilising biofuels as an 
instrument of its foreign policy illustrates this well: 
 
There was a moment between 2006 and mid 2008 that Brazil felt close to 
becoming a world power in the production of biofuel. The country showed off 
its credentials of the largest and most efficient ethanol producer on the planet. It 
seemed to have the solution to help the world face the rising oil prices and 
global warming. Hefty investments were made to expand the sector and several 
bilateral agreements were signed. However, in 2008, the environment changed 
radically. The price of oil collapsed, Brazil announced the discovery of the 
largest oil reserve found in many years and a few of the countries that warmed 
up to the idea of ethanol began to cool down. Ethanol production in Brazil is 
going well and the prospects for the local and foreign market continue 
promising. Maybe the biggest change was in timing. It seems that the world 
power idea will have to be left for a later date.729 
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that in the case of energy statecraft – whether it 
be through the use of oil, natural gas or biofuels – the context in which it takes place 
is much more important in determining its probability of success, than any inherent 
characteristic of energy resources as an instrument of foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
727 Baldwin, D.A., Economic Statecraft, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 123. 
728 Cited in Lebow, Op cit., p. 551. 
729 Análise Energia (Anuário 2009), Op cit., p. 229. 
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